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Message-ID: <20180112191700.67eziuwklmbk5mqn@two.firstfloor.org>
Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 11:17:01 -0800
From: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>, tglx@...utronix.de,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com,
peterz@...radead.org, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
jeyu@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] retpoline/module: Taint kernel for missing retpoline in
module
> It doesn't make a lot of sense to have a taint flag for a *partial*
> retpoline, but not in the case that we have *no* mitigation in place.
The only thing that makes sense checking for is the C compiler
option. Everything else which needs manual changes we cannot check.
So even if we add more things I don't think this particular
check will change.
> So maybe we should drop the taint part, and just make the kernel report
> that it is (partially) vulnerable to Spectre V2, just as in the
> CONFIG_RETPOLINE && !RETPOLINE case?
Ok I can drop the taint part. The reporting is already implemented.
-Andi
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