linux-kernel - Re: [RFC 09/10] x86/enter: Create macros to restrict/unrestrict Indirect Branch Speculation

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Message-ID: <20180123092756.iznzepwnolsviof7@gmail.com>
Date:   Tue, 23 Jan 2018 10:27:56 +0100
From:   Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
To:     David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>
Cc:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@...zon.de>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
        Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>,
        Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@....com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@...el.com>,
        Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        KVM list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
        Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC 09/10] x86/enter: Create macros to restrict/unrestrict
 Indirect Branch Speculation


* Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org> wrote:

> Is there a testcase for the SkyLake 16-deep-call-stack problem that I could run? 
> Is there a description of the exact speculative execution vulnerability that has 
> to be addressed to begin with?

Ok, so for now I'm assuming that this is the 16 entries return-stack-buffer 
underflow condition where SkyLake falls back to the branch predictor (while other 
CPUs wrap the buffer).

> If this approach is workable I'd much prefer it to any MSR writes in the syscall 
> entry path not just because it's fast enough in practice to not be turned off by 
> everyone, but also because everyone would agree that per function call overhead 
> needs to go away on new CPUs. Both deployment and backporting is also _much_ more 
> flexible, simpler, faster and more complete than microcode/firmware or compiler 
> based solutions.
> 
> Assuming the vulnerability can be addressed via this route that is, which is a big 
> assumption!

So I talked this over with PeterZ, and I think it's all doable:

 - the CALL __fentry__ callbacks maintain the depth tracking (on the kernel 
   stack, fast to access), and issue an "RSB-stuffing sequence" when depth reaches
   16 entries.

 - "the RSB-stuffing sequence" is a return trampoline that pushes a CALL on the 
   stack which is executed on the RET.

 - All asynchronous contexts (IRQs, NMIs, etc.) stuff the RSB before IRET. (The 
   tracking could probably made IRQ and maybe even NMI safe, but the worst-case 
   nesting scenarios make my head ache.)

I.e. IBRS can be mostly replaced with a kernel based solution that is better than 
IBRS and which does not negatively impact any other non-SkyLake CPUs or general 
code quality.

I.e. a full upstream Spectre solution.

Thanks,

	Ingo