linux-kernel - Re: [RFC] x86: Avoid CR3 load on compatibility mode with PTI

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Message-Id: <BEEC02AA-4AAA-43A3-81BD-0241E7C2F48E@amacapital.net>
Date:   Mon, 15 Jan 2018 10:04:50 -0800
From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:     Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>
Cc:     LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
        "w@....eu" <w@....eu>
Subject: Re: [RFC] x86: Avoid CR3 load on compatibility mode with PTI



> On Jan 15, 2018, at 9:50 AM, Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com> wrote:
> 
> Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
> 
>> 
>> 
>>> On Jan 15, 2018, at 9:42 AM, Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
>>> 
>>>>> On Jan 14, 2018, at 12:13 PM, Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> Currently, when page-table isolation is on to prevent the Meltdown bug
>>>>> (CVE-2017-5754), CR3 is always loaded on system-call and interrupt.
>>>>> 
>>>>> However, it appears that this is an unnecessary measure when programs
>>>>> run in compatibility mode. In this mode only 32-bit registers are
>>>>> available, which means that there *should* be no way for the CPU to
>>>>> access, even speculatively, memory that belongs to the kernel, which
>>>>> sits in high addresses.
>>>> 
>>>> You're assuming that TIF_IA32 prevents the execution of 64-bit code.  It doesn't.
>>>> 
>>>> I've occasionally considered adding an opt-in hardening mechanism to enforce 32-bit or 64-bit execution, but we don't have this now.
>>> 
>>> I noticed it doesn’t. I thought the removing/restoring the __USER_CS
>>> descriptor on context switch, based on TIF_IA32, would be enough.
>>> modify_ldt() always keeps the descriptor l-bit clear. I will review the
>>> other GDT descriptors, and if needed, create two GDTs. Let me know if I
>>> missed anything else.
>> 
>> There world need to be some opt-in control, I think, for CRIU if nothing else.
>> 
>> Also, on Xen PV, it's a complete nonstarter.  We don't have enough control over the GDT unless someone knows otherwise.  But there's no PTI on Xen PV either.
>> 
>>>> Anything like this would also need to spend on SMEP, I think -- the pseudo-SMEP granted by PTI is too valuable to give up on old boxes, I think.
>>> 
>>> If SMEP is not supported, compatibility mode would still require page-table
>>> isolation.
>>> 
>>> Thanks for the feedback. I still look for an ack for the basic idea of
>>> disabling page-table isolation on compatibility mode.
>> 
>> I'm still not really convinced this is worth it.  It will send a bad message and get people to run critical stuff compiled for 32-bit, which has its own downsides.
> 
> I can handle #GP gracefully if __USER_CS is loaded so PTI would be required
> again. Doing so would eliminate the need for an opt-in, and preserve the
> current semantics.
> 

Not if someone used LAR, a la the sigreturn_32 test.  Not necessarily a showstopper, though.

You'd also have to figure out how to do PTI per-thread, which Linus doesn't like.  See Willy's PTI opt-out thread.