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Message-Id: <1517404231-22406-5-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.de>
Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 14:10:30 +0100
From: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@...zon.de>
To: x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@...zon.de>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@...el.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 4/5] KVM: VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
[ Based on a patch from Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com> ]
Add direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests. This is needed for
guests that will only mitigate Spectre V2 through IBRS+IBPB and will not
be using a retpoline+IBPB based approach.
To avoid the overhead of atomically saving and restoring the
MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests that do not actually use the MSR, only
add_atomic_switch_msr when a non-zero is written to it.
No attempt is made to handle STIBP here, intentionally. Filtering STIBP
may be added in a future patch, which may require trapping all writes
if we don't want to pass it through directly to the guest.
[dwmw2: Clean up CPUID bits, save/restore manually, handle reset]
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>
Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@...el.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@...zon.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
---
v4:
- Add IBRS to kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features
- Handling nested guests
v3:
- Save/restore manually
- Fix CPUID handling
- Fix a copy & paste error in the name of SPEC_CTRL MSR in
disable_intercept.
- support !cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()
v2:
- remove 'host_spec_ctrl' in favor of only a comment (dwmw@).
- special case writing '0' in SPEC_CTRL to avoid confusing live-migration
when the instance never used the MSR (dwmw@).
- depend on X86_FEATURE_IBRS instead of X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (dwmw@).
- add MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL to the list of MSRs to save (dropped it by accident).
---
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 9 ++++---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 1909635..13f5d42 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
/* cpuid 0x80000008.ebx */
const u32 kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features =
- F(IBPB);
+ F(IBPB) | F(IBRS);
/* cpuid 0xC0000001.edx */
const u32 kvm_cpuid_C000_0001_edx_x86_features =
@@ -394,7 +394,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
/* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
- F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
+ F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(SPEC_CTRL) |
+ F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
/* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */
get_cpu();
@@ -630,9 +631,11 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
g_phys_as = phys_as;
entry->eax = g_phys_as | (virt_as << 8);
entry->edx = 0;
- /* IBPB isn't necessarily present in hardware cpuid */
+ /* IBRS and IBPB aren't necessarily present in hardware cpuid */
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
entry->ebx |= F(IBPB);
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+ entry->ebx |= F(IBRS);
entry->ebx &= kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features;
cpuid_mask(&entry->ebx, CPUID_8000_0008_EBX);
break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 40643b8..9080938 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -593,6 +593,8 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
u64 msr_guest_kernel_gs_base;
#endif
u64 arch_capabilities;
+ u64 spec_ctrl;
+ bool save_spec_ctrl_on_exit;
u32 vm_entry_controls_shadow;
u32 vm_exit_controls_shadow;
@@ -938,6 +940,8 @@ static void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked);
static bool nested_vmx_is_page_fault_vmexit(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
u16 error_code);
static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+static void __always_inline vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
+ u32 msr, int type);
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, vmxarea);
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, current_vmcs);
@@ -3238,6 +3242,13 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
case MSR_IA32_TSC:
msr_info->data = guest_read_tsc(vcpu);
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+ return 1;
+
+ msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl;
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
@@ -3351,6 +3362,35 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
case MSR_IA32_TSC:
kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr_info);
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+ return 1;
+
+ /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
+ if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP))
+ return 1;
+
+ vmx->spec_ctrl = data;
+
+ /*
+ * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
+ * it through. This means we don't have to take the perf
+ * hit of saving it on vmexit for the common case of guests
+ * that don't use it.
+ */
+ if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap() && data &&
+ !vmx->save_spec_ctrl_on_exit) {
+ vmx->save_spec_ctrl_on_exit = true;
+
+ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+ break;
+
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap,
+ MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
+ MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ }
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
@@ -5667,6 +5707,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
u64 cr0;
vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0;
+ vmx->spec_ctrl = 0;
vmx->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = get_rdx_init_val();
kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, 0);
@@ -9338,6 +9379,15 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmx_arm_hv_timer(vcpu);
+ /*
+ * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if
+ * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there
+ * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
+ * being speculatively taken.
+ */
+ if (vmx->spec_ctrl)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl);
+
vmx->__launched = vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched;
asm(
/* Store host registers */
@@ -9456,6 +9506,19 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
#endif
);
+ /*
+ * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the
+ * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and
+ * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding
+ * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former
+ * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM.
+ */
+ if (vmx->save_spec_ctrl_on_exit)
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl);
+
+ if (vmx->spec_ctrl)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
+
/* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
vmexit_fill_RSB();
@@ -10119,6 +10182,11 @@ static inline bool nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
if (to_vmx(vcpu)->save_spec_ctrl_on_exit) {
nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(
msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
+ MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
+ MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
+
+ nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(
+ msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD,
MSR_TYPE_R);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 4ec142e..ac38143 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1009,7 +1009,7 @@ static u32 msrs_to_save[] = {
#endif
MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA,
MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, MSR_TSC_AUX,
- MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
+ MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
};
static unsigned num_msrs_to_save;
--
2.7.4
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