[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20180129123840.942897695@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 13:56:45 +0100
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Kevin Cernekee <cernekee@...omium.org>,
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@...filter.org>,
Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@...e.cz>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 21/66] netfilter: xt_osf: Add missing permission checks
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kevin Cernekee <cernekee@...omium.org>
commit 916a27901de01446bcf57ecca4783f6cff493309 upstream.
The capability check in nfnetlink_rcv() verifies that the caller
has CAP_NET_ADMIN in the namespace that "owns" the netlink socket.
However, xt_osf_fingers is shared by all net namespaces on the
system. An unprivileged user can create user and net namespaces
in which he holds CAP_NET_ADMIN to bypass the netlink_net_capable()
check:
vpnns -- nfnl_osf -f /tmp/pf.os
vpnns -- nfnl_osf -f /tmp/pf.os -d
These non-root operations successfully modify the systemwide OS
fingerprint list. Add new capable() checks so that they can't.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Cernekee <cernekee@...omium.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@...filter.org>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@...e.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
net/netfilter/xt_osf.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/if.h>
#include <linux/inetdevice.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
@@ -69,6 +70,9 @@ static int xt_osf_add_callback(struct ne
struct xt_osf_finger *kf = NULL, *sf;
int err = 0;
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!osf_attrs[OSF_ATTR_FINGER])
return -EINVAL;
@@ -113,6 +117,9 @@ static int xt_osf_remove_callback(struct
struct xt_osf_finger *sf;
int err = -ENOENT;
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!osf_attrs[OSF_ATTR_FINGER])
return -EINVAL;
Powered by blists - more mailing lists