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Message-Id: <20180207201517.6518-7-linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2018 21:15:16 +0100
From: Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, mingo@...nel.org, x86@...nel.org
Cc: dan.j.williams@...el.com, tglx@...utronix.de, ak@...ux.intel.com,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, luto@...nel.org
Subject: [RFC v2 PATCH 6/7] x86/entry: get rid of ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK and SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS
Previously, error_entry() and paranoid_entry() saved the GP registers
onto stack space previously allocated by its callers. Combine these two
steps in the callers, and use the generic PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS macro
for that.
Note: The testb $3, CS(%rsp) instruction in idtentry() does not need
modification. Previously %rsp was manually decreased by 15*8; with
this patch, %rsp is decreased by 15 pushq instructions. Moreover,
error_entry did and does the exact same test (with offset=8) after
the registers have been moved/pushed and cleared.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>
---
arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 42 +-----------------------------------------
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 15 +++++++--------
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
index d6a97e2945ee..59675010c9a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -97,46 +97,6 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
#define SIZEOF_PTREGS 21*8
- .macro ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
- addq $-(15*8), %rsp
- .endm
-
- .macro SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS offset=0
- /*
- * Save registers and sanitize registers of values that a
- * speculation attack might otherwise want to exploit. The
- * lower registers are likely clobbered well before they
- * could be put to use in a speculative execution gadget.
- * Interleave XOR with PUSH for better uop scheduling:
- */
- movq %rdi, 14*8+\offset(%rsp)
- movq %rsi, 13*8+\offset(%rsp)
- movq %rdx, 12*8+\offset(%rsp)
- movq %rcx, 11*8+\offset(%rsp)
- movq %rax, 10*8+\offset(%rsp)
- movq %r8, 9*8+\offset(%rsp)
- xorq %r8, %r8 /* nospec r8 */
- movq %r9, 8*8+\offset(%rsp)
- xorq %r9, %r9 /* nospec r9 */
- movq %r10, 7*8+\offset(%rsp)
- xorq %r10, %r10 /* nospec r10 */
- movq %r11, 6*8+\offset(%rsp)
- xorq %r11, %r11 /* nospec r11 */
- movq %rbx, 5*8+\offset(%rsp)
- xorl %ebx, %ebx /* nospec rbx */
- movq %rbp, 4*8+\offset(%rsp)
- xorl %ebp, %ebp /* nospec rbp */
- movq %r12, 3*8+\offset(%rsp)
- xorq %r12, %r12 /* nospec r12 */
- movq %r13, 2*8+\offset(%rsp)
- xorq %r13, %r13 /* nospec r13 */
- movq %r14, 1*8+\offset(%rsp)
- xorq %r14, %r14 /* nospec r14 */
- movq %r15, 0*8+\offset(%rsp)
- xorq %r15, %r15 /* nospec r15 */
- UNWIND_HINT_REGS offset=\offset
- .endm
-
.macro PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rdx=%rdx rax=%rax
/*
* Push registers and sanitize registers of values that a
@@ -211,7 +171,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
* is just setting the LSB, which makes it an invalid stack address and is also
* a signal to the unwinder that it's a pt_regs pointer in disguise.
*
- * NOTE: This macro must be used *after* SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS because it corrupts
+ * NOTE: This macro must be used *after* PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS because it corrupts
* the original rbp.
*/
.macro ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER ptregs_offset=0
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index 9c4fe360db42..fa56a974d1c1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -871,7 +871,9 @@ ENTRY(\sym)
pushq $-1 /* ORIG_RAX: no syscall to restart */
.endif
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
+ /* Save all registers in pt_regs */
+ PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS
+ ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
.if \paranoid < 2
testb $3, CS(%rsp) /* If coming from userspace, switch stacks */
@@ -1121,15 +1123,13 @@ idtentry machine_check do_mce has_error_code=0 paranoid=1
#endif
/*
- * Save all registers in pt_regs, and switch gs if needed.
+ * Switch gs if needed.
* Use slow, but surefire "are we in kernel?" check.
* Return: ebx=0: need swapgs on exit, ebx=1: otherwise
*/
ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
cld
- SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS 8
- ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
movl $1, %ebx
movl $MSR_GS_BASE, %ecx
rdmsr
@@ -1173,14 +1173,12 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_exit)
END(paranoid_exit)
/*
- * Save all registers in pt_regs, and switch gs if needed.
+ * Switch gs if needed.
* Return: EBX=0: came from user mode; EBX=1: otherwise
*/
ENTRY(error_entry)
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
cld
- SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS 8
- ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
testb $3, CS+8(%rsp)
jz .Lerror_kernelspace
@@ -1571,7 +1569,8 @@ end_repeat_nmi:
* frame to point back to repeat_nmi.
*/
pushq $-1 /* ORIG_RAX: no syscall to restart */
- ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
+ PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS
+ ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
/*
* Use paranoid_entry to handle SWAPGS, but no need to use paranoid_exit
--
2.16.1
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