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Message-ID: <CALMp9eTvwVMF0GQKMXBhOyuHFWmJOq4BYTY4D1tEtfp=QMf-fA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 29 Jan 2018 11:04:27 -0800
From:   Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
To:     David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>
Cc:     KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@...zon.de>,
        kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
        Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@...el.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: vmx: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL

Can I assume you'll send out a new version with the fixes?

On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 11:01 AM, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org> wrote:
>
> (Top-posting; sorry.)
>
> Much of that is already fixed during our day, in
> http://git.infradead.org/linux-retpoline.git/shortlog/refs/heads/ibpb
>
> I forgot to fix up the wrong-MSR typo though, and we do still need to address reset.
>
> On Mon, 2018-01-29 at 10:43 -0800, Jim Mattson wrote:
>> On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 11:29 AM, KarimAllah Ahmed  wrote:
>> >
>> > Add direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests. This is needed for guests
>> > that will only mitigate Spectre V2 through IBRS+IBPB and will not be using a
>> > retpoline+IBPB based approach.
>> >
>> > To avoid the overhead of atomically saving and restoring the MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
>> > for guests that do not actually use the MSR, only add_atomic_switch_msr when a
>> > non-zero is written to it.
>> >
>> > Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>
>> > Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>
>> > Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
>> > Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
>> > Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
>> > Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
>> > Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
>> > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
>> > Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
>> > Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@...el.com>
>> > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
>> > Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
>> > Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
>> > Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
>> > Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@...zon.de>
>> > Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>
>> > ---
>> >  arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c |  4 +++-
>> >  arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h |  1 +
>> >  arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c   | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> >  3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>> >
>> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
>> > index 0099e10..dc78095 100644
>> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
>> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
>> > @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ u64 kvm_supported_xcr0(void)
>> >  /* These are scattered features in cpufeatures.h. */
>> >  #define KVM_CPUID_BIT_AVX512_4VNNIW     2
>> >  #define KVM_CPUID_BIT_AVX512_4FMAPS     3
>> > +#define KVM_CPUID_BIT_SPEC_CTRL         26
>> >  #define KF(x) bit(KVM_CPUID_BIT_##x)
>> >
>> >  int kvm_update_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> > @@ -392,7 +393,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
>> >
>> >         /* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
>> >         const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
>> > -               KF(AVX512_4VNNIW) | KF(AVX512_4FMAPS);
>> > +               KF(AVX512_4VNNIW) | KF(AVX512_4FMAPS) | \
>> > +               (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ? KF(SPEC_CTRL) : 0);
>> Isn't 'boot_cpu_has()' superflous here? And aren't there two bits to
>> pass through for existing CPUs (26 and 27)?
>>
>> >
>> >
>> >         /* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */
>> >         get_cpu();
>> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
>> > index cdc70a3..dcfe227 100644
>> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
>> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
>> > @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = {
>> >         [CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = {0x8000000a, 0, CPUID_EDX},
>> >         [CPUID_7_ECX]         = {         7, 0, CPUID_ECX},
>> >         [CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX},
>> > +       [CPUID_7_EDX]         = {         7, 0, CPUID_EDX},
>> >  };
>> >
>> >  static __always_inline struct cpuid_reg x86_feature_cpuid(unsigned x86_feature)
>> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>> > index aa8638a..1b743a0 100644
>> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>> > @@ -920,6 +920,9 @@ static void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked);
>> >  static bool nested_vmx_is_page_fault_vmexit(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
>> >                                             u16 error_code);
>> >  static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>> > +static void __always_inline vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
>> > +                                                         u32 msr, int type);
>> > +
>> >
>> >  static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, vmxarea);
>> >  static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, current_vmcs);
>> > @@ -2007,6 +2010,28 @@ static void add_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr,
>> >         m->host[i].value = host_val;
>> >  }
>> >
>> > +/* do not touch guest_val and host_val if the msr is not found */
>> > +static int read_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr,
