linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v6 11/10] x86/retpoline: Avoid return buffer underflows on context switch

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Message-Id: <FC895787-D674-4BC5-B660-DD946EA9825A@amacapital.net>
Date:   Mon, 8 Jan 2018 19:27:43 -0800
From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:     Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>
Cc:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com" <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "peterz@...radead.org" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "riel@...hat.com" <riel@...hat.com>,
        "keescook@...gle.com" <keescook@...gle.com>,
        "gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk" <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
        "pjt@...gle.com" <pjt@...gle.com>,
        "dave.hansen@...el.com" <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        "jikos@...nel.org" <jikos@...nel.org>,
        "gregkh@...ux-foundation.org" <gregkh@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 11/10] x86/retpoline: Avoid return buffer underflows on context switch


> On Jan 8, 2018, at 5:15 PM, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com> wrote:
> 
>> On 09/01/2018 00:58, Linus Torvalds wrote:
>>> On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 4:44 PM, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
>>> Essentially the RSB are hidden registers, and the only way to clear them
>>> is the FILL_RETURN_BUFFER sequence.  I don't see how clearing anything else
>>> would help?
>> Forget theory. Look at practice.
>> 
>> Let's just assume that the attacker can write arbitrarily to the RSB
>> state.  Just accept it.
>> 
>> If you accept that, then you turn the question instead into: are there
>> things we can do to make that useless to an attacker.
>> 
>> And there the point is that even if you control the RSB contents, you
>> need to find something relevant to *put* in the RSB. You need to find
>> the gadget that makes that control of the RSB useful.
> 
> This is where the problem lies.  An attacker with arbitrary control of
> the RSB can redirect speculation arbitrarily.  (And I agree, this is a
> good default assumption to take).
> 
> If SMEP is not active, speculation can go anywhere, including to a user
> controlled gadget which can reload any registers it needs, including
> with immediate constants.

I thought that, even on pre-SMEP hardware, the CPU wouldn't speculatively execute from NX pages.  And PTI marks user memory NX in kernel mode.

> 
> If SMEP is active, the attackers control of speculation is restricted to
> supervisor executable mappings.
> 
> The real question is whether it is worth special casing the SMEP-active
> case given that for the SMEP-inactive case, your only viable option is
> to refill the RSB and discard any potentially poisoned mappings.
> 
> ~Andrew