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Message-ID: <1518509708.12890.33.camel@infradead.org>
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2018 08:15:08 +0000
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, tglx@...utronix.de,
x86@...nel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com,
dave.hansen@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/speculation: Support "Enhanced IBRS" on future
CPUs
On Tue, 2018-02-13 at 09:02 +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> > @@ -3419,13 +3419,14 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> >
> > vmx->spec_ctrl = data;
> >
> > - if (!data)
> > + if (!data && !spectre_v2_ibrs_all())
> > break;
> This should check the value of IBRS_ALL in the VM, not in the host.
No, it's host we want. If IBRS_ALL is set in the host, we set the
actual hardware MSR once at boot time and never touch it again. The
SPEC_CTRL MSR we expose to guests is purely a no-op fiction.
If spectre_v2_ibrs_all() is true then KVM should *never* actually pass
through or touch the real MSR.
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