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Message-Id: <20180122084001.738154663@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon, 22 Jan 2018 09:45:53 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Salah Coronya <salahx@...oo.com>,
        Milan Broz <gmazyland@...il.com>,
        Mike Snitzer <snitzer@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 73/89] dm crypt: fix crash by adding missing check for auth key size

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Milan Broz <gmazyland@...il.com>

commit 27c7003697fc2c78f965984aa224ef26cd6b2949 upstream.

If dm-crypt uses authenticated mode with separate MAC, there are two
concatenated part of the key structure - key(s) for encryption and
authentication key.

Add a missing check for authenticated key length.  If this key length is
smaller than actually provided key, dm-crypt now properly fails instead
of crashing.

Fixes: ef43aa3806 ("dm crypt: add cryptographic data integrity protection (authenticated encryption)")
Reported-by: Salah Coronya <salahx@...oo.com>
Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -1954,10 +1954,15 @@ static int crypt_setkey(struct crypt_con
 	/* Ignore extra keys (which are used for IV etc) */
 	subkey_size = crypt_subkey_size(cc);
 
-	if (crypt_integrity_hmac(cc))
+	if (crypt_integrity_hmac(cc)) {
+		if (subkey_size < cc->key_mac_size)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
 		crypt_copy_authenckey(cc->authenc_key, cc->key,
 				      subkey_size - cc->key_mac_size,
 				      cc->key_mac_size);
+	}
+
 	for (i = 0; i < cc->tfms_count; i++) {
 		if (crypt_integrity_hmac(cc))
 			r = crypto_aead_setkey(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[i],


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