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Message-ID: <4DCAF18F-C86A-4CBC-A9CC-CC01BF63313F@oracle.com>
Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 15:21:01 -0500
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>
To: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@...zon.de>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
CC: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@...el.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>, daniel.kiper@...cle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: vmx: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
On January 28, 2018 2:29:10 PM EST, KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@...zon.de> wrote:
>Add direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests. This is needed for
>guests
>that will only mitigate Spectre V2 through IBRS+IBPB and will not be
>using a
>retpoline+IBPB based approach.
>
>To avoid the overhead of atomically saving and restoring the
>MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
>for guests that do not actually use the MSR, only add_atomic_switch_msr
>when a
>non-zero is written to it.
We tried this and found that it was about 3% slower that doing the old way of rdmsr and wrmsr.
But that was also with the host doing IBRS as well.
On what type of hardware did you run this?
Ccing Daniel.
>
>Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>
>Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>
>Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
>Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
>Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
>Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
>Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
>Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
>Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
>Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@...el.com>
>Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
>Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
>Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
>Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
>Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@...zon.de>
>Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>
>---
> arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 4 +++-
> arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 1 +
>arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 63
>++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
>index 0099e10..dc78095 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
>@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ u64 kvm_supported_xcr0(void)
> /* These are scattered features in cpufeatures.h. */
> #define KVM_CPUID_BIT_AVX512_4VNNIW 2
> #define KVM_CPUID_BIT_AVX512_4FMAPS 3
>+#define KVM_CPUID_BIT_SPEC_CTRL 26
> #define KF(x) bit(KVM_CPUID_BIT_##x)
>
> int kvm_update_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>@@ -392,7 +393,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct
>kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
>
> /* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
> const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
>- KF(AVX512_4VNNIW) | KF(AVX512_4FMAPS);
>+ KF(AVX512_4VNNIW) | KF(AVX512_4FMAPS) | \
>+ (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ? KF(SPEC_CTRL) : 0);
>
> /* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */
> get_cpu();
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
>index cdc70a3..dcfe227 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
>@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = {
> [CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = {0x8000000a, 0, CPUID_EDX},
> [CPUID_7_ECX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_ECX},
> [CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX},
>+ [CPUID_7_EDX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_EDX},
> };
>
>static __always_inline struct cpuid_reg x86_feature_cpuid(unsigned
>x86_feature)
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>index aa8638a..1b743a0 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>@@ -920,6 +920,9 @@ static void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>bool masked);
> static bool nested_vmx_is_page_fault_vmexit(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
> u16 error_code);
> static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>+static void __always_inline vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned
>long *msr_bitmap,
>+ u32 msr, int type);
>+
>
> static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, vmxarea);
> static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, current_vmcs);
>@@ -2007,6 +2010,28 @@ static void add_atomic_switch_msr(struct
>vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr,
> m->host[i].value = host_val;
> }
>
>+/* do not touch guest_val and host_val if the msr is not found */
>+static int read_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr,
>+ u64 *guest_val, u64 *host_val)
>+{
>+ unsigned i;
>+ struct msr_autoload *m = &vmx->msr_autoload;
>+
>+ for (i = 0; i < m->nr; ++i)
>+ if (m->guest[i].index == msr)
>+ break;
>+
>+ if (i == m->nr)
>+ return 1;
>+
>+ if (guest_val)
>+ *guest_val = m->guest[i].value;
>+ if (host_val)
>+ *host_val = m->host[i].value;
>+
>+ return 0;
>+}
>+
>static bool update_transition_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, int
>efer_offset)
> {
> u64 guest_efer = vmx->vcpu.arch.efer;
>@@ -3203,7 +3228,9 @@ static inline bool
>vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> */
>static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data
>*msr_info)
> {
>+ u64 spec_ctrl = 0;
> struct shared_msr_entry *msr;
>+ struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
>
> switch (msr_info->index) {
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>@@ -3223,6 +3250,19 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>struct msr_data *msr_info)
> case MSR_IA32_TSC:
> msr_info->data = guest_read_tsc(vcpu);
> break;
>+ case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
>+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
>+ !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
>+ return 1;
>+
>+ /*
>+ * If the MSR is not in the atomic list yet, then it was never
>+ * written to. So the MSR value will be '0'.
>+ */
>+ read_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, &spec_ctrl, NULL);
>+
>+ msr_info->data = spec_ctrl;
>+ break;
> case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
> msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS);
> break;
>@@ -3289,6 +3329,13 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>struct msr_data *msr_info)
> int ret = 0;
> u32 msr_index = msr_info->index;
> u64 data = msr_info->data;
>+ unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
>+
>+ /*
>+ * IBRS is not used (yet) to protect the host. Once it does, this
>+ * variable needs to be a bit smarter.
>+ */
>+ u64 host_spec_ctrl = 0;
>
> switch (msr_index) {
> case MSR_EFER:
>@@ -3330,6 +3377,22 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>struct msr_data *msr_info)
> case MSR_IA32_TSC:
> kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr_info);
> break;
>+ case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
>+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
>+ !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
>+ return 1;
>+
>+ /*
>+ * Now we know that the guest is actually using the MSR, so
>+ * atomically load and save the SPEC_CTRL MSR and pass it
>+ * through to the guest.
>+ */
>+ add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr_info->data,
>+ host_spec_ctrl);
>+ msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
>+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
>+
>+ break;
> case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
> if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
> if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data))
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