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Message-Id: <20180205182216.639155003@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2018 10:23:26 -0800
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@...cle.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.15 53/60] x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL
4.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Darren Kenny darren.kenny@...cle.com
commit af189c95a371b59f493dbe0f50c0a09724868881
Fixes: 117cc7a908c83 ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit")
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@...cle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202191220.blvgkgutojecxr3b@starbug-vm.ie.oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
* On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
* can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
* retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
- * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided.
+ * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided.
*/
static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
{
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