linux-kernel - [PATCH 2/2] x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction

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Message-ID: <20180126200813.cignvfovk2dhlzbh@pd.tnic>
Date:   Fri, 26 Jan 2018 21:08:13 +0100
From:   Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To:     David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>
Cc:     X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com, pjt@...gle.com, jikos@...nel.org,
        gregkh@...ux-foundation.org, dave.hansen@...el.com,
        riel@...hat.com, luto@...capital.net,
        torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, ak@...ux.intel.com,
        keescook@...gle.com, peterz@...radead.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] x86/speculation: Simplify
 indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()

Make it all a function which does the WRMSR instead of having a hairy
inline asm.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h   |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 13 ++++---------
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h     |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           |  7 +++++++
 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 6c6d862d66a1..6c033f6adc24 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_MBA			( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
 #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW		( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */
 
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB		( 7*32+21) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled*/
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB		( 7*32+21) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
 
 /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW		( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 4f88e1b2599f..71ae2dd65259 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -183,15 +183,10 @@ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
 
 static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
 {
-	asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("",
-				 "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t"
-				 "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t"
-				 "movl $0, %%edx\n\t"
-				 "wrmsr",
-				 X86_FEATURE_IBPB)
-		     : : [msr] "i" (MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD),
-			 [val] "i" (PRED_CMD_IBPB)
-		     : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory");
+	alternative_input("",
+			 "call __ibp_barrier",
+			 X86_FEATURE_IBPB,
+			 ASM_NO_INPUT_CLOBBER("eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory"));
 }
 
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index d3a67fba200a..4d372f1cea5a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -971,4 +971,8 @@ bool xen_set_default_idle(void);
 
 void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy);
 void df_debug(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+void __ibp_barrier(void);
+#endif
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index be068aea6bda..448410fcffcf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -304,3 +304,10 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
 		       spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : "");
 }
 #endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+void __ibp_barrier(void)
+{
+	__wrmsr(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB, 0);
+}
+#endif
-- 
2.13.0


-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

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