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Message-Id: <20180112175507.31750-1-andi@firstfloor.org>
Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 09:55:07 -0800
From: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>
To: tglx@...utronix.de
Cc: dwmw@...zon.co.uk, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org,
arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com, peterz@...radead.org,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, jeyu@...nel.org
Subject: [PATCH] retpoline/module: Taint kernel for missing retpoline in module
From: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
There's a risk that a kernel that has full retpoline mitigations
becomes vulnerable when a module gets loaded that hasn't been
compiled with the right compiler or the right option.
We cannot fix it, but should at least warn the user when that
happens.
Add a flag to each module if it has been compiled with RETPOLINE
When the a module hasn't been compiled with a retpoline
aware compiler, print a warning and set a taint flag.
For modules it is checked at compile time, however it cannot
check assembler or other non compiled objects used in the module link.
Due to lack of better letter it uses taint option 'Z'
We only set the taint flag for incorrectly compiled modules
now, not for the main kernel, which already has other
report mechanisms.
Also make sure to report vulnerable for spectre if such a module
has been loaded.
v2: Change warning message
v3: Port to latest tree
Cc: jeyu@...nel.org
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst | 3 +++
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 4 ++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 ++++++++++++
include/linux/kernel.h | 3 ++-
kernel/module.c | 11 ++++++++++-
kernel/panic.c | 2 ++
scripts/mod/modpost.c | 9 +++++++++
7 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst
index 1df03b5cb02f..adf0cb0dcf9b 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst
@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ characters, each representing a particular tainted value.
16) ``K`` if the kernel has been live patched.
+ 17) ``Z`` if a module hasn't been compiled with
+ a retpoline aware compiler and may be vulnerable to data leaks.
+
The primary reason for the **'Tainted: '** string is to tell kernel
debuggers if this is a clean kernel or if anything unusual has
occurred. Tainting is permanent: even if an offending module is
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 9c18da64daa9..ea707c91bd8c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -970,4 +970,8 @@ bool xen_set_default_idle(void);
void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy);
void df_debug(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
+
+void disable_retpoline(void);
+bool retpoline_enabled(void);
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index e4dc26185aa7..9064b20473a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -93,6 +93,18 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+/* A module has been loaded. Disable reporting that we're good. */
+void disable_retpoline(void)
+{
+ spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+ pr_err("system may be vunerable to spectre\n");
+}
+
+bool retpoline_enabled(void)
+{
+ return spectre_v2_enabled != SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+}
+
static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason)
{
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
index 4b484ab9e163..b0e0cbf5ee9a 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
@@ -549,7 +549,8 @@ extern enum system_states {
#define TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE 13
#define TAINT_SOFTLOCKUP 14
#define TAINT_LIVEPATCH 15
-#define TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT 16
+#define TAINT_NO_RETPOLINE 16
+#define TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT 17
struct taint_flag {
char c_true; /* character printed when tainted */
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index de66ec825992..f114eee110d4 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -3020,7 +3020,16 @@ static int check_modinfo(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info, int flags)
mod->name);
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_OOT_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
}
-
+#ifdef RETPOLINE
+ if (retpoline_enabled() && !get_modinfo(info, "retpoline")) {
+ if (!test_taint(TAINT_NO_RETPOLINE)) {
+ pr_warn("%s: loading module not compiled with retpoline compiler.\n",
+ mod->name);
+ }
+ add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_NO_RETPOLINE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+ disable_retpoline();
+ }
+#endif
if (get_modinfo(info, "staging")) {
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_CRAP, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
pr_warn("%s: module is from the staging directory, the quality "
diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
index bdd18afa19a4..f8629eb1849d 100644
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -322,6 +322,7 @@ const struct taint_flag taint_flags[TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT] = {
{ 'E', ' ', true }, /* TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE */
{ 'L', ' ', false }, /* TAINT_SOFTLOCKUP */
{ 'K', ' ', true }, /* TAINT_LIVEPATCH */
+ { 'Z', ' ', true }, /* TAINT_NO_RETPOLINE */
};
/**
@@ -343,6 +344,7 @@ const struct taint_flag taint_flags[TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT] = {
* 'E' - Unsigned module has been loaded.
* 'L' - A soft lockup has previously occurred.
* 'K' - Kernel has been live patched.
+ * 'Z' - Module with no retpoline has been loaded
*
* The string is overwritten by the next call to print_tainted().
*/
diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
index 98314b400a95..54deaa1066cf 100644
--- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c
+++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
@@ -2165,6 +2165,14 @@ static void add_intree_flag(struct buffer *b, int is_intree)
buf_printf(b, "\nMODULE_INFO(intree, \"Y\");\n");
}
+/* Cannot check for assembler */
+static void add_retpoline(struct buffer *b)
+{
+ buf_printf(b, "\n#ifdef RETPOLINE\n");
+ buf_printf(b, "MODULE_INFO(retpoline, \"Y\");\n");
+ buf_printf(b, "#endif\n");
+}
+
static void add_staging_flag(struct buffer *b, const char *name)
{
static const char *staging_dir = "drivers/staging";
@@ -2506,6 +2514,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
err |= check_modname_len(mod);
add_header(&buf, mod);
add_intree_flag(&buf, !external_module);
+ add_retpoline(&buf);
add_staging_flag(&buf, mod->name);
err |= add_versions(&buf, mod);
add_depends(&buf, mod, modules);
--
2.14.3
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