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Message-ID: <20180213115049.GB2914@kroah.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2018 12:50:49 +0100
From: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc: lwn@....net, Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
Subject: Re: Linux 4.9.81
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index 4c2667aa4634..466c039c622b 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2805,8 +2805,6 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
norandmaps Don't use address space randomization. Equivalent to
echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
- noreplace-paravirt [X86,IA-64,PV_OPS] Don't patch paravirt_ops
-
noreplace-smp [X86-32,SMP] Don't replace SMP instructions
with UP alternatives
diff --git a/Documentation/speculation.txt b/Documentation/speculation.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e9e6cbae2841
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/speculation.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+This document explains potential effects of speculation, and how undesirable
+effects can be mitigated portably using common APIs.
+
+===========
+Speculation
+===========
+
+To improve performance and minimize average latencies, many contemporary CPUs
+employ speculative execution techniques such as branch prediction, performing
+work which may be discarded at a later stage.
+
+Typically speculative execution cannot be observed from architectural state,
+such as the contents of registers. However, in some cases it is possible to
+observe its impact on microarchitectural state, such as the presence or
+absence of data in caches. Such state may form side-channels which can be
+observed to extract secret information.
+
+For example, in the presence of branch prediction, it is possible for bounds
+checks to be ignored by code which is speculatively executed. Consider the
+following code:
+
+ int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index)
+ {
+ if (index >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS)
+ return 0;
+ else
+ return array[index];
+ }
+
+Which, on arm64, may be compiled to an assembly sequence such as:
+
+ CMP <index>, #MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS
+ B.LT less
+ MOV <returnval>, #0
+ RET
+ less:
+ LDR <returnval>, [<array>, <index>]
+ RET
+
+It is possible that a CPU mis-predicts the conditional branch, and
+speculatively loads array[index], even if index >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS. This
+value will subsequently be discarded, but the speculated load may affect
+microarchitectural state which can be subsequently measured.
+
+More complex sequences involving multiple dependent memory accesses may
+result in sensitive information being leaked. Consider the following
+code, building on the prior example:
+
+ int load_dependent_arrays(int *arr1, int *arr2, int index)
+ {
+ int val1, val2,
+
+ val1 = load_array(arr1, index);
+ val2 = load_array(arr2, val1);
+
+ return val2;
+ }
+
+Under speculation, the first call to load_array() may return the value
+of an out-of-bounds address, while the second call will influence
+microarchitectural state dependent on this value. This may provide an
+arbitrary read primitive.
+
+====================================
+Mitigating speculation side-channels
+====================================
+
+The kernel provides a generic API to ensure that bounds checks are
+respected even under speculation. Architectures which are affected by
+speculation-based side-channels are expected to implement these
+primitives.
+
+The array_index_nospec() helper in <linux/nospec.h> can be used to
+prevent information from being leaked via side-channels.
+
+A call to array_index_nospec(index, size) returns a sanitized index
+value that is bounded to [0, size) even under cpu speculation
+conditions.
+
+This can be used to protect the earlier load_array() example:
+
+ int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index)
+ {
+ if (index >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS)
+ return 0;
+ else {
+ index = array_index_nospec(index, MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS);
+ return array[index];
+ }
+ }
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 9550b6939076..4d5753f1c37b 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
VERSION = 4
PATCHLEVEL = 9
-SUBLEVEL = 80
+SUBLEVEL = 81
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Roaring Lionus
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
index 6eda5abbd719..0a6bb48854e3 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ config PPC
select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
select GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD
select GENERIC_CMOS_UPDATE
+ select GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES if PPC_BOOK3S_64
select GENERIC_TIME_VSYSCALL_OLD
select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS
select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST if SMP
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64e.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64e.h
index a703452d67b6..555e22d5e07f 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64e.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64e.h
@@ -209,5 +209,11 @@ exc_##label##_book3e:
ori r3,r3,vector_offset@l; \
mtspr SPRN_IVOR##vector_number,r3;
+#define RFI_TO_KERNEL \
+ rfi
+
+#define RFI_TO_USER \
+ rfi
+
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_EXCEPTION_64E_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h
index 9a3eee661297..cab6d2a46c41 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h
@@ -51,6 +51,59 @@
#define EX_PPR 88 /* SMT thread status register (priority) */
#define EX_CTR 96
+/*
+ * Macros for annotating the expected destination of (h)rfid
+ *
+ * The nop instructions allow us to insert one or more instructions to flush the
+ * L1-D cache when returning to userspace or a guest.
+ */
+#define RFI_FLUSH_SLOT \
+ RFI_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION; \
+ nop; \
+ nop; \
+ nop
+
+#define RFI_TO_KERNEL \
+ rfid
+
+#define RFI_TO_USER \
+ RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
+ rfid; \
+ b rfi_flush_fallback
+
+#define RFI_TO_USER_OR_KERNEL \
+ RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
+ rfid; \
+ b rfi_flush_fallback
+
+#define RFI_TO_GUEST \
+ RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
+ rfid; \
+ b rfi_flush_fallback
+
+#define HRFI_TO_KERNEL \
+ hrfid
+
+#define HRFI_TO_USER \
+ RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
+ hrfid; \
+ b hrfi_flush_fallback
+
+#define HRFI_TO_USER_OR_KERNEL \
+ RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
+ hrfid; \
+ b hrfi_flush_fallback
+
+#define HRFI_TO_GUEST \
+ RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
+ hrfid; \
+ b hrfi_flush_fallback
+
+#define HRFI_TO_UNKNOWN \
+ RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
+ hrfid; \
+ b hrfi_flush_fallback
+
#ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE
#define __EXCEPTION_RELON_PROLOG_PSERIES_1(label, h) \
mfspr r11,SPRN_##h##SRR0; /* save SRR0 */ \
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h
index ddf54f5bbdd1..7b332342071c 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h
@@ -189,4 +189,19 @@ void apply_feature_fixups(void);
void setup_feature_keys(void);
#endif
+#define RFI_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION \
+951: \
+ .pushsection __rfi_flush_fixup,"a"; \
+ .align 2; \
+952: \
+ FTR_ENTRY_OFFSET 951b-952b; \
+ .popsection;
+
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+extern long __start___rfi_flush_fixup, __stop___rfi_flush_fixup;
+
+#endif
+
#endif /* __ASM_POWERPC_FEATURE_FIXUPS_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h
index 708edebcf147..0e12cb2437d1 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h
@@ -240,6 +240,7 @@
#define H_GET_HCA_INFO 0x1B8
#define H_GET_PERF_COUNT 0x1BC
#define H_MANAGE_TRACE 0x1C0
+#define H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS 0x1C8
#define H_FREE_LOGICAL_LAN_BUFFER 0x1D4
#define H_QUERY_INT_STATE 0x1E4
#define H_POLL_PENDING 0x1D8
@@ -306,6 +307,17 @@
#define H_SET_MODE_RESOURCE_ADDR_TRANS_MODE 3
#define H_SET_MODE_RESOURCE_LE 4
+/* H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS return values */
+#define H_CPU_CHAR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 (1ull << 63) // IBM bit 0
+#define H_CPU_CHAR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED (1ull << 62) // IBM bit 1
+#define H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 (1ull << 61) // IBM bit 2
+#define H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2 (1ull << 60) // IBM bit 3
+#define H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV (1ull << 59) // IBM bit 4
+
+#define H_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY (1ull << 63) // IBM bit 0
+#define H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR (1ull << 62) // IBM bit 1
+#define H_CPU_BEHAV_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR (1ull << 61) // IBM bit 2
+
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
/**
@@ -433,6 +445,11 @@ static inline unsigned long cmo_get_page_size(void)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES */
+struct h_cpu_char_result {
+ u64 character;
+ u64 behaviour;
+};
+
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_HVCALL_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h
index 6a6792bb39fb..ea43897183fd 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h
@@ -205,6 +205,16 @@ struct paca_struct {
struct sibling_subcore_state *sibling_subcore_state;
#endif
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
+ /*
+ * rfi fallback flush must be in its own cacheline to prevent
+ * other paca data leaking into the L1d
+ */
+ u64 exrfi[13] __aligned(0x80);
+ void *rfi_flush_fallback_area;
+ u64 l1d_flush_congruence;
+ u64 l1d_flush_sets;
+#endif
};
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpar_wrappers.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpar_wrappers.h
index 1b394247afc2..4e53b8570d1f 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpar_wrappers.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpar_wrappers.h
@@ -340,4 +340,18 @@ static inline long plapr_set_watchpoint0(unsigned long dawr0, unsigned long dawr
return plpar_set_mode(0, H_SET_MODE_RESOURCE_SET_DAWR, dawr0, dawrx0);
}
+static inline long plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(struct h_cpu_char_result *p)
+{
+ unsigned long retbuf[PLPAR_HCALL_BUFSIZE];
+ long rc;
+
+ rc = plpar_hcall(H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS, retbuf);
+ if (rc == H_SUCCESS) {
+ p->character = retbuf[0];
+ p->behaviour = retbuf[1];
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_PLPAR_WRAPPERS_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h
index 654d64c9f3ac..6825a67cc3db 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h
@@ -38,6 +38,19 @@ static inline void pseries_big_endian_exceptions(void) {}
static inline void pseries_little_endian_exceptions(void) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES */
+void rfi_flush_enable(bool enable);
+
+/* These are bit flags */
+enum l1d_flush_type {
+ L1D_FLUSH_NONE = 0x1,
+ L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK = 0x2,
+ L1D_FLUSH_ORI = 0x4,
+ L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG = 0x8,
+};
+
+void __init setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type, bool enable);
+void do_rfi_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types);
+
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_SETUP_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c
index c833d88c423d..64bcbd580495 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -240,6 +240,10 @@ int main(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
DEFINE(PACAMCEMERGSP, offsetof(struct paca_struct, mc_emergency_sp));
DEFINE(PACA_IN_MCE, offsetof(struct paca_struct, in_mce));
+ DEFINE(PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA, offsetof(struct paca_struct, rfi_flush_fallback_area));
+ DEFINE(PACA_EXRFI, offsetof(struct paca_struct, exrfi));
+ DEFINE(PACA_L1D_FLUSH_CONGRUENCE, offsetof(struct paca_struct, l1d_flush_congruence));
+ DEFINE(PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SETS, offsetof(struct paca_struct, l1d_flush_sets));
#endif
DEFINE(PACAHWCPUID, offsetof(struct paca_struct, hw_cpu_id));
DEFINE(PACAKEXECSTATE, offsetof(struct paca_struct, kexec_state));
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S
index caa659671599..c33b69d10919 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S
@@ -251,13 +251,23 @@ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_HAS_PPR)
ld r13,GPR13(r1) /* only restore r13 if returning to usermode */
+ ld r2,GPR2(r1)
+ ld r1,GPR1(r1)
+ mtlr r4
+ mtcr r5
+ mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r7
+ mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r8
+ RFI_TO_USER
+ b . /* prevent speculative execution */
+
+ /* exit to kernel */
1: ld r2,GPR2(r1)
ld r1,GPR1(r1)
mtlr r4
mtcr r5
mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r7
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r8
- RFI
+ RFI_TO_KERNEL
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
syscall_error:
@@ -859,7 +869,7 @@ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_HAS_PPR)
ACCOUNT_CPU_USER_EXIT(r13, r2, r4)
REST_GPR(13, r1)
-1:
+
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r3
ld r2,_CCR(r1)
@@ -872,8 +882,22 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_HAS_PPR)
ld r3,GPR3(r1)
ld r4,GPR4(r1)
ld r1,GPR1(r1)
+ RFI_TO_USER
+ b . /* prevent speculative execution */
- rfid
+1: mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r3
+
+ ld r2,_CCR(r1)
+ mtcrf 0xFF,r2
+ ld r2,_NIP(r1)
+ mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r2
+
+ ld r0,GPR0(r1)
+ ld r2,GPR2(r1)
+ ld r3,GPR3(r1)
+ ld r4,GPR4(r1)
+ ld r1,GPR1(r1)
+ RFI_TO_KERNEL
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3E */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S
index fd68e19b9ef7..96db6c3adebe 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S
@@ -655,6 +655,8 @@ END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX)
andi. r10,r12,MSR_RI /* check for unrecoverable exception */
beq- 2f
+ andi. r10,r12,MSR_PR /* check for user mode (PR != 0) */
+ bne 1f
/* All done -- return from exception. */
@@ -671,7 +673,23 @@ END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX)
ld r11,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R11(r13)
ld r12,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R12(r13)
ld r13,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R13(r13)
- rfid
+ RFI_TO_KERNEL
+ b . /* prevent speculative execution */
+
+1:
+.machine push
+.machine "power4"
+ mtcrf 0x80,r9
+ mtcrf 0x01,r9 /* slb_allocate uses cr0 and cr7 */
+.machine pop
+
+ RESTORE_PPR_PACA(PACA_EXSLB, r9)
+ ld r9,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R9(r13)
+ ld r10,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R10(r13)
+ ld r11,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R11(r13)
+ ld r12,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R12(r13)
+ ld r13,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R13(r13)
+ RFI_TO_USER
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
2: mfspr r11,SPRN_SRR0
@@ -679,7 +697,7 @@ END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX)
mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r10
ld r10,PACAKMSR(r13)
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r10
- rfid
+ RFI_TO_KERNEL
b .
