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Message-ID: <f8990c30-3e50-852c-81e3-1be2ae8e7d07@linux.intel.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 13:35:45 -0800
From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
To: "Van De Ven, Arjan" <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>,
"Mallick, Asit K" <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...uxfoundation.org>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [patch RFC 5/5] x86/speculation: Add basic speculation control
code
On 01/10/2018 05:53 AM, Van De Ven, Arjan wrote:
>> ibrs_enabled 2:
>>
>> sets IBRS always in host
>
> this is not secure
>
>> This matches the semantics described here by Tim patchset on lkml:
>>
>> https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=151520606320646
>
> I will talk to Tim, it's not right.
>
>
Yes, there's a misunderstanding on my part. Leaving IBRS=1 all the
time may not provide full protection on all cpu models.
Tim
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