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Message-ID: <192215ffd63049b8b6e7f982675ddb4d@AcuMS.aculab.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 15:03:23 +0000
From: David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>
To: 'Willy Tarreau' <w@....eu>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"Brian Gerst" <brgerst@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@...nel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: RE: [RFC PATCH v2 2/6] x86/arch_prctl: add ARCH_GET_NOPTI and
ARCH_SET_NOPTI to enable/disable PTI
From: Willy Tarreau
> Sent: 09 January 2018 12:56
>
> This allows to report the current state of the PTI protection and to
> enable or disable it for the current process. The state change is only
> allowed if the mm is not shared (no threads have been created yet).
>
> Setting the flag to disable the protection is subject to CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
> However it is possible to re-enable the protection without this privilege.
While a process with CAP_SYS_RAWIO can easily access kernel memory so
get little extra protection from PTI, you probably want to be able
to disable PTI without giving a process CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
No point leaving the door wide open.
If you are trying to find the size of the performance hit you also
need to be able to disable (and re-enable) PTI for all the current and
future threads of a given process.
David
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