[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1801111052310.11852@cbobk.fhfr.pm>
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 10:54:55 +0100 (CET)
From: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Alan Cox <alan.cox@...el.com>,
Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Solomon Peachy <pizza@...ftnet.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@...glemail.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
"James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-scsi <linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@....inr.ac.ru>,
Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@...el.com>,
"Linux-media@...r.kernel.org" <linux-media@...r.kernel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.com>,
Eduardo Valentin <edubezval@...il.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, qla2xxx-upstream@...gic.com,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@...nel.org>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
Kalle Valo <kvalo@...eaurora.org>,
Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>,
"Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@...cle.com>,
Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
linux-wireless@...r.kernel.org,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@...asonboard.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative
execution
On Tue, 9 Jan 2018, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 11:44:05AM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> > On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 11:34 AM, Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org> wrote:
> > > On Fri, 5 Jan 2018, Dan Williams wrote:
> > >
> > > [ ... snip ... ]
> > >> Andi Kleen (1):
> > >> x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok
> > >>
> > >> Dan Williams (13):
> > >> x86: implement nospec_barrier()
> > >> [media] uvcvideo: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
> > >> carl9170: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
> > >> p54: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
> > >> qla2xxx: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
> > >> cw1200: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
> > >> Thermal/int340x: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
> > >> ipv6: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
> > >> ipv4: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
> > >> vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
> > >> net: mpls: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
> > >> udf: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
> > >> userns: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
> > >>
> > >> Mark Rutland (4):
> > >> asm-generic/barrier: add generic nospec helpers
> > >> Documentation: document nospec helpers
> > >> arm64: implement nospec_ptr()
> > >> arm: implement nospec_ptr()
> > >
> > > So considering the recent publication of [1], how come we all of a sudden
> > > don't need the barriers in ___bpf_prog_run(), namely for LD_IMM_DW and
> > > LDX_MEM_##SIZEOP, and something comparable for eBPF JIT?
> > >
> > > Is this going to be handled in eBPF in some other way?
> > >
> > > Without that in place, and considering Jann Horn's paper, it would seem
> > > like PTI doesn't really lock it down fully, right?
> >
> > Here is the latest (v3) bpf fix:
> >
> > https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/856645/
> >
> > I currently have v2 on my 'nospec' branch and will move that to v3 for
> > the next update, unless it goes upstream before then.
Daniel, I guess you're planning to send this still for 4.15?
> That patch seems specific to CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL. Is the bpf() syscall
> the only attack vector? Or are there other ways to run bpf programs
> that we should be worried about?
Seems like Alexei is probably the only person in the whole universe who
isn't CCed here ... let's fix that.
Thanks,
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
Powered by blists - more mailing lists