8: mfspr r11,SPRN_SRR0
@@ -1576,6 +1594,92 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_CFAR)
bl kernel_bad_stack
b 1b
+ .globl rfi_flush_fallback
+rfi_flush_fallback:
+ SET_SCRATCH0(r13);
+ GET_PACA(r13);
+ std r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
+ std r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
+ std r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
+ std r12,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R12(r13)
+ std r8,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R13(r13)
+ mfctr r9
+ ld r10,PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA(r13)
+ ld r11,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SETS(r13)
+ ld r12,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_CONGRUENCE(r13)
+ /*
+ * The load adresses are at staggered offsets within cachelines,
+ * which suits some pipelines better (on others it should not
+ * hurt).
+ */
+ addi r12,r12,8
+ mtctr r11
+ DCBT_STOP_ALL_STREAM_IDS(r11) /* Stop prefetch streams */
+
+ /* order ld/st prior to dcbt stop all streams with flushing */
+ sync
+1: li r8,0
+ .rept 8 /* 8-way set associative */
+ ldx r11,r10,r8
+ add r8,r8,r12
+ xor r11,r11,r11 // Ensure r11 is 0 even if fallback area is not
+ add r8,r8,r11 // Add 0, this creates a dependency on the ldx
+ .endr
+ addi r10,r10,128 /* 128 byte cache line */
+ bdnz 1b
+
+ mtctr r9
+ ld r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
+ ld r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
+ ld r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
+ ld r12,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R12(r13)
+ ld r8,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R13(r13)
+ GET_SCRATCH0(r13);
+ rfid
+
+ .globl hrfi_flush_fallback
+hrfi_flush_fallback:
+ SET_SCRATCH0(r13);
+ GET_PACA(r13);
+ std r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
+ std r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
+ std r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
+ std r12,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R12(r13)
+ std r8,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R13(r13)
+ mfctr r9
+ ld r10,PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA(r13)
+ ld r11,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SETS(r13)
+ ld r12,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_CONGRUENCE(r13)
+ /*
+ * The load adresses are at staggered offsets within cachelines,
+ * which suits some pipelines better (on others it should not
+ * hurt).
+ */
+ addi r12,r12,8
+ mtctr r11
+ DCBT_STOP_ALL_STREAM_IDS(r11) /* Stop prefetch streams */
+
+ /* order ld/st prior to dcbt stop all streams with flushing */
+ sync
+1: li r8,0
+ .rept 8 /* 8-way set associative */
+ ldx r11,r10,r8
+ add r8,r8,r12
+ xor r11,r11,r11 // Ensure r11 is 0 even if fallback area is not
+ add r8,r8,r11 // Add 0, this creates a dependency on the ldx
+ .endr
+ addi r10,r10,128 /* 128 byte cache line */
+ bdnz 1b
+
+ mtctr r9
+ ld r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
+ ld r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
+ ld r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
+ ld r12,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R12(r13)
+ ld r8,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R13(r13)
+ GET_SCRATCH0(r13);
+ hrfid
+
/*
* Called from arch_local_irq_enable when an interrupt needs
* to be resent. r3 contains 0x500, 0x900, 0xa00 or 0xe80 to indicate
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
index a12be60181bf..7c30a91c1f86 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/memory.h>
#include <linux/nmi.h>
+#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/kdump.h>
@@ -678,4 +679,142 @@ static int __init disable_hardlockup_detector(void)
return 0;
}
early_initcall(disable_hardlockup_detector);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
+static enum l1d_flush_type enabled_flush_types;
+static void *l1d_flush_fallback_area;
+static bool no_rfi_flush;
+bool rfi_flush;
+
+static int __init handle_no_rfi_flush(char *p)
+{
+ pr_info("rfi-flush: disabled on command line.");
+ no_rfi_flush = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("no_rfi_flush", handle_no_rfi_flush);
+
+/*
+ * The RFI flush is not KPTI, but because users will see doco that says to use
+ * nopti we hijack that option here to also disable the RFI flush.
+ */
+static int __init handle_no_pti(char *p)
+{
+ pr_info("rfi-flush: disabling due to 'nopti' on command line.\n");
+ handle_no_rfi_flush(NULL);
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("nopti", handle_no_pti);
+
+static void do_nothing(void *unused)
+{
+ /*
+ * We don't need to do the flush explicitly, just enter+exit kernel is
+ * sufficient, the RFI exit handlers will do the right thing.
+ */
+}
+
+void rfi_flush_enable(bool enable)
+{
+ if (rfi_flush == enable)
+ return;
+
+ if (enable) {
+ do_rfi_flush_fixups(enabled_flush_types);
+ on_each_cpu(do_nothing, NULL, 1);
+ } else
+ do_rfi_flush_fixups(L1D_FLUSH_NONE);
+
+ rfi_flush = enable;
+}
+
+static void init_fallback_flush(void)
+{
+ u64 l1d_size, limit;
+ int cpu;
+
+ l1d_size = ppc64_caches.dsize;
+ limit = min(safe_stack_limit(), ppc64_rma_size);
+
+ /*
+ * Align to L1d size, and size it at 2x L1d size, to catch possible
+ * hardware prefetch runoff. We don't have a recipe for load patterns to
+ * reliably avoid the prefetcher.
+ */
+ l1d_flush_fallback_area = __va(memblock_alloc_base(l1d_size * 2, l1d_size, limit));
+ memset(l1d_flush_fallback_area, 0, l1d_size * 2);
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ /*
+ * The fallback flush is currently coded for 8-way
+ * associativity. Different associativity is possible, but it
+ * will be treated as 8-way and may not evict the lines as
+ * effectively.
+ *
+ * 128 byte lines are mandatory.
+ */
+ u64 c = l1d_size / 8;
+
+ paca[cpu].rfi_flush_fallback_area = l1d_flush_fallback_area;
+ paca[cpu].l1d_flush_congruence = c;
+ paca[cpu].l1d_flush_sets = c / 128;
+ }
+}
+
+void __init setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable)
+{
+ if (types & L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK) {
+ pr_info("rfi-flush: Using fallback displacement flush\n");
+ init_fallback_flush();
+ }
+
+ if (types & L1D_FLUSH_ORI)
+ pr_info("rfi-flush: Using ori type flush\n");
+
+ if (types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG)
+ pr_info("rfi-flush: Using mttrig type flush\n");
+
+ enabled_flush_types = types;
+
+ if (!no_rfi_flush)
+ rfi_flush_enable(enable);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
+static int rfi_flush_set(void *data, u64 val)
+{
+ if (val == 1)
+ rfi_flush_enable(true);
+ else if (val == 0)
+ rfi_flush_enable(false);
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rfi_flush_get(void *data, u64 *val)
+{
+ *val = rfi_flush ? 1 : 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(fops_rfi_flush, rfi_flush_get, rfi_flush_set, "%llu\n");
+
+static __init int rfi_flush_debugfs_init(void)
+{
+ debugfs_create_file("rfi_flush", 0600, powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL, &fops_rfi_flush);
+ return 0;
+}
+device_initcall(rfi_flush_debugfs_init);
+#endif
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ if (rfi_flush)
+ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: RFI Flush\n");
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */
#endif
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 7394b770ae1f..b61fb7902018 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -132,6 +132,15 @@ SECTIONS
/* Read-only data */
RODATA
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
+ . = ALIGN(8);
+ __rfi_flush_fixup : AT(ADDR(__rfi_flush_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+ __start___rfi_flush_fixup = .;
+ *(__rfi_flush_fixup)
+ __stop___rfi_flush_fixup = .;
+ }
+#endif
+
EXCEPTION_TABLE(0)
NOTES :kernel :notes
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c b/arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c
index 043415f0bdb1..e86bfa111f3c 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/firmware.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
struct fixup_entry {
unsigned long mask;
@@ -115,6 +116,47 @@ void do_feature_fixups(unsigned long value, void *fixup_start, void *fixup_end)
}
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
+void do_rfi_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types)
+{
+ unsigned int instrs[3], *dest;
+ long *start, *end;
+ int i;
+
+ start = PTRRELOC(&__start___rfi_flush_fixup),
+ end = PTRRELOC(&__stop___rfi_flush_fixup);
+
+ instrs[0] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
+ instrs[1] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
+ instrs[2] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
+
+ if (types & L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK)
+ /* b .+16 to fallback flush */
+ instrs[0] = 0x48000010;
+
+ i = 0;
+ if (types & L1D_FLUSH_ORI) {
+ instrs[i++] = 0x63ff0000; /* ori 31,31,0 speculation barrier */
+ instrs[i++] = 0x63de0000; /* ori 30,30,0 L1d flush*/
+ }
+
+ if (types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG)
+ instrs[i++] = 0x7c12dba6; /* mtspr TRIG2,r0 (SPR #882) */
+
+ for (i = 0; start < end; start++, i++) {
+ dest = (void *)start + *start;
+
+ pr_devel("patching dest %lx\n", (unsigned long)dest);
+
+ patch_instruction(dest, instrs[0]);
+ patch_instruction(dest + 1, instrs[1]);
+ patch_instruction(dest + 2, instrs[2]);
+ }
+
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "rfi-flush: patched %d locations\n", i);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */
+
void do_lwsync_fixups(unsigned long value, void *fixup_start, void *fixup_end)
{
long *start, *end;
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c
index b33faa0015cc..6f8b4c19373a 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c
@@ -35,13 +35,63 @@
#include <asm/opal.h>
#include <asm/kexec.h>
#include <asm/smp.h>
+#include <asm/tm.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
#include "powernv.h"
+static void pnv_setup_rfi_flush(void)
+{
+ struct device_node *np, *fw_features;
+ enum l1d_flush_type type;
+ int enable;
+
+ /* Default to fallback in case fw-features are not available */
+ type = L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK;
+ enable = 1;
+
+ np = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "ibm,opal");
+ fw_features = of_get_child_by_name(np, "fw-features");
+ of_node_put(np);
+
+ if (fw_features) {
+ np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, "inst-l1d-flush-trig2");
+ if (np && of_property_read_bool(np, "enabled"))
+ type = L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG;
+
+ of_node_put(np);
+
+ np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, "inst-l1d-flush-ori30,30,0");
+ if (np && of_property_read_bool(np, "enabled"))
+ type = L1D_FLUSH_ORI;
+
+ of_node_put(np);
+
+ /* Enable unless firmware says NOT to */
+ enable = 2;
+ np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, "needs-l1d-flush-msr-hv-1-to-0");
+ if (np && of_property_read_bool(np, "disabled"))
+ enable--;
+
+ of_node_put(np);
+
+ np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, "needs-l1d-flush-msr-pr-0-to-1");
+ if (np && of_property_read_bool(np, "disabled"))
+ enable--;
+
+ of_node_put(np);
+ of_node_put(fw_features);
+ }
+
+ setup_rfi_flush(type, enable > 0);
+}
+
static void __init pnv_setup_arch(void)
{
set_arch_panic_timeout(10, ARCH_PANIC_TIMEOUT);
+ pnv_setup_rfi_flush();
+
/* Initialize SMP */
pnv_smp_init();
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c
index 97aa3f332f24..1845fc611912 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c
@@ -450,6 +450,39 @@ static void __init find_and_init_phbs(void)
of_pci_check_probe_only();
}
+static void pseries_setup_rfi_flush(void)
+{
+ struct h_cpu_char_result result;
+ enum l1d_flush_type types;
+ bool enable;
+ long rc;
+
+ /* Enable by default */
+ enable = true;
+
+ rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&result);
+ if (rc == H_SUCCESS) {
+ types = L1D_FLUSH_NONE;
+
+ if (result.character & H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2)
+ types |= L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG;
+ if (result.character & H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30)
+ types |= L1D_FLUSH_ORI;
+
+ /* Use fallback if nothing set in hcall */
+ if (types == L1D_FLUSH_NONE)
+ types = L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK;
+
+ if (!(result.behaviour & H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR))
+ enable = false;
+ } else {
+ /* Default to fallback if case hcall is not available */
+ types = L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK;
+ }
+
+ setup_rfi_flush(types, enable);
+}
+
static void __init pSeries_setup_arch(void)
{
set_arch_panic_timeout(10, ARCH_PANIC_TIMEOUT);
@@ -467,6 +500,8 @@ static void __init pSeries_setup_arch(void)
fwnmi_init();
+ pseries_setup_rfi_flush();
+
/* By default, only probe PCI (can be overridden by rtas_pci) */
pci_add_flags(PCI_PROBE_ONLY);
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
index bdd9cc59d20f..b0cd306dc527 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/context_tracking.h>
#include <linux/user-return-notifier.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/uprobes.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
@@ -201,7 +202,7 @@ __visible inline void prepare_exit_to_usermode(struct pt_regs *regs)
* special case only applies after poking regs and before the
* very next return to user mode.
*/
- current->thread.status &= ~(TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED);
+ ti->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED);
#endif
user_enter_irqoff();
@@ -277,7 +278,8 @@ __visible void do_syscall_64(struct pt_regs *regs)
* regs->orig_ax, which changes the behavior of some syscalls.
*/
if (likely((nr & __SYSCALL_MASK) < NR_syscalls)) {
- regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr & __SYSCALL_MASK](
+ nr = array_index_nospec(nr & __SYSCALL_MASK, NR_syscalls);
+ regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr](
regs->di, regs->si, regs->dx,
regs->r10, regs->r8, regs->r9);
}
@@ -299,7 +301,7 @@ static __always_inline void do_syscall_32_irqs_on(struct pt_regs *regs)
unsigned int nr = (unsigned int)regs->orig_ax;
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
- current->thread.status |= TS_COMPAT;
+ ti->status |= TS_COMPAT;
#endif
if (READ_ONCE(ti->flags) & _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY) {
@@ -313,6 +315,7 @@ static __always_inline void do_syscall_32_irqs_on(struct pt_regs *regs)
}
if (likely(nr < IA32_NR_syscalls)) {
+ nr = array_index_nospec(nr, IA32_NR_syscalls);
/*
* It's possible that a 32-bit syscall implementation
* takes a 64-bit parameter but nonetheless assumes that
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
index a76dc738ec61..f5434b4670c1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -237,7 +237,8 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
* exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture
* speculative execution to prevent attack.
