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Message-Id: <1515707194-20531-13-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 21:46:34 +0000
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
To: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@...gle.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...ux-foundation.org>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, tglx@...utronix.de,
Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>, gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk,
x86@...nel.org, thomas.lendacky@....com,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 12/12] x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit
In accordance with the Intel and AMD documentation, we need to overwrite
all entries in the RSB on exiting a guest, to prevent malicious branch
target predictions from affecting the host kernel. This is needed both
for retpoline and for IBRS.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@...radead.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 4 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 4 ++
3 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index ea034fa..475ab0c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -7,6 +7,43 @@
#include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
+/*
+ * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
+ *
+ * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
+ * infinite 'pause; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
+ *
+ * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
+ * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
+ * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
+ * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
+ * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
+ *
+ * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and
+ * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that
+ * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there.
+ */
+
+#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
+#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */
+
+#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp, uniq) \
+ mov $(nr/2), reg; \
+.Ldo_call1_ ## uniq: \
+ call .Ldo_call2_ ## uniq; \
+.Ltrap1_ ## uniq: \
+ pause; \
+ jmp .Ltrap1_ ## uniq; \
+.Ldo_call2_ ## uniq: \
+ call .Ldo_loop_ ## uniq; \
+.Ltrap2_ ## uniq: \
+ pause; \
+ jmp .Ltrap2_ ## uniq; \
+.Ldo_loop_ ## uniq: \
+ dec reg; \
+ jnz .Ldo_call1_ ## uniq; \
+ add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp;
+
#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
/*
@@ -76,6 +113,20 @@
#endif
.endm
+ /*
+ * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
+ * monstrosity above, manually.
+ */
+.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
+ ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \
+ __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP,\@)) \
+ \ftr
+.Lskip_rsb_\@:
+#endif
+.endm
+
#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#define ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \
@@ -119,7 +170,7 @@
X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
-#else /* No retpoline */
+#else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */
# define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n"
# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
#endif
@@ -134,5 +185,25 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
};
+/*
+ * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
+ * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
+ * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
+ * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided.
+ */
+static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ unsigned long loops = RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS / 2;
+
+ asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
+ ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f",
+ __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1, __LINE__)),
+ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
+ "910:"
+ : "=&r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
+ : "r" (loops) : "memory" );
+#endif
+}
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 0e68f0b..2744b973 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
#include <asm/kvm_para.h>
#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <asm/virtext.h>
#include "trace.h"
@@ -4985,6 +4986,9 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
#endif
);
+ /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
+ vmexit_fill_RSB();
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base);
#else
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 62ee436..d1e25db 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include "trace.h"
#include "pmu.h"
@@ -9403,6 +9404,9 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
#endif
);
+ /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
+ vmexit_fill_RSB();
+
/* MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is zeroed on vmexit. Restore it if needed */
if (debugctlmsr)
update_debugctlmsr(debugctlmsr);
--
2.7.4
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