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Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 10:43:22 -0800
From: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
To: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@...zon.de>
Cc: kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@...el.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: vmx: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 11:29 AM, KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@...zon.de> wrote:
> Add direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests. This is needed for guests
> that will only mitigate Spectre V2 through IBRS+IBPB and will not be using a
> retpoline+IBPB based approach.
>
> To avoid the overhead of atomically saving and restoring the MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
> for guests that do not actually use the MSR, only add_atomic_switch_msr when a
> non-zero is written to it.
>
> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>
> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@...el.com>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
> Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@...zon.de>
> Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 4 +++-
> arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> index 0099e10..dc78095 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ u64 kvm_supported_xcr0(void)
> /* These are scattered features in cpufeatures.h. */
> #define KVM_CPUID_BIT_AVX512_4VNNIW 2
> #define KVM_CPUID_BIT_AVX512_4FMAPS 3
> +#define KVM_CPUID_BIT_SPEC_CTRL 26
> #define KF(x) bit(KVM_CPUID_BIT_##x)
>
> int kvm_update_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> @@ -392,7 +393,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
>
> /* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
> const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
> - KF(AVX512_4VNNIW) | KF(AVX512_4FMAPS);
> + KF(AVX512_4VNNIW) | KF(AVX512_4FMAPS) | \
> + (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ? KF(SPEC_CTRL) : 0);
Isn't 'boot_cpu_has()' superflous here? And aren't there two bits to
pass through for existing CPUs (26 and 27)?
>
> /* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */
> get_cpu();
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
> index cdc70a3..dcfe227 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
> @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = {
> [CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = {0x8000000a, 0, CPUID_EDX},
> [CPUID_7_ECX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_ECX},
> [CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX},
> + [CPUID_7_EDX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_EDX},
> };
>
> static __always_inline struct cpuid_reg x86_feature_cpuid(unsigned x86_feature)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> index aa8638a..1b743a0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> @@ -920,6 +920,9 @@ static void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked);
> static bool nested_vmx_is_page_fault_vmexit(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
> u16 error_code);
> static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> +static void __always_inline vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
> + u32 msr, int type);
> +
>
> static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, vmxarea);
> static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, current_vmcs);
> @@ -2007,6 +2010,28 @@ static void add_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr,
> m->host[i].value = host_val;
> }
>
> +/* do not touch guest_val and host_val if the msr is not found */
> +static int read_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr,
> + u64 *guest_val, u64 *host_val)
> +{
> + unsigned i;
> + struct msr_autoload *m = &vmx->msr_autoload;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < m->nr; ++i)
> + if (m->guest[i].index == msr)
> + break;
> +
> + if (i == m->nr)
> + return 1;
> +
> + if (guest_val)
> + *guest_val = m->guest[i].value;
> + if (host_val)
> + *host_val = m->host[i].value;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static bool update_transition_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, int efer_offset)
> {
> u64 guest_efer = vmx->vcpu.arch.efer;
> @@ -3203,7 +3228,9 @@ static inline bool vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> */
> static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> {
> + u64 spec_ctrl = 0;
> struct shared_msr_entry *msr;
> + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
>
> switch (msr_info->index) {
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> @@ -3223,6 +3250,19 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> case MSR_IA32_TSC:
> msr_info->data = guest_read_tsc(vcpu);
> break;
> + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
> + if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
Shouldn't this conjunct be:
!(guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_STIBP))?
> + return 1;
What if !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)? That should also return 1, I think.
> +
> + /*
> + * If the MSR is not in the atomic list yet, then it was never
> + * written to. So the MSR value will be '0'.
> + */
> + read_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, &spec_ctrl, NULL);
Why not just add msr_ia32_spec_ctrl to struct vcpu_vmx, so that you
don't have to search the atomic switch list?
> +
> + msr_info->data = spec_ctrl;
> + break;
> case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
> msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS);
> break;
> @@ -3289,6 +3329,13 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> int ret = 0;
> u32 msr_index = msr_info->index;
> u64 data = msr_info->data;
> + unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
> +
> + /*
> + * IBRS is not used (yet) to protect the host. Once it does, this
> + * variable needs to be a bit smarter.
> + */
> + u64 host_spec_ctrl = 0;
>
> switch (msr_index) {
> case MSR_EFER:
> @@ -3330,6 +3377,22 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> case MSR_IA32_TSC:
> kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr_info);
> break;
> + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
> + if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
> + return 1;
This looks incomplete. As above, what if
!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)?
If the host doesn't support MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, you'll get a VMX-abort
on loading the host MSRs from the VM-exit MSR load list.
Also, what if the value being written is illegal?
/*
* Processors that support IBRS but not STIBP
* (CPUID.(EAX=07H, ECX=0):EDX[27:26] = 01b) will
* ignore attempts to set STIBP instead of causing an
* exception due to setting that reserved bit.
*/
if ((data & ~(u64)(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP)) ||
((data & SPEC_CTRL_IBRS) &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)))
return 1;
> +
> + /*
> + * Now we know that the guest is actually using the MSR, so
> + * atomically load and save the SPEC_CTRL MSR and pass it
> + * through to the guest.
> + */
> + add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr_info->data,
> + host_spec_ctrl);
> + msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
> + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
I assume you mean MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL rather than MSR_FS_BASE.
Also, what if the host and the guest support a different set of bits
in MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, due to a userspace modification of the guest's
CPUID info?
> +
> + break;
> case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
> if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
> if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data))
> --
> 2.7.4
>
Where do you preserve the guest's MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL value on VM-exit,
if the guest has been given permission to write the MSR?
You also have to clear the guest's MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL on
vmx_vcpu_reset, don't you?
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