*/
- FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
+ /* Clobbers %ebx */
+ FILL_RETURN_BUFFER RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
#endif
/* restore callee-saved registers */
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index e729e1528584..db5009ce065a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -177,96 +177,17 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_swapgs)
pushq %r9 /* pt_regs->r9 */
pushq %r10 /* pt_regs->r10 */
pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->r11 */
- sub $(6*8), %rsp /* pt_regs->bp, bx, r12-15 not saved */
+ pushq %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */
+ pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */
+ pushq %r12 /* pt_regs->r12 */
+ pushq %r13 /* pt_regs->r13 */
+ pushq %r14 /* pt_regs->r14 */
+ pushq %r15 /* pt_regs->r15 */
- /*
- * If we need to do entry work or if we guess we'll need to do
- * exit work, go straight to the slow path.
- */
- movq PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %r11
- testl $_TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY|_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, TASK_TI_flags(%r11)
- jnz entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path
-
-entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath:
- /*
- * Easy case: enable interrupts and issue the syscall. If the syscall
- * needs pt_regs, we'll call a stub that disables interrupts again
- * and jumps to the slow path.
- */
- TRACE_IRQS_ON
- ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
-#if __SYSCALL_MASK == ~0
- cmpq $__NR_syscall_max, %rax
-#else
- andl $__SYSCALL_MASK, %eax
- cmpl $__NR_syscall_max, %eax
-#endif
- ja 1f /* return -ENOSYS (already in pt_regs->ax) */
- movq %r10, %rcx
-
- /*
- * This call instruction is handled specially in stub_ptregs_64.
- * It might end up jumping to the slow path. If it jumps, RAX
- * and all argument registers are clobbered.
- */
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
- movq sys_call_table(, %rax, 8), %rax
- call __x86_indirect_thunk_rax
-#else
- call *sys_call_table(, %rax, 8)
-#endif
-.Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath_call:
-
- movq %rax, RAX(%rsp)
-1:
-
- /*
- * If we get here, then we know that pt_regs is clean for SYSRET64.
- * If we see that no exit work is required (which we are required
- * to check with IRQs off), then we can go straight to SYSRET64.
- */
- DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
- TRACE_IRQS_OFF
- movq PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %r11
- testl $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, TASK_TI_flags(%r11)
- jnz 1f
-
- LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT
- TRACE_IRQS_ON /* user mode is traced as IRQs on */
- movq RIP(%rsp), %rcx
- movq EFLAGS(%rsp), %r11
- RESTORE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_RCX_R11
- /*
- * This opens a window where we have a user CR3, but are
- * running in the kernel. This makes using the CS
- * register useless for telling whether or not we need to
- * switch CR3 in NMIs. Normal interrupts are OK because
- * they are off here.
- */
- SWITCH_USER_CR3
- movq RSP(%rsp), %rsp
- USERGS_SYSRET64
-
-1:
- /*
- * The fast path looked good when we started, but something changed
- * along the way and we need to switch to the slow path. Calling
- * raise(3) will trigger this, for example. IRQs are off.
- */
- TRACE_IRQS_ON
- ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
- movq %rsp, %rdi
- call syscall_return_slowpath /* returns with IRQs disabled */
- jmp return_from_SYSCALL_64
-
-entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path:
/* IRQs are off. */
- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
movq %rsp, %rdi
call do_syscall_64 /* returns with IRQs disabled */
-return_from_SYSCALL_64:
RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ /* we're about to change IF */
@@ -339,6 +260,7 @@ return_from_SYSCALL_64:
syscall_return_via_sysret:
/* rcx and r11 are already restored (see code above) */
RESTORE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_RCX_R11
+
/*
* This opens a window where we have a user CR3, but are
* running in the kernel. This makes using the CS
@@ -363,45 +285,6 @@ opportunistic_sysret_failed:
jmp restore_c_regs_and_iret
END(entry_SYSCALL_64)
-ENTRY(stub_ptregs_64)
- /*
- * Syscalls marked as needing ptregs land here.
- * If we are on the fast path, we need to save the extra regs,
- * which we achieve by trying again on the slow path. If we are on
- * the slow path, the extra regs are already saved.
- *
- * RAX stores a pointer to the C function implementing the syscall.
- * IRQs are on.
- */
- cmpq $.Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath_call, (%rsp)
- jne 1f
-
- /*
- * Called from fast path -- disable IRQs again, pop return address
- * and jump to slow path
- */
- DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
- TRACE_IRQS_OFF
- popq %rax
- jmp entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path
-
-1:
- JMP_NOSPEC %rax /* Called from C */
-END(stub_ptregs_64)
-
-.macro ptregs_stub func
-ENTRY(ptregs_\func)
- leaq \func(%rip), %rax
- jmp stub_ptregs_64
-END(ptregs_\func)
-.endm
-
-/* Instantiate ptregs_stub for each ptregs-using syscall */
-#define __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_(sym)
-#define __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_ptregs(sym) ptregs_stub sym
-#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_##qual(sym)
-#include <asm/syscalls_64.h>
-
/*
* %rdi: prev task
* %rsi: next task
@@ -435,7 +318,8 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
* exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture
* speculative execution to prevent attack.
*/
- FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
+ /* Clobbers %rbx */
+ FILL_RETURN_BUFFER RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
#endif
/* restore callee-saved registers */
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c
index 9dbc5abb6162..6705edda4ac3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c
@@ -6,14 +6,11 @@
#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
#include <asm/syscall.h>
-#define __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_(sym) sym
-#define __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_ptregs(sym) ptregs_##sym
-
-#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) extern asmlinkage long __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_##qual(sym)(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
+#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) extern asmlinkage long sym(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
#include <asm/syscalls_64.h>
#undef __SYSCALL_64
-#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) [nr] = __SYSCALL_64_QUAL_##qual(sym),
+#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, qual) [nr] = sym,
extern long sys_ni_syscall(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
index 982c9e31daca..21298c173b0e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <linux/device.h>
#include <linux/coredump.h>
+#include <linux/kaiser.h>
#include <asm-generic/sizes.h>
#include <asm/perf_event.h>
@@ -77,6 +78,23 @@ static size_t buf_size(struct page *page)
return 1 << (PAGE_SHIFT + page_private(page));
}
+static void bts_buffer_free_aux(void *data)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+ struct bts_buffer *buf = data;
+ int nbuf;
+
+ for (nbuf = 0; nbuf < buf->nr_bufs; nbuf++) {
+ struct page *page = buf->buf[nbuf].page;
+ void *kaddr = page_address(page);
+ size_t page_size = buf_size(page);
+
+ kaiser_remove_mapping((unsigned long)kaddr, page_size);
+ }
+#endif
+ kfree(data);
+}
+
static void *
bts_buffer_setup_aux(int cpu, void **pages, int nr_pages, bool overwrite)
{
@@ -113,29 +131,33 @@ bts_buffer_setup_aux(int cpu, void **pages, int nr_pages, bool overwrite)
buf->real_size = size - size % BTS_RECORD_SIZE;
for (pg = 0, nbuf = 0, offset = 0, pad = 0; nbuf < buf->nr_bufs; nbuf++) {
- unsigned int __nr_pages;
+ void *kaddr = pages[pg];
+ size_t page_size;
+
+ page = virt_to_page(kaddr);
+ page_size = buf_size(page);
+
+ if (kaiser_add_mapping((unsigned long)kaddr,
+ page_size, __PAGE_KERNEL) < 0) {
+ buf->nr_bufs = nbuf;
+ bts_buffer_free_aux(buf);
+ return NULL;
+ }
- page = virt_to_page(pages[pg]);
- __nr_pages = PagePrivate(page) ? 1 << page_private(page) : 1;
buf->buf[nbuf].page = page;
buf->buf[nbuf].offset = offset;
buf->buf[nbuf].displacement = (pad ? BTS_RECORD_SIZE - pad : 0);
- buf->buf[nbuf].size = buf_size(page) - buf->buf[nbuf].displacement;
+ buf->buf[nbuf].size = page_size - buf->buf[nbuf].displacement;
pad = buf->buf[nbuf].size % BTS_RECORD_SIZE;
buf->buf[nbuf].size -= pad;
- pg += __nr_pages;
- offset += __nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ pg += page_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ offset += page_size;
}
return buf;
}
-static void bts_buffer_free_aux(void *data)
-{
- kfree(data);
-}
-
static unsigned long bts_buffer_offset(struct bts_buffer *buf, unsigned int idx)
{
return buf->buf[idx].offset + buf->buf[idx].displacement;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
index b15aa4083dfd..166654218329 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
@@ -37,5 +37,7 @@ INDIRECT_THUNK(dx)
INDIRECT_THUNK(si)
INDIRECT_THUNK(di)
INDIRECT_THUNK(bp)
-INDIRECT_THUNK(sp)
+asmlinkage void __fill_rsb(void);
+asmlinkage void __clear_rsb(void);
+
#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h
index 00523524edbf..7bb29a416b77 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h
@@ -11,10 +11,12 @@
# define __ASM_FORM_COMMA(x) " " #x ","
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+#ifndef __x86_64__
+/* 32 bit */
# define __ASM_SEL(a,b) __ASM_FORM(a)
# define __ASM_SEL_RAW(a,b) __ASM_FORM_RAW(a)
#else
+/* 64 bit */
# define __ASM_SEL(a,b) __ASM_FORM(b)
# define __ASM_SEL_RAW(a,b) __ASM_FORM_RAW(b)
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
index bfb28caf97b1..857590390397 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
@@ -23,6 +23,34 @@
#define wmb() asm volatile("sfence" ::: "memory")
#endif
+/**
+ * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a mask that is ~0UL when the
+ * bounds check succeeds and 0 otherwise
+ * @index: array element index
+ * @size: number of elements in array
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0 - (index < size)
+ */
+static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ unsigned long mask;
+
+ asm ("cmp %1,%2; sbb %0,%0;"
+ :"=r" (mask)
+ :"r"(size),"r" (index)
+ :"cc");
+ return mask;
+}
+
+/* Override the default implementation from linux/nospec.h. */
+#define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec
+
+/* Prevent speculative execution past this barrier. */
+#define barrier_nospec() alternative_2("", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, \
+ "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PPRO_FENCE
#define dma_rmb() rmb()
#else
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
index 9ea67a04ff4f..8c101579f535 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ enum cpuid_leafs
CPUID_8000_000A_EDX,
CPUID_7_ECX,
CPUID_8000_0007_EBX,
+ CPUID_7_EDX,
};
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES
@@ -78,8 +79,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32];
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 15, feature_bit) || \
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \
+ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \
REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK || \
- BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18))
+ BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19))
#define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET(feature_bit) \
( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 0, feature_bit) || \
@@ -100,8 +102,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32];
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 15, feature_bit) || \
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \
+ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \
DISABLED_MASK_CHECK || \
- BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18))
+ BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19))
#define cpu_has(c, bit) \
(__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 : \
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 8537a21acd8b..8eb23f5cf7f4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
/*
* Defines x86 CPU feature bits
*/
-#define NCAPINTS 18 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
+#define NCAPINTS 19 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
#define NBUGINTS 1 /* N 32-bit bug flags */
/*
@@ -194,16 +194,16 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE ( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */
#define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (7*32+16) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (7*32+17) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */
/* Because the ALTERNATIVE scheme is for members of the X86_FEATURE club... */
#define X86_FEATURE_KAISER ( 7*32+31) /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION w/o nokaiser */
+#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
+
/* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
#define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
#define X86_FEATURE_VNMI ( 8*32+ 1) /* Intel Virtual NMI */
@@ -260,6 +260,9 @@
/* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (ebx), word 13 */
#define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO (13*32+0) /* CLZERO instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_IRPERF (13*32+1) /* Instructions Retired Count */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB (13*32+12) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS (13*32+14) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP (13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
/* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (eax), word 14 */
#define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM (14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */
@@ -295,6 +298,13 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_SUCCOR (17*32+1) /* Uncorrectable error containment and recovery */
#define X86_FEATURE_SMCA (17*32+3) /* Scalable MCA */
+/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP (18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */
+
/*
* BUG word(s)
*/
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 21c5ac15657b..1f8cca459c6c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
#define DISABLED_MASK15 0
#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE)
#define DISABLED_MASK17 0
-#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18)
+#define DISABLED_MASK18 0
+#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
#endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
index 34a46dc076d3..75b748a1deb8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
*/
#define INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH 0x0E
+
#define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM 0x0F
#define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM_L 0x16
#define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_PENRYN 0x17
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@
#define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_G 0x1F /* Auburndale / Havendale */
#define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EP 0x1A
#define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EX 0x2E
+
#define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE 0x25
#define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EP 0x2C
#define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EX 0x2F
@@ -36,9 +38,9 @@
#define INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E 0x46
#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE 0x3D
-#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D 0x56
#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E 0x47
#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X 0x4F
+#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D 0x56
#define INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE 0x4E
#define INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP 0x5E
@@ -57,9 +59,10 @@
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2 0x4D /* Avaton/Rangely */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT 0x4C /* CherryTrail / Braswell */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD 0x4A /* Tangier */
-#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MOOREFIELD 0x5A /* Annidale */
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MOOREFIELD 0x5A /* Anniedale */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT 0x5C
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_DENVERTON 0x5F /* Goldmont Microserver */
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE 0x7A
/* Xeon Phi */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index b11c4c072df8..c768bc1550a1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -37,6 +37,13 @@
#define EFER_FFXSR (1<<_EFER_FFXSR)
/* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */
+#define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL 0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP (1 << 1) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+
+#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
+#define PRED_CMD_IBPB (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+
#define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0 0x000000c1
#define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR1 0x000000c2
#define MSR_FSB_FREQ 0x000000cd
@@ -50,6 +57,11 @@
#define SNB_C3_AUTO_UNDEMOTE (1UL << 28)
#define MSR_MTRRcap 0x000000fe
+
+#define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a
+#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO (1 << 0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
+#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL (1 << 1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */
+
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL 0x00000119
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3 0x0000011e
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
index b5fee97813cd..ed35b915b5c9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
@@ -188,8 +188,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long long rdtsc_ordered(void)
* that some other imaginary CPU is updating continuously with a
* time stamp.
