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Message-Id: <1515720739-43819-6-git-send-email-ashok.raj@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 17:32:19 -0800
From: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@...el.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] x86/feature: Detect the x86 feature Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier
cpuid ax=0x7, return rdx bit 26 to indicate presence of both
IA32_SPEC_CTRL(MSR 0x48) and IA32_PRED_CMD(MSR 0x49)
BIT0: Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier
When this MSR is written with IBPB=1 it ensures that earlier code's behavior
doesn't control later indirect branch predictions.
Note this MSR is only writable and does not carry any state. Its a barrier
so the code should perform a wrmsr when the barrier is needed.
Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 3 +++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c | 7 +++++++
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 10 ++++++++++
5 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 624b58e..52f37fc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_MBA ( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+19) /* Speculation Control */
#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_IBRS ( 7*32+20) /* Speculation Control, use IBRS */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PRED_CMD ( 7*32+21) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
/* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
#define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 3e1cb18..1888e19 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@
#define SPEC_CTRL_DISABLE_IBRS (0 << 0)
#define SPEC_CTRL_ENABLE_IBRS (1 << 0)
+#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049
+#define FEATURE_SET_IBPB (1<<0)
+
#define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0 0x000000c1
#define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR1 0x000000c2
#define MSR_FSB_FREQ 0x000000cd
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c
index 02fc630..6cfec19 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -15,6 +15,13 @@ void spec_ctrl_scan_feature(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (!c->cpu_index)
static_branch_enable(&spec_ctrl_dynamic_ibrs);
}
+ /*
+ * For Intel CPU's this MSR is shared the same cpuid
+ * enumeration. When MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL is present
+ * MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL is also available
+ * TBD: AMD might have a separate enumeration for each.
+ */
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_PRED_CMD);
}
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 7c14471a..36924c9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs {
{ .index = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, .always = true },
#endif
{ .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, .always = true },
+ { .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, .always = false },
{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, .always = false },
{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, .always = false },
{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, .always = false },
@@ -531,6 +532,7 @@ struct svm_cpu_data {
struct kvm_ldttss_desc *tss_desc;
struct page *save_area;
+ struct vmcb *current_vmcb;
};
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data *, svm_data);
@@ -923,6 +925,8 @@ static void svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(u32 *msrpm)
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
set_msr_interception(msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1);
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PRED_CMD))
+ set_msr_interception(msrpm, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, 1, 1);
}
static void add_msr_offset(u32 offset)
@@ -1711,11 +1715,18 @@ static void svm_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
__free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->nested.msrpm), MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER);
kvm_vcpu_uninit(vcpu);
kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, svm);
+ /*
+ * The VMCB could be recycled, causing a false negative in svm_vcpu_load;
+ * block speculative execution.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PRED_CMD))
+ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
}
static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
int i;
if (unlikely(cpu != vcpu->cpu)) {
@@ -1744,6 +1755,11 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
wrmsrl(MSR_TSC_AUX, svm->tsc_aux);
+ if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) {
+ sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PRED_CMD))
+ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
+ }
avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 1913896..caeb9ff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -2280,6 +2280,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) {
per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
+ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
}
if (!already_loaded) {
@@ -3837,6 +3839,12 @@ static void free_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
free_vmcs(loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
loaded_vmcs->vmcs = NULL;
WARN_ON(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs != NULL);
+ /*
+ * The VMCS could be recycled, causing a false negative in vmx_vcpu_load
+ * block speculative execution.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
+ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
}
static void free_kvm_area(void)
@@ -6804,6 +6812,8 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
*/
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, false);
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PRED_CMD))
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, false);
vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_FS_BASE, false);
vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_GS_BASE, false);
--
2.7.4
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