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Message-ID: <20180110122045.GE9706@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 13:20:45 +0100
From: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...uxfoundation.org>, x86@...nel.org,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [patch RFC 5/5] x86/speculation: Add basic speculation control
code
On Wed, Jan 10, 2018 at 12:12:53PM +0000, David Woodhouse wrote:
> IBRS is like a barrier. You must write it between the 'problematic'
> loading of the branch targets, and the kernel code which might be
> affected.
>
> You cannot, on current hardware, merely set it once and forget about
> it. That is not sufficient.
I think you've got it all wrong...
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