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Message-ID: <0575AF4FD06DD142AD198903C74E1CC87A572373@ORSMSX103.amr.corp.intel.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 13:53:42 +0000
From: "Van De Ven, Arjan" <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>
To: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
CC: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>,
"Mallick, Asit K" <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"Linus Torvalds" <torvalds@...uxfoundation.org>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
"Andi Kleen" <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@...nel.org>
Subject: RE: [patch RFC 5/5] x86/speculation: Add basic speculation control
code
> ibrs_enabled 2:
>
> sets IBRS always in host
this is not secure
> This matches the semantics described here by Tim patchset on lkml:
>
> https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=151520606320646
I will talk to Tim, it's not right.
> I can tell in practice it works as I described in all microcodes
> I tested.
have you tested all 80 ?
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