lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:03:21 -0800 From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com> To: tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...nel.org Cc: linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>, alan@...ux.intel.com Subject: [PATCH v6 13/13] x86/spectre: report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim mitigation for __user pointer de-references. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com> Cc: x86@...nel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 390b3dc3d438..06f1d4c5ec6b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); } ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
Powered by blists - more mailing lists