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Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2018 08:42:50 +0100
From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>
To: Dave Watson <davejwatson@...com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
Junaid Shahid <junaids@...gle.com>,
Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Sabrina Dubroca <sd@...asysnail.net>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Ilya Lesokhin <ilyal@...lanox.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 14/14] x86/crypto: aesni: Update aesni-intel_glue to use scatter/gather
Am Montag, 12. Februar 2018, 20:51:28 CET schrieb Dave Watson:
Hi Dave,
> Add gcmaes_en/decrypt_sg routines, that will do scatter/gather
> by sg. Either src or dst may contain multiple buffers, so
> iterate over both at the same time if they are different.
> If the input is the same as the output, iterate only over one.
>
> Currently both the AAD and TAG must be linear, so copy them out
> with scatterlist_map_and_copy.
>
> Only the SSE routines are updated so far, so leave the previous
> gcmaes_en/decrypt routines, and branch to the sg ones if the
> keysize is inappropriate for avx, or we are SSE only.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dave Watson <davejwatson@...com>
> ---
> arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c | 166
> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 166 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
> b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c index de986f9..1e32fbe 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
> @@ -791,6 +791,82 @@ static int generic_gcmaes_set_authsize(struct
> crypto_aead *tfm, return 0;
> }
>
> +static int gcmaes_encrypt_sg(struct aead_request *req, unsigned int
> assoclen, + u8 *hash_subkey, u8 *iv, void *aes_ctx)
> +{
> + struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
> + unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
> + struct gcm_context_data data AESNI_ALIGN_ATTR;
> + struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk = {};
> + unsigned long left = req->cryptlen;
> + unsigned long len, srclen, dstlen;
> + struct scatter_walk src_sg_walk;
> + struct scatterlist src_start[2];
> + struct scatterlist dst_start[2];
> + struct scatterlist *src_sg;
> + struct scatterlist *dst_sg;
> + u8 *src, *dst, *assoc;
> + u8 authTag[16];
> +
> + assoc = kmalloc(assoclen, GFP_ATOMIC);
> + if (unlikely(!assoc))
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->src, 0, assoclen, 0);
Have you tested that this code does not barf when assoclen is 0?
Maybe it is worth while to finally add a test vector to testmgr.h which
validates such scenario. If you would like, here is a vector you could add to
testmgr:
https://github.com/smuellerDD/libkcapi/blob/master/test/test.sh#L315
This is a decryption of gcm(aes) with no message, no AAD and just a tag. The
result should be EBADMSG.
> +
> + src_sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(src_start, req->src, req->assoclen);
Why do you use assoclen in the map_and_copy, and req->assoclen in the ffwd?
> + scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, src_sg);
> + if (req->src != req->dst) {
> + dst_sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(dst_start, req->dst, req->assoclen);
Dto: req->assoclen or assoclen?
> + scatterwalk_start(&dst_sg_walk, dst_sg);
> + }
> +
> + kernel_fpu_begin();
> + aesni_gcm_init(aes_ctx, &data, iv,
> + hash_subkey, assoc, assoclen);
> + if (req->src != req->dst) {
> + while (left) {
> + src = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
> + dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk);
> + srclen = scatterwalk_clamp(&src_sg_walk, left);
> + dstlen = scatterwalk_clamp(&dst_sg_walk, left);
> + len = min(srclen, dstlen);
> + if (len)
> + aesni_gcm_enc_update(aes_ctx, &data,
> + dst, src, len);
> + left -= len;
> +
> + scatterwalk_unmap(src);
> + scatterwalk_unmap(dst);
> + scatterwalk_advance(&src_sg_walk, len);
> + scatterwalk_advance(&dst_sg_walk, len);
> + scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, 0, left);
> + scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 1, left);
> + }
> + } else {
> + while (left) {
> + dst = src = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
> + len = scatterwalk_clamp(&src_sg_walk, left);
> + if (len)
> + aesni_gcm_enc_update(aes_ctx, &data,
> + src, src, len);
> + left -= len;
> + scatterwalk_unmap(src);
> + scatterwalk_advance(&src_sg_walk, len);
> + scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, 1, left);
> + }
> + }
> + aesni_gcm_finalize(aes_ctx, &data, authTag, auth_tag_len);
> + kernel_fpu_end();
> +
> + kfree(assoc);
> +
> + /* Copy in the authTag */
> + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(authTag, req->dst,
> + req->assoclen + req->cryptlen,
> + auth_tag_len, 1);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static int gcmaes_encrypt(struct aead_request *req, unsigned int assoclen,
> u8 *hash_subkey, u8 *iv, void *aes_ctx)
> {
> @@ -802,6 +878,11 @@ static int gcmaes_encrypt(struct aead_request *req,
> unsigned int assoclen, struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk = {};
> struct gcm_context_data data AESNI_ALIGN_ATTR;
>
> + if (((struct crypto_aes_ctx *)aes_ctx)->key_length != AES_KEYSIZE_128 ||
> + aesni_gcm_enc_tfm == aesni_gcm_enc) {
> + return gcmaes_encrypt_sg(req, assoclen, hash_subkey, iv,
> + aes_ctx);
> + }
> if (sg_is_last(req->src) &&
> (!PageHighMem(sg_page(req->src)) ||
> req->src->offset + req->src->length <= PAGE_SIZE) &&
> @@ -854,6 +935,86 @@ static int gcmaes_encrypt(struct aead_request *req,
> unsigned int assoclen, return 0;
> }
>
> +static int gcmaes_decrypt_sg(struct aead_request *req, unsigned int
> assoclen, + u8 *hash_subkey, u8 *iv, void *aes_ctx)
> +{
This is a lot of code duplication.
> + struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
> + unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
> + unsigned long left = req->cryptlen - auth_tag_len;
> + struct gcm_context_data data AESNI_ALIGN_ATTR;
> + struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk = {};
> + unsigned long len, srclen, dstlen;
> + struct scatter_walk src_sg_walk;
> + struct scatterlist src_start[2];
> + struct scatterlist dst_start[2];
> + struct scatterlist *src_sg;
> + struct scatterlist *dst_sg;
> + u8 *src, *dst, *assoc;
> + u8 authTagGen[16];
> + u8 authTag[16];
> +
> + assoc = kmalloc(assoclen, GFP_ATOMIC);
> + if (unlikely(!assoc))
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->src, 0, assoclen, 0);
> +
> + src_sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(src_start, req->src, req->assoclen);
> + scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, src_sg);
> + if (req->src != req->dst) {
> + dst_sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(dst_start, req->dst, req->assoclen);
> + scatterwalk_start(&dst_sg_walk, dst_sg);
> + }
> +
> + kernel_fpu_begin();
> + aesni_gcm_init(aes_ctx, &data, iv,
> + hash_subkey, assoc, assoclen);
> + if (req->src != req->dst) {
> + while (left) {
> + src = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
> + dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk);
> + srclen = scatterwalk_clamp(&src_sg_walk, left);
> + dstlen = scatterwalk_clamp(&dst_sg_walk, left);
> + len = min(srclen, dstlen);
> + if (len)
> + aesni_gcm_dec_update(aes_ctx, &data,
> + dst, src, len);
> + left -= len;
> +
> + scatterwalk_unmap(src);
> + scatterwalk_unmap(dst);
> + scatterwalk_advance(&src_sg_walk, len);
> + scatterwalk_advance(&dst_sg_walk, len);
> + scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, 0, left);
> + scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 1, left);
> + }
> + } else {
> + while (left) {
> + dst = src = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
> + len = scatterwalk_clamp(&src_sg_walk, left);
> + if (len)
> + aesni_gcm_dec_update(aes_ctx, &data,
> + src, src, len);
> + left -= len;
> + scatterwalk_unmap(src);
> + scatterwalk_advance(&src_sg_walk, len);
> + scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, 1, left);
> + }
> + }
> + aesni_gcm_finalize(aes_ctx, &data, authTagGen, auth_tag_len);
> + kernel_fpu_end();
> +
> + kfree(assoc);
> +
> + /* Copy out original authTag */
> + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(authTag, req->src,
> + req->assoclen + req->cryptlen - auth_tag_len,
> + auth_tag_len, 0);
> +
> + /* Compare generated tag with passed in tag. */
> + return crypto_memneq(authTagGen, authTag, auth_tag_len) ?
> + -EBADMSG : 0;
> +}
> +
> static int gcmaes_decrypt(struct aead_request *req, unsigned int assoclen,
> u8 *hash_subkey, u8 *iv, void *aes_ctx)
> {
> @@ -868,6 +1029,11 @@ static int gcmaes_decrypt(struct aead_request *req,
> unsigned int assoclen, struct gcm_context_data data AESNI_ALIGN_ATTR;
> int retval = 0;
>
> + if (((struct crypto_aes_ctx *)aes_ctx)->key_length != AES_KEYSIZE_128 ||
> + aesni_gcm_enc_tfm == aesni_gcm_enc) {
> + return gcmaes_decrypt_sg(req, assoclen, hash_subkey, iv,
> + aes_ctx);
> + }
> tempCipherLen = (unsigned long)(req->cryptlen - auth_tag_len);
>
> if (sg_is_last(req->src) &&
Ciao
Stephan
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