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Message-ID: <20180116020943.GC6607@jagdpanzerIV>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 11:09:43 +0900
From: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@...il.com>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
Cc: Dan Aloni <dan@...nelim.com>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCHv2 5/7] printk: allow kmsg to be encrypted using public
key encryption
On (01/15/18 07:52), Steven Rostedt wrote:
[..]
> I'm very skeptical that such an approach has much benefit. From the
> email referenced above:
agreed. dmesg can be SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT.
so the patch is *probably* aiming the systems in which anyone can read
dmesg, but we kinda don't want that to happen. may be I'm missing the
point.
> > I am not sure that desktop and power users would like to have their
> > kernel message encrypted, but there are scenarios such as in mobile
> > devices, where only the developers, makers of devices, may actually
> > benefit from access to kernel prints messages, and the users may be
> > more protected from exploits.
>
> Do you have any backing from makers of such devices? I'd like to hear
> from Google's Android team or whoever that would turn this feature on.
>
> I would be hard pressed to add such a feature if it's never used.
right.
-ss
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