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Message-ID: <20180111122607.GZ6176@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 13:26:07 +0100
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, Paul Turner <pjt@...gle.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...ux-foundation.org>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, tglx@...utronix.de,
Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>, gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk,
x86@...nel.org, bp@...en8.de, rga@...zon.de,
thomas.lendacky@....com, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2.1] x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit
On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 11:37:18AM +0000, David Woodhouse wrote:
> In accordance with the Intel and AMD documentation, we need to overwrite
> all entries in the RSB on exiting a guest, to prevent malicious branch
> target predictions from affecting the host kernel. This is needed both
> for retpoline and for IBRS.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
Tested this on my AMD Interlagos, seems to work.
Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@...radead.org>
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