linux-kernel - [PATCH v2] Correct use of IBRS_ATT name, should be IBRS

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20180205110220.ky2ih34egygmg4xs@starbug-vm.ie.oracle.com>
Date:   Mon, 5 Feb 2018 11:02:20 +0000
From:   Darren Kenny <Darren.Kenny@...cle.com>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
        Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Darren Kenny <Darren.Kenny@...cle.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2] Correct use of IBRS_ATT name, should be IBRS_ALL

Fixes a comment in commit 117cc7a908c83697b0b737d15ae1eb5943afe35b
("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit")

While the original name was "IBRS All The Time" (IBRS_ATT),
the publicly documented name is IBRS_ALL, we should be using that.

Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@...cle.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 4ad4108..5b778d2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
  * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
  * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
  * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
- * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided.
+ * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided.
  */
 static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
 {
-- 
2.9.5