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Message-ID: <20180109142506.u3mpwz6snmtitxp6@linux.intel.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 16:25:06 +0200
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To: greg@...ellic.com
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org,
x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
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Haim Cohen <haim.cohen@...el.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@....com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Kan Liang <Kan.liang@...el.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Kyle Huey <me@...ehuey.com>, Len Brown <len.brown@...el.com>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
"open list:FILESYSTEMS (VFS and infrastructure)"
<linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@...nel.org>,
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Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/11] Intel SGX Driver
On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 03:06:43AM -0600, Dr. Greg Wettstein wrote:
> If we are talking about the issues motivating the KPTI work I don't
> have any useful information beyond what is raging through the industry
> right now.
>
> With respect to SGX, the issues giving rise to KPTI are characteristic
> of what this technology is designed to address. The technical 'news'
> sites, which are even more of an abomination then usual with this
> issue, are talking about privileged information such as credentials,
> passwords et.al being leaked by this vulnerability.
>
> Data committed to enclaves are only accessible by the enclave, even
> the kernel, by definition, can't access the memory. Given current
> events that is an arguably useful behavior.
Exactly. You could think adversary using meltdown leak utilizing malware
as having same capabilities as peripheral connected to a bus, which we
can defend against with SGX.
/Jarkko
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