*/
- alternative_2("", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC,
- "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC);
+ barrier_nospec();
return rdtsc();
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 4ad41087ce0e..300cc159b4a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -1,56 +1,12 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
-#ifndef __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__
-#define __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
+#define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
-/*
- * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
- *
- * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
- * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
- *
- * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
- * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
- * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
- * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
- * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
- *
- * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and
- * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that
- * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there.
- */
-
-#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
-#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */
-
-/*
- * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
- * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation
- * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
- */
-#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \
- mov $(nr/2), reg; \
-771: \
- call 772f; \
-773: /* speculation trap */ \
- pause; \
- lfence; \
- jmp 773b; \
-772: \
- call 774f; \
-775: /* speculation trap */ \
- pause; \
- lfence; \
- jmp 775b; \
-774: \
- dec reg; \
- jnz 771b; \
- add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp;
-
#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
/*
@@ -121,17 +77,10 @@
#endif
.endm
- /*
- * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
- * monstrosity above, manually.
- */
-.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
+/* This clobbers the BX register */
+.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER nr:req ftr:req
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
- ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
- ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \
- __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)) \
- \ftr
-.Lskip_rsb_\@:
+ ALTERNATIVE "", "call __clear_rsb", \ftr
#endif
.endm
@@ -201,22 +150,30 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
* On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
* can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
* retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
- * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided.
+ * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided.
*/
static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
- unsigned long loops;
-
- asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
- ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f",
- __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)),
- X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
- "910:"
- : "=r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
- : : "memory" );
+ alternative_input("",
+ "call __fill_rsb",
+ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,
+ ASM_NO_INPUT_CLOBBER(_ASM_BX, "memory"));
#endif
}
+static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
+{
+ asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("",
+ "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t"
+ "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t"
+ "movl $0, %%edx\n\t"
+ "wrmsr",
+ X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB)
+ : : [msr] "i" (MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD),
+ [val] "i" (PRED_CMD_IBPB)
+ : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory");
+}
+
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
-#endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h
index 1178a51b77f3..b6d425999f99 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h
@@ -27,17 +27,6 @@ static inline void paravirt_release_pud(unsigned long pfn) {}
*/
extern gfp_t __userpte_alloc_gfp;
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
-/*
- * Instead of one PGD, we acquire two PGDs. Being order-1, it is
- * both 8k in size and 8k-aligned. That lets us just flip bit 12
- * in a pointer to swap between the two 4k halves.
- */
-#define PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER 1
-#else
-#define PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER 0
-#endif
-
/*
* Allocate and free page tables.
*/
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 2536f90cd30c..5af0401ccff2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -20,9 +20,15 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
extern int kaiser_enabled;
+/*
+ * Instead of one PGD, we acquire two PGDs. Being order-1, it is
+ * both 8k in size and 8k-aligned. That lets us just flip bit 12
+ * in a pointer to swap between the two 4k halves.
+ */
#else
#define kaiser_enabled 0
#endif
+#define PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER kaiser_enabled
void ptdump_walk_pgd_level(struct seq_file *m, pgd_t *pgd);
void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 353f038ec645..cb866ae1bc5d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -391,8 +391,6 @@ struct thread_struct {
unsigned short gsindex;
#endif
- u32 status; /* thread synchronous flags */
-
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
unsigned long fsbase;
unsigned long gsbase;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h
index fac9a5c0abe9..6847d85400a8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@
#define REQUIRED_MASK15 0
#define REQUIRED_MASK16 0
#define REQUIRED_MASK17 0
-#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18)
+#define REQUIRED_MASK18 0
+#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
#endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h
index e3c95e8e61c5..03eedc21246d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static inline long syscall_get_error(struct task_struct *task,
* TS_COMPAT is set for 32-bit syscall entries and then
* remains set until we return to user mode.
*/
- if (task->thread.status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED))
+ if (task->thread_info.status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED))
/*
* Sign-extend the value so (int)-EFOO becomes (long)-EFOO
* and will match correctly in comparisons.
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static inline void syscall_get_arguments(struct task_struct *task,
unsigned long *args)
{
# ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
- if (task->thread.status & TS_COMPAT)
+ if (task->thread_info.status & TS_COMPAT)
switch (i) {
case 0:
if (!n--) break;
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static inline void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task,
const unsigned long *args)
{
# ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
- if (task->thread.status & TS_COMPAT)
+ if (task->thread_info.status & TS_COMPAT)
switch (i) {
case 0:
if (!n--) break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
index bdf9c4c91572..89978b9c667a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ struct task_struct;
struct thread_info {
unsigned long flags; /* low level flags */
+ u32 status; /* thread synchronous flags */
};
#define INIT_THREAD_INFO(tsk) \
@@ -213,7 +214,7 @@ static inline int arch_within_stack_frames(const void * const stack,
#define in_ia32_syscall() true
#else
#define in_ia32_syscall() (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) && \
- current->thread.status & TS_COMPAT)
+ current_thread_info()->status & TS_COMPAT)
#endif
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index dead0f3921f3..a8d85a687cf4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -123,6 +123,11 @@ extern int __get_user_bad(void);
#define __uaccess_begin() stac()
#define __uaccess_end() clac()
+#define __uaccess_begin_nospec() \
+({ \
+ stac(); \
+ barrier_nospec(); \
+})
/*
* This is a type: either unsigned long, if the argument fits into
@@ -432,7 +437,7 @@ do { \
({ \
int __gu_err; \
__inttype(*(ptr)) __gu_val; \
- __uaccess_begin(); \
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \
__get_user_size(__gu_val, (ptr), (size), __gu_err, -EFAULT); \
__uaccess_end(); \
(x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \
@@ -474,6 +479,10 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; };
__uaccess_begin(); \
barrier();
+#define uaccess_try_nospec do { \
+ current->thread.uaccess_err = 0; \
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \
+
#define uaccess_catch(err) \
__uaccess_end(); \
(err) |= (current->thread.uaccess_err ? -EFAULT : 0); \
@@ -538,7 +547,7 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; };
* get_user_ex(...);
* } get_user_catch(err)
*/
-#define get_user_try uaccess_try
+#define get_user_try uaccess_try_nospec
#define get_user_catch(err) uaccess_catch(err)
#define get_user_ex(x, ptr) do { \
@@ -573,7 +582,7 @@ extern void __cmpxchg_wrong_size(void)
__typeof__(ptr) __uval = (uval); \
__typeof__(*(ptr)) __old = (old); \
__typeof__(*(ptr)) __new = (new); \
- __uaccess_begin(); \
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \
switch (size) { \
case 1: \
{ \
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
index 7d3bdd1ed697..d6d245088dd5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
@@ -102,17 +102,17 @@ __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
switch (n) {
case 1:
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
__get_user_size(*(u8 *)to, from, 1, ret, 1);
__uaccess_end();
return ret;
case 2:
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
__get_user_size(*(u16 *)to, from, 2, ret, 2);
__uaccess_end();
return ret;
case 4:
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
__get_user_size(*(u32 *)to, from, 4, ret, 4);
__uaccess_end();
return ret;
@@ -130,17 +130,17 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long __copy_from_user_nocache(void *to,
switch (n) {
case 1:
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
__get_user_size(*(u8 *)to, from, 1, ret, 1);
__uaccess_end();
return ret;
case 2:
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
__get_user_size(*(u16 *)to, from, 2, ret, 2);
__uaccess_end();
return ret;
case 4:
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
__get_user_size(*(u32 *)to, from, 4, ret, 4);
__uaccess_end();
return ret;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
index 673059a109fe..6e5cc08134ba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
@@ -59,31 +59,31 @@ int __copy_from_user_nocheck(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size)
return copy_user_generic(dst, (__force void *)src, size);
switch (size) {
case 1:
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
__get_user_asm(*(u8 *)dst, (u8 __user *)src,
ret, "b", "b", "=q", 1);
__uaccess_end();
return ret;
case 2:
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
__get_user_asm(*(u16 *)dst, (u16 __user *)src,
ret, "w", "w", "=r", 2);
__uaccess_end();
return ret;
case 4:
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
__get_user_asm(*(u32 *)dst, (u32 __user *)src,
ret, "l", "k", "=r", 4);
__uaccess_end();
return ret;
case 8:
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
__get_user_asm(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src,
ret, "q", "", "=r", 8);
__uaccess_end();
return ret;
case 10:
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
__get_user_asm(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src,
ret, "q", "", "=r", 10);
if (likely(!ret))
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ int __copy_from_user_nocheck(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size)
__uaccess_end();
return ret;
case 16:
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
__get_user_asm(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src,
ret, "q", "", "=r", 16);
if (likely(!ret))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index 10d5a3d6affc..03b6e5c6cf23 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -46,17 +46,6 @@ static int __init setup_noreplace_smp(char *str)
}
__setup("noreplace-smp", setup_noreplace_smp);
-#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
-static int __initdata_or_module noreplace_paravirt = 0;
-
-static int __init setup_noreplace_paravirt(char *str)
-{
- noreplace_paravirt = 1;
- return 1;
-}
-__setup("noreplace-paravirt", setup_noreplace_paravirt);
-#endif
-
#define DPRINTK(fmt, args...) \
do { \
if (debug_alternative) \
@@ -588,9 +577,6 @@ void __init_or_module apply_paravirt(struct paravirt_patch_site *start,
struct paravirt_patch_site *p;
char insnbuf[MAX_PATCH_LEN];
- if (noreplace_paravirt)
- return;
-
for (p = start; p < end; p++) {
unsigned int used;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 8cacf62ec458..957ad443b786 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
@@ -89,20 +90,41 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
};
#undef pr_fmt
-#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 mitigation: " fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt
static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+#ifdef RETPOLINE
+static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
+
+bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
+{
+ if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline)
+ return true;
+
+ pr_err("System may be vulnerable to spectre v2\n");
+ spectre_v2_bad_module = true;
+ return false;
+}
+
+static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void)
+{
+ return spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : "";
+}
+#else
+static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
+#endif
+
static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason)
{
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
- pr_info("%s\n", reason);
+ pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason);
}
static void __init spec2_print_if_secure(const char *reason)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
- pr_info("%s\n", reason);
+ pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason);
}
static inline bool retp_compiler(void)
@@ -117,42 +139,68 @@ static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len);
}
+static const struct {
+ const char *option;
+ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd;
+ bool secure;
+} mitigation_options[] = {
+ { "off", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE, false },
+ { "on", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, true },
+ { "retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, false },
+ { "retpoline,amd", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, false },
+ { "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false },
+ { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false },
+};
+
static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
{
char arg[20];
- int ret;
-
- ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg,
- sizeof(arg));
- if (ret > 0) {
- if (match_option(arg, ret, "off")) {
- goto disable;
- } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "on")) {
- spec2_print_if_secure("force enabled on command line.");
- return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE;
- } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline")) {
- spec2_print_if_insecure("retpoline selected on command line.");
- return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE;
- } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,amd")) {
- if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
- pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n");
- return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
- }
- spec2_print_if_insecure("AMD retpoline selected on command line.");
- return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD;
- } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,generic")) {
- spec2_print_if_insecure("generic retpoline selected on command line.");
- return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC;
- } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "auto")) {
+ int ret, i;
+ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+
+ if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
+ else {
+ ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg,
+ sizeof(arg));
+ if (ret < 0)
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) {
+ if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option))
+ continue;
+ cmd = mitigation_options[i].cmd;
+ break;
}
+
+ if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) {
+ pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ mitigation_options[i].option);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE ||
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD ||
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) &&
+ !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
+ pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ mitigation_options[i].option);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
- if (!cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
+ if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
+ pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n");
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
-disable:
- spec2_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
- return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
+ }
+
+ if (mitigation_options[i].secure)
+ spec2_print_if_secure(mitigation_options[i].option);
+ else
+ spec2_print_if_insecure(mitigation_options[i].option);
+
+ return cmd;
}
/* Check for Skylake-like CPUs (for RSB handling) */
@@ -190,10 +238,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
return;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
- /* FALLTRHU */
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
- goto retpoline_auto;
-
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
+ goto retpoline_auto;
+ break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD:
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
goto retpoline_amd;
@@ -248,6 +296,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n");
}
+
+ /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
+ pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
+ }
}
#undef pr_fmt
@@ -268,7 +322,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
- return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
}
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
@@ -277,6 +331,8 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
- return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]);
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
+ spectre_v2_module_string());
}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index d198ae02f2b7..08e89ed6aa87 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
#include <asm/pat.h>
#include <asm/microcode.h>
#include <asm/microcode_intel.h>
+#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
#include <asm/uv/uv.h>
@@ -716,6 +718,26 @@ static void apply_forced_caps(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}
}
+static void init_speculation_control(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ /*
+ * The Intel SPEC_CTRL CPUID bit implies IBRS and IBPB support,
+ * and they also have a different bit for STIBP support. Also,
+ * a hypervisor might have set the individual AMD bits even on
+ * Intel CPUs, for finer-grained selection of what's available.
