linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 07/19] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM

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Date:   Fri, 12 Jan 2018 12:58:15 -0600
From:   Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
To:     Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Cc:     Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 07/19] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and
 ASM_IFENCE

On Fri, Jan 12, 2018 at 10:21:43AM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> > That just sounds wrong.  What if the speculation starts *after* the
> > access_ok() check?  Then the barrier has no purpose.
> >
> > Most access_ok/get_user/copy_from_user calls are like this:
> >
> >   if (copy_from_user(...uptr..))  /* or access_ok() or get_user() */
> >         return -EFAULT;
> >
> > So in other words, the usercopy function is called *before* the branch.
> >
> > But to halt speculation, the lfence needs to come *after* the branch.
> > So putting lfences *before* the branch doesn't solve anything.
> >
> > So what am I missing?
> 
> We're trying to prevent a pointer under user control from being
> de-referenced inside the kernel, before we know it has been limited to
> something safe. In the following sequence the branch we are worried
> about speculating is the privilege check:
> 
> if (access_ok(uptr))  /* <--- Privelege Check */
>     if (copy_from_user_(uptr))
> 
> The cpu can speculatively skip that access_ok() check and cause a read
> of kernel memory.

Converting your example code to assembly:

	call	access_ok # no speculation which started before this point is allowed to continue past this point
	test	%rax, %rax
	jne	error_path
dereference_uptr:
	(do nefarious things with the user pointer)

error_path:
	mov -EINVAL, %rax
	ret

So the CPU is still free to speculately execute the dereference_uptr
block because the lfence was before the 'jne error_path' branch.

-- 
Josh