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Message-ID: <43859417-ae76-ed1f-eb4f-8a84a35998fc@amazon.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 22:00:54 +0100
From: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@...zon.com>
To: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@...zon.de>
CC: kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
"Andrea Arcangeli" <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@...el.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 4/4] KVM: VMX: Allow direct access to
MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
On 01/30/2018 06:49 PM, Jim Mattson wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 4:10 PM, KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@...zon.de> wrote:
>> [ Based on a patch from Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com> ]
>>
>> Add direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests. This is needed for
>> guests that will only mitigate Spectre V2 through IBRS+IBPB and will not
>> be using a retpoline+IBPB based approach.
>>
>> To avoid the overhead of atomically saving and restoring the
>> MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests that do not actually use the MSR, only
>> add_atomic_switch_msr when a non-zero is written to it.
>>
>> No attempt is made to handle STIBP here, intentionally. Filtering STIBP
>> may be added in a future patch, which may require trapping all writes
>> if we don't want to pass it through directly to the guest.
>>
>> [dwmw2: Clean up CPUID bits, save/restore manually, handle reset]
>>
>> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>
>> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>
>> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
>> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
>> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
>> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
>> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
>> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
>> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@...el.com>
>> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
>> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
>> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
>> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
>> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>
>> Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@...zon.de>
>> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
>> ---
>> v2:
>> - remove 'host_spec_ctrl' in favor of only a comment (dwmw@).
>> - special case writing '0' in SPEC_CTRL to avoid confusing live-migration
>> when the instance never used the MSR (dwmw@).
>> - depend on X86_FEATURE_IBRS instead of X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (dwmw@).
>> - add MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL to the list of MSRs to save (dropped it by accident).
>> v3:
>> - Save/restore manually
>> - Fix CPUID handling
>> - Fix a copy & paste error in the name of SPEC_CTRL MSR in
>> disable_intercept.
>> - support !cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()
>> ---
>> arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 7 +++++--
>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +-
>> 3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
>> index 1909635..662d0c0 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
>> @@ -394,7 +394,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
>>
>> /* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
>> const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
>> - F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
>> + F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(SPEC_CTRL) |
>> + F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
>>
>> /* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */
>> get_cpu();
>> @@ -630,9 +631,11 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
>> g_phys_as = phys_as;
>> entry->eax = g_phys_as | (virt_as << 8);
>> entry->edx = 0;
>> - /* IBPB isn't necessarily present in hardware cpuid */
>> + /* IBRS and IBPB aren't necessarily present in hardware cpuid */
>> if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
>> entry->ebx |= F(IBPB);
>> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
>> + entry->ebx |= F(IBRS);
>> entry->ebx &= kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features;
>> cpuid_mask(&entry->ebx, CPUID_8000_0008_EBX);
>> break;
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>> index 798a00b..9ac9747 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>> @@ -582,6 +582,8 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
>> u64 msr_guest_kernel_gs_base;
>> #endif
>> u64 arch_capabilities;
>> + u64 spec_ctrl;
>> + bool save_spec_ctrl_on_exit;
>>
>> u32 vm_entry_controls_shadow;
>> u32 vm_exit_controls_shadow;
>> @@ -922,6 +924,8 @@ static void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked);
>> static bool nested_vmx_is_page_fault_vmexit(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
>> u16 error_code);
>> static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>> +static void __always_inline vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
>> + u32 msr, int type);
>>
>> static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, vmxarea);
>> static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, current_vmcs);
>> @@ -3226,6 +3230,13 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>> case MSR_IA32_TSC:
>> msr_info->data = guest_read_tsc(vcpu);
>> break;
>> + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
>> + if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
>> + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
>> + return 1;
>> +
>> + msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl;
>> + break;
>> case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
>> if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
>> !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
>> @@ -3339,6 +3350,31 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>> case MSR_IA32_TSC:
>> kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr_info);
>> break;
>> + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
>> + if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
>> + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
>> + return 1;
>> +
>> + /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
>> + if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP))
>> + return 1;
>> +
>> + vmx->spec_ctrl = data;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
>> + * it through. This means we don't have to take the perf
>> + * hit of saving it on vmexit for the common case of guests
>> + * that don't use it.
>> + */
>> + if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap() && data &&
>> + !vmx->save_spec_ctrl_on_exit) {
>> + vmx->save_spec_ctrl_on_exit = true;
>> + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap,
>> + MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
>> + MSR_TYPE_RW);
>> + }
>
> This code seems to assume that L1 is currently active. What if L2 is
> currently active?
Ooops! I did not think at all about nested :)
This should be addressed now, I hope:
http://git.infradead.org/linux-retpoline.git/commitdiff/f7f0cbba3e0cffcee050a8a5a9597a162d57e572
I have not tested it yet though.
>
>> + break;
>> case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD:
>> if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
>> !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
>> @@ -5644,6 +5680,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
>> u64 cr0;
>>
>> vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0;
>> + vmx->spec_ctrl = 0;
>>
>> vmx->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = get_rdx_init_val();
>> kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, 0);
>> @@ -9314,6 +9351,15 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>
>> vmx_arm_hv_timer(vcpu);
>>
>> + /*
>> + * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if
>> + * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there
>> + * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
>> + * being speculatively taken.
>> + */
>> + if (vmx->spec_ctrl)
>> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl);
>> +
>> vmx->__launched = vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched;
>> asm(
>> /* Store host registers */
>> @@ -9420,6 +9466,19 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> #endif
>> );
>>
>> + /*
>> + * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the
>> + * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and
>> + * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding
>> + * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former
>> + * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM.
>> + */
>> + if (vmx->save_spec_ctrl_on_exit)
>> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl);
>> +
>> + if (vmx->spec_ctrl)
>> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
>> +
>> /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
>> vmexit_fill_RSB();
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>> index 8e889dc..fc9724c 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>> @@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@ static u32 msrs_to_save[] = {
>> #endif
>> MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA,
>> MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, MSR_TSC_AUX,
>> - MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
>> + MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
>> };
>>
>> static unsigned num_msrs_to_save;
>> --
>> 2.7.4
>>
>
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