+ *
+ * We use the AMD bits in 0x8000_0008 EBX as the generic hardware
+ * features, which are visible in /proc/cpuinfo and used by the
+ * kernel. So set those accordingly from the Intel bits.
+ */
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) {
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
+ }
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
+}
+
void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
@@ -737,6 +759,7 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
cpuid_count(0x00000007, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_0_EBX] = ebx;
c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_ECX] = ecx;
+ c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_EDX] = edx;
}
/* Extended state features: level 0x0000000d */
@@ -809,6 +832,7 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = cpuid_edx(0x8000000a);
init_scattered_cpuid_features(c);
+ init_speculation_control(c);
}
static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
@@ -837,6 +861,41 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
#endif
}
+static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_speculation[] = {
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
+ { X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR, 5 },
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 5 },
+ { X86_VENDOR_NSC, 5 },
+ { X86_VENDOR_ANY, 4 },
+ {}
+};
+
+static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_meltdown[] = {
+ { X86_VENDOR_AMD },
+ {}
+};
+
+static bool __init cpu_vulnerable_to_meltdown(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u64 ia32_cap = 0;
+
+ if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown))
+ return false;
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
+
+ /* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
+ if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
/*
* Do minimum CPU detection early.
* Fields really needed: vendor, cpuid_level, family, model, mask,
@@ -883,11 +942,12 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
- if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
- setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
-
- setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
- setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
+ if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation)) {
+ if (cpu_vulnerable_to_meltdown(c))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
+ }
fpu__init_system(c);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
index fcd484d2bb03..4097b43cba2d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -61,6 +61,59 @@ void check_mpx_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}
}
+/*
+ * Early microcode releases for the Spectre v2 mitigation were broken.
+ * Information taken from;
+ * - https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/01/microcode-update-guidance.pdf
+ * - https://kb.vmware.com/s/article/52345
+ * - Microcode revisions observed in the wild
+ * - Release note from 20180108 microcode release
+ */
+struct sku_microcode {
+ u8 model;
+ u8 stepping;
+ u32 microcode;
+};
+static const struct sku_microcode spectre_bad_microcodes[] = {
+ { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0B, 0x84 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0A, 0x84 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x09, 0x84 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x0A, 0x84 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x09, 0x84 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x03, 0x0100013e },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x04, 0x0200003c },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x03, 0xc2 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x03, 0xc2 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE, 0x04, 0x28 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x1b },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x02, 0x14 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x03, 0x07000011 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X, 0x01, 0x0b000025 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT, 0x01, 0x21 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x18 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE, 0x03, 0x23 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x02, 0x3b },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x04, 0x10 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X, 0x04, 0x42a },
+ /* Updated in the 20180108 release; blacklist until we know otherwise */
+ { INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE, 0x01, 0x22 },
+ /* Observed in the wild */
+ { INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x06, 0x61b },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x07, 0x712 },
+};
+
+static bool bad_spectre_microcode(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spectre_bad_microcodes); i++) {
+ if (c->x86_model == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].model &&
+ c->x86_mask == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].stepping)
+ return (c->microcode <= spectre_bad_microcodes[i].microcode);
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 misc_enable;
@@ -87,6 +140,19 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV, lower_word, c->microcode);
}
+ /* Now if any of them are set, check the blacklist and clear the lot */
+ if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
+ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP) ||
+ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ||
+ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) && bad_spectre_microcode(c)) {
+ pr_warn("Intel Spectre v2 broken microcode detected; disabling Speculation Control\n");
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
+ }
+
/*
* Atom erratum AAE44/AAF40/AAG38/AAH41:
*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
index 5ce5155f0695..0afaf00b029b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
#define MICROCODE_VERSION "2.01"
static struct microcode_ops *microcode_ops;
-static bool dis_ucode_ldr;
+static bool dis_ucode_ldr = true;
/*
* Synchronization.
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ struct cpu_info_ctx {
static bool __init check_loader_disabled_bsp(void)
{
static const char *__dis_opt_str = "dis_ucode_ldr";
+ u32 a, b, c, d;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
const char *cmdline = (const char *)__pa_nodebug(boot_command_line);
@@ -85,8 +86,20 @@ static bool __init check_loader_disabled_bsp(void)
bool *res = &dis_ucode_ldr;
#endif
- if (cmdline_find_option_bool(cmdline, option))
- *res = true;
+ a = 1;
+ c = 0;
+ native_cpuid(&a, &b, &c, &d);
+
+ /*
+ * CPUID(1).ECX[31]: reserved for hypervisor use. This is still not
+ * completely accurate as xen pv guests don't see that CPUID bit set but
+ * that's good enough as they don't land on the BSP path anyway.
+ */
+ if (c & BIT(31))
+ return *res;
+
+ if (cmdline_find_option_bool(cmdline, option) <= 0)
+ *res = false;
return *res;
}
@@ -114,9 +127,7 @@ void __init load_ucode_bsp(void)
{
int vendor;
unsigned int family;
-
- if (check_loader_disabled_bsp())
- return;
+ bool intel = true;
if (!have_cpuid_p())
return;
@@ -126,16 +137,27 @@ void __init load_ucode_bsp(void)
switch (vendor) {
case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
- if (family >= 6)
- load_ucode_intel_bsp();
+ if (family < 6)
+ return;
break;
+
case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
- if (family >= 0x10)
- load_ucode_amd_bsp(family);
+ if (family < 0x10)
+ return;
+ intel = false;
break;
+
default:
- break;
+ return;
}
+
+ if (check_loader_disabled_bsp())
+ return;
+
+ if (intel)
+ load_ucode_intel_bsp();
+ else
+ load_ucode_amd_bsp(family);
}
static bool check_loader_disabled_ap(void)
@@ -154,9 +176,6 @@ void load_ucode_ap(void)
if (check_loader_disabled_ap())
return;
- if (!have_cpuid_p())
- return;
-
vendor = x86_cpuid_vendor();
family = x86_cpuid_family();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
index b0dd9aec183d..afbb52532791 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@ void init_scattered_cpuid_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
const struct cpuid_bit *cb;
static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
- { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW, CR_EDX, 2, 0x00000007, 0 },
- { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS, CR_EDX, 3, 0x00000007, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF, CR_ECX, 0, 0x00000006, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_EPB, CR_ECX, 3, 0x00000006, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE, CR_EDX, 7, 0x80000007, 0 },
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index 0887d2ae3797..dffe81d3c261 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ void set_personality_ia32(bool x32)
current->personality &= ~READ_IMPLIES_EXEC;
/* in_compat_syscall() uses the presence of the x32
syscall bit flag to determine compat status */
- current->thread.status &= ~TS_COMPAT;
+ current_thread_info()->status &= ~TS_COMPAT;
} else {
set_thread_flag(TIF_IA32);
clear_thread_flag(TIF_X32);
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ void set_personality_ia32(bool x32)
current->mm->context.ia32_compat = TIF_IA32;
current->personality |= force_personality32;
/* Prepare the first "return" to user space */
- current->thread.status |= TS_COMPAT;
+ current_thread_info()->status |= TS_COMPAT;
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(set_personality_ia32);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
index 0e63c0267f99..e497d374412a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ static int putreg32(struct task_struct *child, unsigned regno, u32 value)
*/
regs->orig_ax = value;
if (syscall_get_nr(child, regs) >= 0)
- child->thread.status |= TS_I386_REGS_POKED;
+ child->thread_info.status |= TS_I386_REGS_POKED;
break;
case offsetof(struct user32, regs.eflags):
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
index 763af1d0de64..b1a5d252d482 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
@@ -785,7 +785,7 @@ static inline unsigned long get_nr_restart_syscall(const struct pt_regs *regs)
* than the tracee.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
- if (current->thread.status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED))
+ if (current_thread_info()->status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED))
return __NR_ia32_restart_syscall;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
index 8402907825b0..21454e254a4c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
@@ -134,6 +134,16 @@ static int map_tboot_page(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long pfn,
return -1;
set_pte_at(&tboot_mm, vaddr, pte, pfn_pte(pfn, prot));
pte_unmap(pte);
+
+ /*
+ * PTI poisons low addresses in the kernel page tables in the
+ * name of making them unusable for userspace. To execute
+ * code at such a low address, the poison must be cleared.
+ *
+ * Note: 'pgd' actually gets set in pud_alloc().
+ */
+ pgd->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX;
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 91af75e37306..93f924de06cf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -355,6 +355,10 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
F(3DNOWPREFETCH) | F(OSVW) | 0 /* IBS */ | F(XOP) |
0 /* SKINIT, WDT, LWP */ | F(FMA4) | F(TBM);
+ /* cpuid 0x80000008.ebx */
+ const u32 kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features =
+ F(IBPB) | F(IBRS);
+
/* cpuid 0xC0000001.edx */
const u32 kvm_cpuid_C000_0001_edx_x86_features =
F(XSTORE) | F(XSTORE_EN) | F(XCRYPT) | F(XCRYPT_EN) |
@@ -376,6 +380,10 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
/* cpuid 7.0.ecx*/
const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_ecx_x86_features = F(PKU) | 0 /*OSPKE*/;
+ /* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
+ const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
+ F(SPEC_CTRL) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
+
/* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */
get_cpu();
@@ -458,12 +466,14 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
/* PKU is not yet implemented for shadow paging. */
if (!tdp_enabled || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
entry->ecx &= ~F(PKU);
+ entry->edx &= kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features;
+ cpuid_mask(&entry->edx, CPUID_7_EDX);
} else {
entry->ebx = 0;
entry->ecx = 0;
+ entry->edx = 0;
}
entry->eax = 0;
- entry->edx = 0;
break;
}
case 9:
@@ -607,7 +617,14 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
if (!g_phys_as)
g_phys_as = phys_as;
entry->eax = g_phys_as | (virt_as << 8);
- entry->ebx = entry->edx = 0;
+ entry->edx = 0;
+ /* IBRS and IBPB aren't necessarily present in hardware cpuid */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
+ entry->ebx |= F(IBPB);
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+ entry->ebx |= F(IBRS);
+ entry->ebx &= kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features;
+ cpuid_mask(&entry->ebx, CPUID_8000_0008_EBX);
break;
}
case 0x80000019:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
index 9368fecca3ee..d1beb7156704 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
@@ -160,6 +160,37 @@ static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_rdtscp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP));
}
+static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_ibpb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
+
+ best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000008, 0);
+ if (best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)))
+ return true;
+ best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0);
+ return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL));
+}
+
+static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
+
+ best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000008, 0);
+ if (best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)))
+ return true;
+ best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0);
+ return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL));
+}
+
+static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_arch_capabilities(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
+
+ best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0);
+ return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES));
+}
+
+
/*
* NRIPS is provided through cpuidfn 0x8000000a.edx bit 3
*/
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
index 6f5a3b076341..c8d573822e60 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <asm/kvm_emulate.h>
#include <linux/stringify.h>
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include "x86.h"
#include "tss.h"
@@ -1012,8 +1013,8 @@ static __always_inline u8 test_cc(unsigned int condition, unsigned long flags)
void (*fop)(void) = (void *)em_setcc + 4 * (condition & 0xf);
flags = (flags & EFLAGS_MASK) | X86_EFLAGS_IF;
- asm("push %[flags]; popf; call *%[fastop]"
- : "=a"(rc) : [fastop]"r"(fop), [flags]"r"(flags));
+ asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC
+ : "=a"(rc) : [thunk_target]"r"(fop), [flags]"r"(flags));
return rc;
}
@@ -5306,15 +5307,14 @@ static void fetch_possible_mmx_operand(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void (*fop)(struct fastop *))
{
- register void *__sp asm(_ASM_SP);
ulong flags = (ctxt->eflags & EFLAGS_MASK) | X86_EFLAGS_IF;
if (!(ctxt->d & ByteOp))
fop += __ffs(ctxt->dst.bytes) * FASTOP_SIZE;
- asm("push %[flags]; popf; call *%[fastop]; pushf; pop %[flags]\n"
+ asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC " ; pushf; pop %[flags]\n"
: "+a"(ctxt->dst.val), "+d"(ctxt->src.val), [flags]"+D"(flags),
- [fastop]"+S"(fop), "+r"(__sp)
+ [thunk_target]"+S"(fop), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
: "c"(ctxt->src2.val));
ctxt->eflags = (ctxt->eflags & ~EFLAGS_MASK) | (flags & EFLAGS_MASK);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 24af898fb3a6..be644afab1bb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -183,6 +183,8 @@ struct vcpu_svm {
u64 gs_base;
} host;
+ u64 spec_ctrl;
+
u32 *msrpm;
ulong nmi_iret_rip;
@@ -248,6 +250,8 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs {
{ .index = MSR_CSTAR, .always = true },
{ .index = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, .always = true },
#endif
+ { .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, .always = false },
+ { .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, .always = false },
{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, .always = false },
{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, .always = false },
{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, .always = false },
@@ -510,6 +514,7 @@ struct svm_cpu_data {
struct kvm_ldttss_desc *tss_desc;
struct page *save_area;
+ struct vmcb *current_vmcb;
};
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data *, svm_data);
@@ -861,6 +866,25 @@ static bool valid_msr_intercept(u32 index)
return false;
}
+static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned msr)
+{
+ u8 bit_write;
+ unsigned long tmp;
+ u32 offset;
+ u32 *msrpm;
+
+ msrpm = is_guest_mode(vcpu) ? to_svm(vcpu)->nested.msrpm:
+ to_svm(vcpu)->msrpm;
+
+ offset = svm_msrpm_offset(msr);
+ bit_write = 2 * (msr & 0x0f) + 1;
+ tmp = msrpm[offset];
+
+ BUG_ON(offset == MSR_INVALID);
+
+ return !!test_bit(bit_write, &tmp);
+}
+
static void set_msr_interception(u32 *msrpm, unsigned msr,
int read, int write)
{
@@ -1535,6 +1559,8 @@ static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
u32 dummy;
u32 eax = 1;
+ svm->spec_ctrl = 0;
+
if (!init_event) {
svm->vcpu.arch.apic_base = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE |
MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE;
@@ -1644,11 +1670,17 @@ static void svm_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
__free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->nested.msrpm), MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER);
kvm_vcpu_uninit(vcpu);
kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, svm);
+ /*
+ * The vmcb page can be recycled, causing a false negative in
+ * svm_vcpu_load(). So do a full IBPB now.
