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Message-ID: <20180110144506.mh7kvqnjyk5b4dvx@pd.tnic>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 15:45:06 +0100
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/6] x86/arch_prctl: add ARCH_GET_NOPTI and
ARCH_SET_NOPTI to enable/disable PTI
On Wed, Jan 10, 2018 at 08:25:08AM +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> We could taint the kernel and warn prominently in the syslog when PTI is disabled
> globally on the boot line though, if running on affected CPUs.
>
> Something like:
>
> "x86/intel: Page Table Isolation (PTI) is disabled globally. This allows unprivileged, untrusted code to exploit the Meltdown CPU bug to read kernel data."
>
I think we should warn in the per-mm disabling case too. Not the same
text but a similar blurb about the trusted process becoming a high-value
target.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
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