Message-ID: <7c0b0879-3448-43e4-8380-4708fc787113@default>
Date:   Thu, 25 Jan 2018 18:11:42 -0800 (PST)
From:   Liran Alon <liran.alon@...cle.com>
To:     <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc:     <labbott@...hat.com>, <luto@...nel.org>,
        <Janakarajan.Natarajan@....com>, <bp@...e.de>,
        <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
        <rkrcmar@...hat.com>, <karahmed@...zon.de>, <hpa@...or.com>,
        <jun.nakajima@...el.com>, <mingo@...hat.com>, <x86@...nel.org>,
        <ashok.raj@...el.com>, <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>,
        <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>, <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        <ak@...ux.intel.com>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        <dwmw2@...radead.org>, <peterz@...radead.org>,
        <tglx@...utronix.de>, <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        <mhiramat@...nel.org>, <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
        <thomas.lendacky@....com>, <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        <joro@...tes.org>, <aarcange@...hat.com>, <kvm@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC 09/10] x86/enter: Create macros to restrict/unrestrict
 Indirect Branch Speculation


----- dave.hansen@...el.com wrote:

> On 01/23/2018 03:13 AM, Liran Alon wrote:
> > Therefore, breaking KASLR. In order to handle this, every exit from
> > kernel-mode to user-mode should stuff RSB. In addition, this
> stuffing
> > of RSB may need to be done from a fixed address to avoid leaking
> the
> > address of the RSB stuffing itself.
> 
> With PTI alone in place, I don't see how userspace could do anything
> with this information.  Even if userspace started to speculate to a
> kernel address, there is nothing at the kernel address to execute: no
> TLB entry, no PTE to load, nothing.
> 
> You probably have a valid point about host->guest, though.

I see it differently.

It is true that attacker cannot speculate to a kernel-address, but it doesn't mean it cannot use the leaked kernel-address together with another unrelated vulnerability to build a reliable exploit.

Security is built in layers.
The purpose of KASLR is to break the reliablity of an exploit which relies on vulnerability primitives such as: memory-corruption of a kernel-address, hijack kernel control-flow to a kernel-address or even just read a kernel-address. In modern exploitation, it is common to chain multiple different vulnerabilities in order to build a reliable exploit. Therefore, leaking a kernel-address could be exactly the missing primitive to complete a vulnerability-chain of a reliable exploit.

I don't see a big difference between leaking a kernel-address from user-mode vs. leaking a hypervisor-address from guest. They are both useful just as a primitive which is part of an exploit chain.

One could argue though, that currently KASLR is fundementally broken and therefore should not be considered a security boundary anymore. This argument could be legit as there were some well-known techniques that could break KASLR before KPTI patch-set was introduced (e.g. Timing memory accesses to kernel-addresses and messure reliably by leveraging TSX). Another well-known argument against KASLR is that it is a non-deterministic mitigation which some argue is not good enough. However, I think that if we decide KASLR is not a security boundary anymore, it should be made loud and clear.

In general, I think there are some info-leak vulnerabilities in our current mitigation plan which doesn't seem to be addressed. I will be glad if we could address them clearly. These are all the open issues as I see them:

1) Because IBRS doesn't restrict low prediction-mode code from using BTB of high prediction-mode code, It is possible to info-leak addresses from high prediction-mode code to low prediciton-mode code.
This is the KASLR breakage discussed above. Again, could be ignored if we discard KASLR as a security boundary.

2) Both IBRS & retpoline don't prevent use of BHB of high prediction-mode code from being used by low prediction-mode code. Therefore, low prediction-mode code could deduce the conditional branches taken by high prediction-mode code.

3) Similar leak to (1) exists from the fact that RSB entries of high prediction-mode code could be leaked by low prediction-mode code which may reveal kernel-addresses. Again, we could decide that this isn't a security boundary. An alternative to solve this could be to just stuff RSB from a fixed address between prediction-mode transitions.

-Liran

P.S:
It seems to me that all these issues could be resolved completely at hardware in future CPUs if BTB/BHB/RSB entries were tagged with prediction-mode (or similar metadata). It will be nice if Intel/AMD could share if that is the planned long-term solution instead of IBRS-all-the-time.

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