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Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1801091113210.1766@nanos>
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 11:15:03 +0100 (CET)
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
jmattson@...gle.com, aliguori@...zon.com, thomas.lendacky@....com,
dwmw@...zon.co.uk, bp@...en8.de
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] KVM: x86: expose CVE-2017-5715 ("Spectre variant
2") mitigations to guest
On Mon, 8 Jan 2018, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> This series allows guests to use the MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and
> MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD model specific registers that were added as mitigations
> for CVE-2017-5715.
>
> These are only the KVM specific parts of the fix. It does *not* yet
> include any protection for reading host memory from the guest, because
> that would be done in the same way as the rest of Linux. So there is no
> IBRS *usage* here, no retpolines, no stuffing of the return stack buffer.
> (KVM already includes a fix to clear all registers on vmexit, which is
> enough to block Google Project Zero's PoC exploit).
>
> However, I am including the changes to use IBPB (indirect branch
> predictor barrier) if available. That occurs only when there is a VCPU
> switch on a physical CPU, thus it has a small impact on performance.
>
> The patches are a bit hackish because the relevant cpufeatures have
> not been included yet, and because I wanted to make the patches easier
> to backport to distro kernels if desired, but I would still like to
> have them in 4.16.
>
> Please review.
CC'ing x86@...nel.org on this would have been asked too much, right?
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