+ */
+ indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
}
static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
int i;
if (unlikely(cpu != vcpu->cpu)) {
@@ -1677,6 +1709,10 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
wrmsrl(MSR_TSC_AUX, svm->tsc_aux);
+ if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) {
+ sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+ indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+ }
avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
}
@@ -3508,6 +3544,13 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
case MSR_VM_CR:
msr_info->data = svm->nested.vm_cr_msr;
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(vcpu))
+ return 1;
+
+ msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl;
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
msr_info->data = 0x01000065;
break;
@@ -3599,6 +3642,49 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
case MSR_IA32_TSC:
kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr);
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if (!msr->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(vcpu))
+ return 1;
+
+ /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
+ if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP))
+ return 1;
+
+ svm->spec_ctrl = data;
+
+ if (!data)
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * For non-nested:
+ * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
+ * it through.
+ *
+ * For nested:
+ * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in
+ * nested_svm_vmrun_msrpm.
+ * We update the L1 MSR bit as well since it will end up
+ * touching the MSR anyway now.
+ */
+ set_msr_interception(svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD:
+ if (!msr->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has_ibpb(vcpu))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (data & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!data)
+ break;
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB);
+ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+ break;
+ set_msr_interception(svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, 0, 1);
+ break;
case MSR_STAR:
svm->vmcb->save.star = data;
break;
@@ -4826,6 +4912,15 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
local_irq_enable();
+ /*
+ * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if
+ * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there
+ * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
+ * being speculatively taken.
+ */
+ if (svm->spec_ctrl)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
+
asm volatile (
"push %%" _ASM_BP "; \n\t"
"mov %c[rbx](%[svm]), %%" _ASM_BX " \n\t"
@@ -4918,6 +5013,27 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
#endif
);
+ /*
+ * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the
+ * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and
+ * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding
+ * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former
+ * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM.
+ *
+ * For non-nested case:
+ * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
+ * save it.
+ *
+ * For nested case:
+ * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
+ * save it.
+ */
+ if (!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
+
+ if (svm->spec_ctrl)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
+
/* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
vmexit_fill_RSB();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 178a344f55f8..d49da86e3099 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/tboot.h>
#include <linux/hrtimer.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
#include "x86.h"
@@ -109,6 +110,14 @@ static u64 __read_mostly host_xss;
static bool __read_mostly enable_pml = 1;
module_param_named(pml, enable_pml, bool, S_IRUGO);
+#define MSR_TYPE_R 1
+#define MSR_TYPE_W 2
+#define MSR_TYPE_RW 3
+
+#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC 1
+#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV 2
+#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_LM 4
+
#define KVM_VMX_TSC_MULTIPLIER_MAX 0xffffffffffffffffULL
/* Guest_tsc -> host_tsc conversion requires 64-bit division. */
@@ -173,7 +182,6 @@ module_param(ple_window_max, int, S_IRUGO);
extern const ulong vmx_return;
#define NR_AUTOLOAD_MSRS 8
-#define VMCS02_POOL_SIZE 1
struct vmcs {
u32 revision_id;
@@ -191,6 +199,7 @@ struct loaded_vmcs {
struct vmcs *shadow_vmcs;
int cpu;
int launched;
+ unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
struct list_head loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link;
};
@@ -207,7 +216,7 @@ struct shared_msr_entry {
* stored in guest memory specified by VMPTRLD, but is opaque to the guest,
* which must access it using VMREAD/VMWRITE/VMCLEAR instructions.
* More than one of these structures may exist, if L1 runs multiple L2 guests.
- * nested_vmx_run() will use the data here to build a vmcs02: a VMCS for the
+ * nested_vmx_run() will use the data here to build the vmcs02: a VMCS for the
* underlying hardware which will be used to run L2.
* This structure is packed to ensure that its layout is identical across
* machines (necessary for live migration).
@@ -386,13 +395,6 @@ struct __packed vmcs12 {
*/
#define VMCS12_SIZE 0x1000
-/* Used to remember the last vmcs02 used for some recently used vmcs12s */
-struct vmcs02_list {
- struct list_head list;
- gpa_t vmptr;
- struct loaded_vmcs vmcs02;
-};
-
/*
* The nested_vmx structure is part of vcpu_vmx, and holds information we need
* for correct emulation of VMX (i.e., nested VMX) on this vcpu.
@@ -419,15 +421,15 @@ struct nested_vmx {
*/
bool sync_shadow_vmcs;
- /* vmcs02_list cache of VMCSs recently used to run L2 guests */
- struct list_head vmcs02_pool;
- int vmcs02_num;
bool change_vmcs01_virtual_x2apic_mode;
/* L2 must run next, and mustn't decide to exit to L1. */
bool nested_run_pending;
+
+ struct loaded_vmcs vmcs02;
+
/*
- * Guest pages referred to in vmcs02 with host-physical pointers, so
- * we must keep them pinned while L2 runs.
+ * Guest pages referred to in the vmcs02 with host-physical
+ * pointers, so we must keep them pinned while L2 runs.
*/
struct page *apic_access_page;
struct page *virtual_apic_page;
@@ -436,8 +438,6 @@ struct nested_vmx {
bool pi_pending;
u16 posted_intr_nv;
- unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
-
struct hrtimer preemption_timer;
bool preemption_timer_expired;
@@ -538,6 +538,7 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
unsigned long host_rsp;
u8 fail;
bool nmi_known_unmasked;
+ u8 msr_bitmap_mode;
u32 exit_intr_info;
u32 idt_vectoring_info;
ulong rflags;
@@ -549,6 +550,10 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
u64 msr_host_kernel_gs_base;
u64 msr_guest_kernel_gs_base;
#endif
+
+ u64 arch_capabilities;
+ u64 spec_ctrl;
+
u32 vm_entry_controls_shadow;
u32 vm_exit_controls_shadow;
/*
@@ -856,21 +861,18 @@ static const unsigned short vmcs_field_to_offset_table[] = {
static inline short vmcs_field_to_offset(unsigned long field)
{
- BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) > SHRT_MAX);
+ const size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table);
+ unsigned short offset;
- if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table))
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(size > SHRT_MAX);
+ if (field >= size)
return -ENOENT;
- /*
- * FIXME: Mitigation for CVE-2017-5753. To be replaced with a
- * generic mechanism.
- */
- asm("lfence");
-
- if (vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0)
+ field = array_index_nospec(field, size);
+ offset = vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field];
+ if (offset == 0)
return -ENOENT;
-
- return vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field];
+ return offset;
}
static inline struct vmcs12 *get_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -912,6 +914,9 @@ static u32 vmx_segment_access_rights(struct kvm_segment *var);
static void copy_vmcs12_to_shadow(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx);
static void copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx);
static int alloc_identity_pagetable(struct kvm *kvm);
+static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+static void __always_inline vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
+ u32 msr, int type);
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, vmxarea);
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, current_vmcs);
@@ -931,12 +936,6 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(spinlock_t, blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock);
static unsigned long *vmx_io_bitmap_a;
static unsigned long *vmx_io_bitmap_b;
-static unsigned long *vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy;
-static unsigned long *vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode;
-static unsigned long *vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic;
-static unsigned long *vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic;
-static unsigned long *vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive;
-static unsigned long *vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive;
static unsigned long *vmx_vmread_bitmap;
static unsigned long *vmx_vmwrite_bitmap;
@@ -1853,6 +1852,52 @@ static void update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmcs_write32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, eb);
}
+/*
+ * Check if MSR is intercepted for currently loaded MSR bitmap.
+ */
+static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
+{
+ unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
+ int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+ if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
+ return true;
+
+ msr_bitmap = to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap;
+
+ if (msr <= 0x1fff) {
+ return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f);
+ } else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) {
+ msr &= 0x1fff;
+ return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f);
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if MSR is intercepted for L01 MSR bitmap.
+ */
+static bool msr_write_intercepted_l01(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
+{
+ unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
+ int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+ if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
+ return true;
+
+ msr_bitmap = to_vmx(vcpu)->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
+
+ if (msr <= 0x1fff) {
+ return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f);
+ } else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) {
+ msr &= 0x1fff;
+ return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f);
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
static void clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit)
{
@@ -2262,6 +2307,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) {
per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
+ indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
}
if (!already_loaded) {
@@ -2530,36 +2576,6 @@ static void move_msr_up(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, int from, int to)
vmx->guest_msrs[from] = tmp;
}
-static void vmx_set_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
-
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
- msr_bitmap = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msr_bitmap;
- else if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls() &&
- (vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL) &
- SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE)) {
- if (enable_apicv && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) {
- if (is_long_mode(vcpu))
- msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic;
- else
- msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic;
- } else {
- if (is_long_mode(vcpu))
- msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive;
- else
- msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive;
- }
- } else {
- if (is_long_mode(vcpu))
- msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode;
- else
- msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy;
- }
-
- vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(msr_bitmap));
-}
-
/*
* Set up the vmcs to automatically save and restore system
* msrs. Don't touch the 64-bit msrs if the guest is in legacy
@@ -2600,7 +2616,7 @@ static void setup_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
vmx->save_nmsrs = save_nmsrs;
if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
- vmx_set_msr_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu);
+ vmx_update_msr_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu);
}
/*
@@ -2989,6 +3005,19 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
case MSR_IA32_TSC:
msr_info->data = guest_read_tsc(vcpu);
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(vcpu))
+ return 1;
+
+ msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl;
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has_arch_capabilities(vcpu))
+ return 1;
+ msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->arch_capabilities;
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS);
break;
@@ -3093,6 +3122,68 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
case MSR_IA32_TSC:
kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr_info);
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(vcpu))
+ return 1;
+
+ /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
+ if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP))
+ return 1;
+
+ vmx->spec_ctrl = data;
+
+ if (!data)
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * For non-nested:
+ * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
+ * it through.
+ *
+ * For nested:
+ * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in
+ * nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the
+ * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten
+ * in the merging. We update the vmcs01 here for L1 as well
+ * since it will end up touching the MSR anyway now.
+ */
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap,
+ MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
+ MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD:
+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has_ibpb(vcpu))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (data & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!data)
+ break;
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB);
+
+ /*
+ * For non-nested:
+ * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
+ * it through.
+ *
+ * For nested:
+ * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in
+ * nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the
+ * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten
+ * in the merging.
+ */
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD,
+ MSR_TYPE_W);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
+ return 1;
+ vmx->arch_capabilities = data;
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data))
@@ -3532,11 +3623,6 @@ static struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs_cpu(int cpu)
return vmcs;
}
-static struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs(void)
-{
- return alloc_vmcs_cpu(raw_smp_processor_id());
-}
-
static void free_vmcs(struct vmcs *vmcs)
{
free_pages((unsigned long)vmcs, vmcs_config.order);
@@ -3552,9 +3638,38 @@ static void free_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
loaded_vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs);
free_vmcs(loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
loaded_vmcs->vmcs = NULL;
+ if (loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap)
+ free_page((unsigned long)loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap);
WARN_ON(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs != NULL);
}
+static struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs(void)
+{
+ return alloc_vmcs_cpu(raw_smp_processor_id());
+}
+
+static int alloc_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
+{
+ loaded_vmcs->vmcs = alloc_vmcs();
+ if (!loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs = NULL;
+ loaded_vmcs_init(loaded_vmcs);
+
+ if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) {
+ loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap = (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap)
+ goto out_vmcs;
+ memset(loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE);
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+out_vmcs:
+ free_loaded_vmcs(loaded_vmcs);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
static void free_kvm_area(void)
{
int cpu;
@@ -4561,10 +4676,8 @@ static void free_vpid(int vpid)
spin_unlock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
}
-#define MSR_TYPE_R 1
-#define MSR_TYPE_W 2
-static void __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
- u32 msr, int type)
+static void __always_inline vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
+ u32 msr, int type)
{
int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
@@ -4598,8 +4711,8 @@ static void __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
}
}
-static void __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
- u32 msr, int type)
+static void __always_inline vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
+ u32 msr, int type)
{
int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
@@ -4633,6 +4746,15 @@ static void __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
}
}
+static void __always_inline vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
+ u32 msr, int type, bool value)
+{
+ if (value)
+ vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, msr, type);
+ else
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, msr, type);
+}
+
/*
* If a msr is allowed by L0, we should check whether it is allowed by L1.
