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Message-ID: <CA+55aFw-RNg4diZ0RCVkEYAANDp22YDskNOR913vKQEBdarJSw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2018 10:18:53 -0800
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr:
sanitize speculative array de-references
On Fri, Jan 19, 2018 at 2:20 AM, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com> wrote:
>> + \
>> + __u._ptr = _arr + (_i & _mask); \
>> + __u._bit &= _mask; \
>
> AFAICS, if `idx` is out of bounds, you first zero out the index
> (`_i & _mask`) and then immediately afterwards zero out
> the whole pointer (`_u._bit &= _mask`).
> Is there a reason for the `_i & _mask`, and if so, can you
> add a comment explaining that?
I think that's just leftovers from my original (untested) thing that
also did the access itself. So that __u._bit masking wasn't masking
the pointer, it was masking the value that was *read* from the
pointer, so that you could know that an invalid access returned
0/NULL, not just the first value in the array.
Linus
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