>> > +                                 u64 *guest_val, u64 *host_val)
>> > +{
>> > +       unsigned i;
>> > +       struct msr_autoload *m = &vmx->msr_autoload;
>> > +
>> > +       for (i = 0; i < m->nr; ++i)
>> > +               if (m->guest[i].index == msr)
>> > +                       break;
>> > +
>> > +       if (i == m->nr)
>> > +               return 1;
>> > +
>> > +       if (guest_val)
>> > +               *guest_val = m->guest[i].value;
>> > +       if (host_val)
>> > +               *host_val = m->host[i].value;
>> > +
>> > +       return 0;
>> > +}
>> > +
>> >  static bool update_transition_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, int efer_offset)
>> >  {
>> >         u64 guest_efer = vmx->vcpu.arch.efer;
>> > @@ -3203,7 +3228,9 @@ static inline bool vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> >   */
>> >  static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>> >  {
>> > +       u64 spec_ctrl = 0;
>> >         struct shared_msr_entry *msr;
>> > +       struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
>> >
>> >         switch (msr_info->index) {
>> >  #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>> > @@ -3223,6 +3250,19 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>> >         case MSR_IA32_TSC:
>> >                 msr_info->data = guest_read_tsc(vcpu);
>> >                 break;
>> > +       case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
>> > +               if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
>> > +                   !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
>> Shouldn't this conjunct be:
>> !(guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
>> guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_STIBP))?
>>
>> >
>> > +                       return 1;
>> What if !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
>> !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)? That should also return 1, I think.
>>
>> >
>> > +
>> > +               /*
>> > +                * If the MSR is not in the atomic list yet, then it was never
>> > +                * written to. So the MSR value will be '0'.
>> > +                */
>> > +               read_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, &spec_ctrl, NULL);
>> Why not just add msr_ia32_spec_ctrl to struct vcpu_vmx, so that you
>> don't have to search the atomic switch list?
>>
>> >
>> > +
>> > +               msr_info->data = spec_ctrl;
>> > +               break;
>> >         case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
>> >                 msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS);
>> >                 break;
>> > @@ -3289,6 +3329,13 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>> >         int ret = 0;
>> >         u32 msr_index = msr_info->index;
>> >         u64 data = msr_info->data;
>> > +       unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
>> > +
>> > +       /*
>> > +        * IBRS is not used (yet) to protect the host. Once it does, this
>> > +        * variable needs to be a bit smarter.
>> > +        */
>> > +       u64 host_spec_ctrl = 0;
>> >
>> >         switch (msr_index) {
>> >         case MSR_EFER:
>> > @@ -3330,6 +3377,22 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>> >         case MSR_IA32_TSC:
>> >                 kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr_info);
>> >                 break;
>> > +       case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
>> > +               if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
>> > +                   !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
>> > +                       return 1;
>> This looks incomplete. As above, what if
>> !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
>> !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)?
>> If the host doesn't support MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, you'll get a VMX-abort
>> on loading the host MSRs from the VM-exit MSR load list.
>>
>> Also, what if the value being written is illegal?
>>
>> /*
>> * Processors that support IBRS but not STIBP
>> * (CPUID.(EAX=07H, ECX=0):EDX[27:26] = 01b) will
>> * ignore attempts to set STIBP instead of causing an
>> * exception due to setting that reserved bit.
>> */
>> if ((data & ~(u64)(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP)) ||
>>     ((data & SPEC_CTRL_IBRS) &&
>>      !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)))
>> return 1;
>>
>> >
>> > +
>> > +               /*
>> > +                * Now we know that the guest is actually using the MSR, so
>> > +                * atomically load and save the SPEC_CTRL MSR and pass it
>> > +                * through to the guest.
>> > +                */
>> > +               add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr_info->data,
>> > +                                     host_spec_ctrl);
>> > +               msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
>> > +               vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
>> I assume you mean MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL rather than MSR_FS_BASE.
>>
>> Also, what if the host and the guest support a different set of bits
>> in MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, due to a userspace modification of the guest's
>> CPUID info?
>>
>> >
>> > +
>> > +               break;
>> >         case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
>> >                 if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
>> >                         if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data))
>> > --
>> > 2.7.4
>> >
>> Where do you preserve the guest's MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL value on VM-exit,
>> if the guest has been given permission to write the MSR?
>>
>> You also have to clear the guest's MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL on
>> vmx_vcpu_reset, don't you?
>>

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