* The corresponding bit will be cleared unless both of L0 and L1 allow it.
@@ -4679,58 +4801,68 @@ static void nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l1,
}
}
-static void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(u32 msr, bool longmode_only)
+static u8 vmx_msr_bitmap_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- if (!longmode_only)
- __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy,
- msr, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
- __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode,
- msr, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
-}
+ u8 mode = 0;
-static void vmx_enable_intercept_msr_read_x2apic(u32 msr, bool apicv_active)
-{
- if (apicv_active) {
- __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic,
- msr, MSR_TYPE_R);
- __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic,
- msr, MSR_TYPE_R);
- } else {
- __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive,
- msr, MSR_TYPE_R);
- __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive,
- msr, MSR_TYPE_R);
+ if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls() &&
+ (vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL) &
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE)) {
+ mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC;
+ if (enable_apicv && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+ mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV;
}
+
+ if (is_long_mode(vcpu))
+ mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_LM;
+
+ return mode;
}
-static void vmx_disable_intercept_msr_read_x2apic(u32 msr, bool apicv_active)
+#define X2APIC_MSR(r) (APIC_BASE_MSR + ((r) >> 4))
+
+static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
+ u8 mode)
{
- if (apicv_active) {
- __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic,
- msr, MSR_TYPE_R);
- __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic,
- msr, MSR_TYPE_R);
- } else {
- __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive,
- msr, MSR_TYPE_R);
- __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive,
- msr, MSR_TYPE_R);
+ int msr;
+
+ for (msr = 0x800; msr <= 0x8ff; msr += BITS_PER_LONG) {
+ unsigned word = msr / BITS_PER_LONG;
+ msr_bitmap[word] = (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV) ? 0 : ~0;
+ msr_bitmap[word + (0x800 / sizeof(long))] = ~0;
+ }
+
+ if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC) {
+ /*
+ * TPR reads and writes can be virtualized even if virtual interrupt
+ * delivery is not in use.
+ */
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI), MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV) {
+ vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT), MSR_TYPE_R);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI), MSR_TYPE_W);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_SELF_IPI), MSR_TYPE_W);
+ }
}
}
-static void vmx_disable_intercept_msr_write_x2apic(u32 msr, bool apicv_active)
+static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- if (apicv_active) {
- __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic,
- msr, MSR_TYPE_W);
- __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic,
- msr, MSR_TYPE_W);
- } else {
- __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive,
- msr, MSR_TYPE_W);
- __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive,
- msr, MSR_TYPE_W);
- }
+ struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+ unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
+ u8 mode = vmx_msr_bitmap_mode(vcpu);
+ u8 changed = mode ^ vmx->msr_bitmap_mode;
+
+ if (!changed)
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW,
+ !(mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_LM));
+
+ if (changed & (MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC | MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV))
+ vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(msr_bitmap, mode);
+
+ vmx->msr_bitmap_mode = mode;
}
static bool vmx_get_enable_apicv(void)
@@ -4738,30 +4870,45 @@ static bool vmx_get_enable_apicv(void)
return enable_apicv;
}
-static int vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static void nested_mark_vmcs12_pages_dirty(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+ gfn_t gfn;
+
+ /*
+ * Don't need to mark the APIC access page dirty; it is never
+ * written to by the CPU during APIC virtualization.
+ */
+
+ if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)) {
+ gfn = vmcs12->virtual_apic_page_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gfn);
+ }
+
+ if (nested_cpu_has_posted_intr(vmcs12)) {
+ gfn = vmcs12->posted_intr_desc_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gfn);
+ }
+}
+
+
+static void vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
int max_irr;
void *vapic_page;
u16 status;
- if (vmx->nested.pi_desc &&
- vmx->nested.pi_pending) {
- vmx->nested.pi_pending = false;
- if (!pi_test_and_clear_on(vmx->nested.pi_desc))
- return 0;
-
- max_irr = find_last_bit(
- (unsigned long *)vmx->nested.pi_desc->pir, 256);
+ if (!vmx->nested.pi_desc || !vmx->nested.pi_pending)
+ return;
- if (max_irr == 256)
- return 0;
+ vmx->nested.pi_pending = false;
+ if (!pi_test_and_clear_on(vmx->nested.pi_desc))
+ return;
+ max_irr = find_last_bit((unsigned long *)vmx->nested.pi_desc->pir, 256);
+ if (max_irr != 256) {
vapic_page = kmap(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page);
- if (!vapic_page) {
- WARN_ON(1);
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
__kvm_apic_update_irr(vmx->nested.pi_desc->pir, vapic_page);
kunmap(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page);
@@ -4772,7 +4919,8 @@ static int vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status);
}
}
- return 0;
+
+ nested_mark_vmcs12_pages_dirty(vcpu);
}
static inline bool kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -4959,7 +5107,7 @@ static void vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
- vmx_set_msr_bitmap(vcpu);
+ vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu);
}
static u32 vmx_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
@@ -5048,7 +5196,7 @@ static int vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
vmcs_write64(VMWRITE_BITMAP, __pa(vmx_vmwrite_bitmap));
}
if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
- vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy));
+ vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap));
vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, -1ull); /* 22.3.1.5 */
@@ -5122,6 +5270,8 @@ static int vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
++vmx->nmsrs;
}
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, vmx->arch_capabilities);
vm_exit_controls_init(vmx, vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl);
@@ -5150,6 +5300,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
u64 cr0;
vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0;
+ vmx->spec_ctrl = 0;
vmx->soft_vnmi_blocked = 0;
@@ -6379,7 +6530,7 @@ static void wakeup_handler(void)
static __init int hardware_setup(void)
{
- int r = -ENOMEM, i, msr;
+ int r = -ENOMEM, i;
rdmsrl_safe(MSR_EFER, &host_efer);
@@ -6394,41 +6545,13 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
if (!vmx_io_bitmap_b)
goto out;
- vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy = (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy)
- goto out1;
-
- vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic =
- (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic)
- goto out2;
-
- vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive =
- (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive)
- goto out3;
-
- vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode = (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode)
- goto out4;
-
- vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic =
- (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic)
- goto out5;
-
- vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive =
- (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive)
- goto out6;
-
vmx_vmread_bitmap = (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vmx_vmread_bitmap)
- goto out7;
+ goto out1;
vmx_vmwrite_bitmap = (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vmx_vmwrite_bitmap)
- goto out8;
+ goto out2;
memset(vmx_vmread_bitmap, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE);
memset(vmx_vmwrite_bitmap, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE);
@@ -6437,12 +6560,9 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
memset(vmx_io_bitmap_b, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE);
- memset(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE);
- memset(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE);
-
if (setup_vmcs_config(&vmcs_config) < 0) {
r = -EIO;
- goto out9;
+ goto out3;
}
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX))
@@ -6499,47 +6619,8 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
kvm_tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits = 48;
}
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_FS_BASE, false);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_GS_BASE, false);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, true);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, false);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, false);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, false);
-
- memcpy(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic,
- vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, PAGE_SIZE);
- memcpy(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic,
- vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode, PAGE_SIZE);
- memcpy(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive,
- vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, PAGE_SIZE);
- memcpy(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive,
- vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode, PAGE_SIZE);
-
set_bit(0, vmx_vpid_bitmap); /* 0 is reserved for host */
- /*
- * enable_apicv && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active()
- */
- for (msr = 0x800; msr <= 0x8ff; msr++)
- vmx_disable_intercept_msr_read_x2apic(msr, true);
-
- /* TMCCT */
- vmx_enable_intercept_msr_read_x2apic(0x839, true);
- /* TPR */
- vmx_disable_intercept_msr_write_x2apic(0x808, true);
- /* EOI */
- vmx_disable_intercept_msr_write_x2apic(0x80b, true);
- /* SELF-IPI */
- vmx_disable_intercept_msr_write_x2apic(0x83f, true);
-
- /*
- * (enable_apicv && !kvm_vcpu_apicv_active()) ||
- * !enable_apicv
- */
- /* TPR */
- vmx_disable_intercept_msr_read_x2apic(0x808, false);
- vmx_disable_intercept_msr_write_x2apic(0x808, false);
-
if (enable_ept) {
kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK,
(enable_ept_ad_bits) ? VMX_EPT_ACCESS_BIT : 0ull,
@@ -6585,22 +6666,10 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
return alloc_kvm_area();
-out9:
- free_page((unsigned long)vmx_vmwrite_bitmap);
-out8:
- free_page((unsigned long)vmx_vmread_bitmap);
-out7:
- free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive);
-out6:
- free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic);
-out5:
- free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode);
-out4:
- free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive);
out3:
- free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic);
+ free_page((unsigned long)vmx_vmwrite_bitmap);
out2:
- free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy);
+ free_page((unsigned long)vmx_vmread_bitmap);
out1:
free_page((unsigned long)vmx_io_bitmap_b);
out:
@@ -6611,12 +6680,6 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
static __exit void hardware_unsetup(void)
{
- free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic);
- free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv_inactive);
- free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic);
- free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic_apicv_inactive);
- free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy);
- free_page((unsigned long)vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode);
free_page((unsigned long)vmx_io_bitmap_b);
free_page((unsigned long)vmx_io_bitmap_a);
free_page((unsigned long)vmx_vmwrite_bitmap);
@@ -6663,94 +6726,6 @@ static int handle_monitor(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return handle_nop(vcpu);
}
-/*
- * To run an L2 guest, we need a vmcs02 based on the L1-specified vmcs12.
- * We could reuse a single VMCS for all the L2 guests, but we also want the
- * option to allocate a separate vmcs02 for each separate loaded vmcs12 - this
- * allows keeping them loaded on the processor, and in the future will allow
- * optimizations where prepare_vmcs02 doesn't need to set all the fields on
- * every entry if they never change.
- * So we keep, in vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, a cache of size VMCS02_POOL_SIZE
- * (>=0) with a vmcs02 for each recently loaded vmcs12s, most recent first.
- *
- * The following functions allocate and free a vmcs02 in this pool.
- */
-
-/* Get a VMCS from the pool to use as vmcs02 for the current vmcs12. */
-static struct loaded_vmcs *nested_get_current_vmcs02(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
-{
- struct vmcs02_list *item;
- list_for_each_entry(item, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, list)
- if (item->vmptr == vmx->nested.current_vmptr) {
- list_move(&item->list, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool);
- return &item->vmcs02;
- }
-
- if (vmx->nested.vmcs02_num >= max(VMCS02_POOL_SIZE, 1)) {
- /* Recycle the least recently used VMCS. */
- item = list_last_entry(&vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool,
- struct vmcs02_list, list);
- item->vmptr = vmx->nested.current_vmptr;
- list_move(&item->list, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool);
- return &item->vmcs02;
- }
-
- /* Create a new VMCS */
- item = kmalloc(sizeof(struct vmcs02_list), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!item)
- return NULL;
- item->vmcs02.vmcs = alloc_vmcs();
- item->vmcs02.shadow_vmcs = NULL;
- if (!item->vmcs02.vmcs) {
- kfree(item);
- return NULL;
- }
- loaded_vmcs_init(&item->vmcs02);
- item->vmptr = vmx->nested.current_vmptr;
- list_add(&(item->list), &(vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool));
- vmx->nested.vmcs02_num++;
- return &item->vmcs02;
-}
-
-/* Free and remove from pool a vmcs02 saved for a vmcs12 (if there is one) */
-static void nested_free_vmcs02(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, gpa_t vmptr)
-{
- struct vmcs02_list *item;
- list_for_each_entry(item, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, list)
- if (item->vmptr == vmptr) {
- free_loaded_vmcs(&item->vmcs02);
- list_del(&item->list);
- kfree(item);
- vmx->nested.vmcs02_num--;
- return;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Free all VMCSs saved for this vcpu, except the one pointed by
- * vmx->loaded_vmcs. We must be running L1, so vmx->loaded_vmcs
- * must be &vmx->vmcs01.
- */
-static void nested_free_all_saved_vmcss(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
-{
- struct vmcs02_list *item, *n;
-
- WARN_ON(vmx->loaded_vmcs != &vmx->vmcs01);
- list_for_each_entry_safe(item, n, &vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool, list) {
- /*
- * Something will leak if the above WARN triggers. Better than
- * a use-after-free.
