linux-kernel - Re: [PATCHv3 0/5] x86: Enumerate TME and PCONFIG, add MKTME_KEY

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20180211190241.nzulvhhzkb74t72o@gmail.com>
Date:   Sun, 11 Feb 2018 20:02:41 +0100
From:   Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
To:     "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Kai Huang <kai.huang@...ux.intel.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv3 0/5] x86: Enumerate TME and PCONFIG, add MKTME_KEY_PROG
 helper


* Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com> wrote:

> Multikey Total Memory Encryption (MKTME)[1] is a technology that allows
> transparent memory encryption in upcoming Intel platforms.
>
> MKTME is built on top of TME. TME allows encryption of the entirety of
> system memory using a single key. MKTME allows to have multiple encryption
> domains, each having own key -- different memory pages can be encrypted
> with different keys.
> 
> The patchset does some ground work for MKTME enabling:
>   - Adds two new cpufeatures: TME and PCONFIG;
>   - Detects if BIOS enabled TME and MKTME;
>   - Enumerates what PCONFIG targets are supported;
>   - Provides helper to program encryption keys into CPU;
> 
> As part of TME enumeration we check out how many bits from physical address
> are claimed for encryption key ID. This may be critical as we or guest VM
> must not use these bits for physical address.

So how will the 'full' patchset look like, roughly - is there a tree or diffstat 
we could take a look at perhaps?

I'm also wondering how 'TME' compares to AMD's SME (Secure Memory Encryption) and 
SEV features. SME required a number of low level boot code changes - I'm wondering 
how much commonality there can be achieved with Intel's TME so that we don't end 
up with two sets of interfaces.

Thanks,

	Ingo