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Message-ID: <20180109213227.GA13282@1wt.eu>
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 22:32:27 +0100
From: Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/6] x86/arch_prctl: add ARCH_GET_NOPTI and
ARCH_SET_NOPTI to enable/disable PTI
On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 10:29:40PM +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 01:26:57PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > 2.Turning off PTI is, in general, a terrible idea. It totally breaks
> > any semblance of a security model on a Meltdown-affected CPU. So I
> > think we should require CAP_SYS_RAWIO *and* that the system is booted
> > with pti=allow_optout or something like that.
>
> Uhh, I like that.
>
> Maybe also taint the kernel ...
Requiring a reboot just to fix a performance problem you've discovered
the hard way is not the most friendly way to help users I'm afraid.
However, definitely +1 on tainting!
Willy
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