linux-kernel - Re: [RFC] UBIFS authentication

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Message-Id: <AF303146-8E37-48B2-B9DF-8C3193138EFA@sigma-star.at>
Date:   Thu, 25 Jan 2018 09:49:32 +0100
From:   David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>
To:     linux-fscrypt@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-mtd@...ts.infradead.org
Cc:     Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        kernel@...gutronix.de
Subject: Re: [RFC] UBIFS authentication

Hi!

> On 17.01.2018, at 16:19, David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at> wrote:
> 
> Hi everybody!
> 
> Richard and I have been working on extending UBIFS' security features and came
> up with the following concept to add full file contents and metadata authentication.
> 
> For block devices like eMMCs dm-crypt and dm-verity/dm-integrity can be used to
> get full data confidentiality and authenticity, but for raw flash or more
> specifically UBIFS, existing options are not ideal:
> 
> One option is to use eCryptfs with some out-of-tree patches that add AEAD cipher
> (AES-GCM) support, but does not look like there was much progress recently [1].
> 
> Another option is to use IMA/EVM as described by Marc Kleine-Budde in his
> ELCE 2016 talk [2], but this just protects the file payload and some attributes
> and not the full filesystem data structures.
> 
> A short overview of existing options is also given here [3].
> 
> Due to the design of UBIFS it is actually a bit easier than on other filesystems
> to authenticate its data structures and ensure consistency of on-flash data.
> 
> I've attached the whitepaper below and also published it here [4].
> 
> Comments are welcome. :)

*ping*

Did anybody get a chance to look at this yet, or is everybody still busy with Meltdown and Spectre? ;D

Thanks,
David