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Message-ID: <20180201174335.3tccxfotu7slriuu@treble>
Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 11:43:35 -0600
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@...el.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] objtool: retpoline validation
On Thu, Feb 01, 2018 at 06:14:27PM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 01, 2018 at 04:51:35PM +0000, David Woodhouse wrote:
> > > Ideally we'd have a way to mark the module 'unsafe' or something.
> >
> > No, we just need to set IBRS before doing it.
>
> That would work, assuming IBRS is available to begin with of course. Do
> we WARN if we hit this code and don't have IBRS available?
Perhaps it should just be reported in the spectre_v2 sysfs file.
So
"Mitigation: Full generic retpoline"
would instead be something like
"Vulnerable: Retpoline without IBRS"
?
> > The same applies to any
> > EFI runtime calls, APM and all kinds of other random crap that calls
> > into firmware. I'm not sure why those aren't showing up.
>
> arch/x86/platform/efi/Makefile:OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_efi_thunk_$(BITS).o := y
> arch/x86/platform/efi/Makefile:OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_efi_stub_$(BITS).o := y
>
> And similar things tell objtool to please not look..
Right, some of the corner cases like efi, vdso, and bpf tend to be
ignored by objtool right now.
--
Josh
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