- */
- if (vmx->loaded_vmcs == &item->vmcs02)
- continue;
-
- free_loaded_vmcs(&item->vmcs02);
- list_del(&item->list);
- kfree(item);
- vmx->nested.vmcs02_num--;
- }
-}
-
/*
* The following 3 functions, nested_vmx_succeed()/failValid()/failInvalid(),
* set the success or error code of an emulated VMX instruction, as specified
@@ -7025,6 +7000,7 @@ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
struct vmcs *shadow_vmcs;
const u64 VMXON_NEEDED_FEATURES = FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED
| FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
+ int r;
/* The Intel VMX Instruction Reference lists a bunch of bits that
* are prerequisite to running VMXON, most notably cr4.VMXE must be
@@ -7064,12 +7040,9 @@ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 1;
}
- if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) {
- vmx->nested.msr_bitmap =
- (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!vmx->nested.msr_bitmap)
- goto out_msr_bitmap;
- }
+ r = alloc_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out_vmcs02;
vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12 = kmalloc(VMCS12_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12)
@@ -7086,9 +7059,6 @@ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs = shadow_vmcs;
}
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool));
- vmx->nested.vmcs02_num = 0;
-
hrtimer_init(&vmx->nested.preemption_timer, CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
HRTIMER_MODE_REL_PINNED);
vmx->nested.preemption_timer.function = vmx_preemption_timer_fn;
@@ -7103,9 +7073,9 @@ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
kfree(vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12);
out_cached_vmcs12:
- free_page((unsigned long)vmx->nested.msr_bitmap);
+ free_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02);
-out_msr_bitmap:
+out_vmcs02:
return -ENOMEM;
}
@@ -7181,17 +7151,13 @@ static void free_nested(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
vmx->nested.vmxon = false;
free_vpid(vmx->nested.vpid02);
nested_release_vmcs12(vmx);
- if (vmx->nested.msr_bitmap) {
- free_page((unsigned long)vmx->nested.msr_bitmap);
- vmx->nested.msr_bitmap = NULL;
- }
if (enable_shadow_vmcs) {
vmcs_clear(vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs);
free_vmcs(vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs);
vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs = NULL;
}
kfree(vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12);
- /* Unpin physical memory we referred to in current vmcs02 */
+ /* Unpin physical memory we referred to in the vmcs02 */
if (vmx->nested.apic_access_page) {
nested_release_page(vmx->nested.apic_access_page);
vmx->nested.apic_access_page = NULL;
@@ -7207,7 +7173,7 @@ static void free_nested(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
vmx->nested.pi_desc = NULL;
}
- nested_free_all_saved_vmcss(vmx);
+ free_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02);
}
/* Emulate the VMXOFF instruction */
@@ -7241,8 +7207,6 @@ static int handle_vmclear(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmptr + offsetof(struct vmcs12, launch_state),
&zero, sizeof(zero));
- nested_free_vmcs02(vmx, vmptr);
-
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
return 1;
@@ -8029,6 +7993,19 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE),
KVM_ISA_VMX);
+ /*
+ * The host physical addresses of some pages of guest memory
+ * are loaded into the vmcs02 (e.g. vmcs12's Virtual APIC
+ * Page). The CPU may write to these pages via their host
+ * physical address while L2 is running, bypassing any
+ * address-translation-based dirty tracking (e.g. EPT write
+ * protection).
+ *
+ * Mark them dirty on every exit from L2 to prevent them from
+ * getting out of sync with dirty tracking.
+ */
+ nested_mark_vmcs12_pages_dirty(vcpu);
+
if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending)
return false;
@@ -8520,7 +8497,7 @@ static void vmx_set_virtual_x2apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool set)
}
vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, sec_exec_control);
- vmx_set_msr_bitmap(vcpu);
+ vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu);
}
static void vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t hpa)
@@ -8676,14 +8653,14 @@ static void vmx_handle_external_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
#endif
"pushf\n\t"
__ASM_SIZE(push) " $%c[cs]\n\t"
- "call *%[entry]\n\t"
+ CALL_NOSPEC
:
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
[sp]"=&r"(tmp),
#endif
"+r"(__sp)
:
- [entry]"r"(entry),
+ THUNK_TARGET(entry),
[ss]"i"(__KERNEL_DS),
[cs]"i"(__KERNEL_CS)
);
@@ -8909,6 +8886,15 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmx_arm_hv_timer(vcpu);
+ /*
+ * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if
+ * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there
+ * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
+ * being speculatively taken.
+ */
+ if (vmx->spec_ctrl)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl);
+
vmx->__launched = vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched;
asm(
/* Store host registers */
@@ -9027,6 +9013,27 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
#endif
);
+ /*
+ * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the
+ * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and
+ * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding
+ * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former
+ * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM.
+ *
+ * For non-nested case:
+ * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
+ * save it.
+ *
+ * For nested case:
+ * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
+ * save it.
+ */
+ if (!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl);
+
+ if (vmx->spec_ctrl)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
+
/* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
vmexit_fill_RSB();
@@ -9140,6 +9147,7 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
{
int err;
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = kmem_cache_zalloc(kvm_vcpu_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
+ unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
int cpu;
if (!vmx)
@@ -9172,17 +9180,24 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
if (!vmx->guest_msrs)
goto free_pml;
- vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01;
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs = alloc_vmcs();
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs = NULL;
- if (!vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
- goto free_msrs;
if (!vmm_exclusive)
kvm_cpu_vmxon(__pa(per_cpu(vmxarea, raw_smp_processor_id())));
- loaded_vmcs_init(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
+ err = alloc_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->vmcs01);
if (!vmm_exclusive)
kvm_cpu_vmxoff();
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto free_msrs;
+ msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ vmx->msr_bitmap_mode = 0;
+
+ vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01;
cpu = get_cpu();
vmx_vcpu_load(&vmx->vcpu, cpu);
vmx->vcpu.cpu = cpu;
@@ -9576,21 +9591,31 @@ static inline bool nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
int msr;
struct page *page;
unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l1;
- unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l0 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msr_bitmap;
+ unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l0 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmcs02.msr_bitmap;
+ /*
+ * pred_cmd & spec_ctrl are trying to verify two things:
+ *
+ * 1. L0 gave a permission to L1 to actually passthrough the MSR. This
+ * ensures that we do not accidentally generate an L02 MSR bitmap
+ * from the L12 MSR bitmap that is too permissive.
+ * 2. That L1 or L2s have actually used the MSR. This avoids
+ * unnecessarily merging of the bitmap if the MSR is unused. This
+ * works properly because we only update the L01 MSR bitmap lazily.
+ * So even if L0 should pass L1 these MSRs, the L01 bitmap is only
+ * updated to reflect this when L1 (or its L2s) actually write to
+ * the MSR.
+ */
+ bool pred_cmd = msr_write_intercepted_l01(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD);
+ bool spec_ctrl = msr_write_intercepted_l01(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
- /* This shortcut is ok because we support only x2APIC MSRs so far. */
- if (!nested_cpu_has_virt_x2apic_mode(vmcs12))
+ if (!nested_cpu_has_virt_x2apic_mode(vmcs12) &&
+ !pred_cmd && !spec_ctrl)
return false;
page = nested_get_page(vcpu, vmcs12->msr_bitmap);
if (!page)
return false;
msr_bitmap_l1 = (unsigned long *)kmap(page);
- if (!msr_bitmap_l1) {
- nested_release_page_clean(page);
- WARN_ON(1);
- return false;
- }
memset(msr_bitmap_l0, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE);
@@ -9617,6 +9642,19 @@ static inline bool nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
MSR_TYPE_W);
}
}
+
+ if (spec_ctrl)
+ nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(
+ msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
+ MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
+ MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
+
+ if (pred_cmd)
+ nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(
+ msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
+ MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD,
+ MSR_TYPE_W);
+
kunmap(page);
nested_release_page_clean(page);
@@ -10096,6 +10134,9 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
if (kvm_has_tsc_control)
decache_tsc_multiplier(vmx);
+ if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
+ vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx->nested.vmcs02.msr_bitmap));
+
if (enable_vpid) {
/*
* There is no direct mapping between vpid02 and vpid12, the
@@ -10191,7 +10232,6 @@ static int nested_vmx_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool launch)
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12;
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
int cpu;
- struct loaded_vmcs *vmcs02;
bool ia32e;
u32 msr_entry_idx;
@@ -10331,17 +10371,13 @@ static int nested_vmx_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool launch)
* the nested entry.
*/
- vmcs02 = nested_get_current_vmcs02(vmx);
- if (!vmcs02)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
enter_guest_mode(vcpu);
if (!(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS))
vmx->nested.vmcs01_debugctl = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL);
cpu = get_cpu();
- vmx->loaded_vmcs = vmcs02;
+ vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->nested.vmcs02;
vmx_vcpu_put(vcpu);
vmx_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
vcpu->cpu = cpu;
@@ -10493,7 +10529,8 @@ static int vmx_check_nested_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool external_intr)
return 0;
}
- return vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt(vcpu);
+ vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt(vcpu);
+ return 0;
}
static u32 vmx_get_preemption_timer_value(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -10804,7 +10841,7 @@ static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, 0);
if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
- vmx_set_msr_bitmap(vcpu);
+ vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu);
if (nested_vmx_load_msr(vcpu, vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_addr,
vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_count))
@@ -10855,10 +10892,6 @@ static void nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason,
vm_exit_controls_reset_shadow(vmx);
vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
- /* if no vmcs02 cache requested, remove the one we used */
- if (VMCS02_POOL_SIZE == 0)
- nested_free_vmcs02(vmx, vmx->nested.current_vmptr);
-
load_vmcs12_host_state(vcpu, vmcs12);
/* Update any VMCS fields that might have changed while L2 ran */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index e023ef981feb..75f756eac979 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -975,6 +975,7 @@ static u32 msrs_to_save[] = {
#endif
MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA,
MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, MSR_TSC_AUX,
+ MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
};
static unsigned num_msrs_to_save;
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
index 6bf1898ddf49..4ad7c4dd311c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ lib-$(CONFIG_RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM) += rwsem.o
lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o
lib-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o
lib-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o
+OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_retpoline.o :=y
obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o hweight.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S
index 37b62d412148..b12b214713a6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_1)
mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX
cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX
jae bad_get_user
+ sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */
+ and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
ASM_STAC
1: movzbl (%_ASM_AX),%edx
xor %eax,%eax
@@ -53,6 +55,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_2)
mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX
cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX
jae bad_get_user
+ sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */
+ and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
ASM_STAC
2: movzwl -1(%_ASM_AX),%edx
xor %eax,%eax
@@ -67,6 +71,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_4)
mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX
cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX
jae bad_get_user
+ sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */
+ and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
ASM_STAC
3: movl -3(%_ASM_AX),%edx
xor %eax,%eax
@@ -82,6 +88,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_8)
mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX
cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX
jae bad_get_user
+ sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */
+ and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
ASM_STAC
4: movq -7(%_ASM_AX),%rdx
xor %eax,%eax
@@ -93,6 +101,8 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_8)
mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX
cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX
jae bad_get_user_8
+ sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */
+ and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
ASM_STAC
4: movl -7(%_ASM_AX),%edx
5: movl -3(%_ASM_AX),%ecx
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
index dfb2ba91b670..480edc3a5e03 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
#include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
#include <asm/export.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/bitsperlong.h>
.macro THUNK reg
.section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk
@@ -36,7 +37,6 @@ GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_DX)
GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_SI)
GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_DI)
GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_BP)
-GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_SP)
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
GENERATE_THUNK(r8)
GENERATE_THUNK(r9)
@@ -47,3 +47,58 @@ GENERATE_THUNK(r13)
GENERATE_THUNK(r14)
GENERATE_THUNK(r15)
#endif
+
+/*
+ * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
+ *
+ * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
+ * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
+ *
+ * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
+ * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
+ * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
+ * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
+ * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
+ *
+ * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
+ * the optimal version - two calls, each with their own speculation
+ * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
+ */
+.macro STUFF_RSB nr:req sp:req
+ mov $(\nr / 2), %_ASM_BX
+ .align 16
+771:
+ call 772f
+773: /* speculation trap */
+ pause
+ lfence
+ jmp 773b
+ .align 16
+772:
+ call 774f
+775: /* speculation trap */
+ pause
+ lfence
+ jmp 775b
+ .align 16
+774:
+ dec %_ASM_BX
+ jnz 771b
+ add $((BITS_PER_LONG/8) * \nr), \sp
+.endm
+
+#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */
+
+ENTRY(__fill_rsb)
+ STUFF_RSB RSB_FILL_LOOPS, %_ASM_SP
+ ret
+END(__fill_rsb)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fill_rsb)
+
+#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
+
+ENTRY(__clear_rsb)
+ STUFF_RSB RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %_ASM_SP
+ ret
+END(__clear_rsb)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__clear_rsb)
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c
index 3bc7baf2a711..5c06dbffc52f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c
@@ -570,12 +570,12 @@ do { \
unsigned long __copy_to_user_ll(void __user *to, const void *from,
unsigned long n)
{
- stac();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
if (movsl_is_ok(to, from, n))
__copy_user(to, from, n);
else
n = __copy_user_intel(to, from, n);
- clac();
+ __uaccess_end();
return n;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_to_user_ll);
@@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_from_user_ll_nocache);
unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero(void *to, const void __user *from,
unsigned long n)
{
- stac();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY
if (n > 64 && static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM2))
n = __copy_user_intel_nocache(to, from, n);
@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero(void *to, const void __user *fr
#else
__copy_user(to, from, n);
#endif
- clac();
+ __uaccess_end();
return n;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero);
diff --git a/crypto/tcrypt.c b/crypto/tcrypt.c
index e3af318af2db..2a07341aca46 100644
--- a/crypto/tcrypt.c
+++ b/crypto/tcrypt.c
@@ -223,11 +223,13 @@ static void sg_init_aead(struct scatterlist *sg, char *xbuf[XBUFSIZE],
}
sg_init_table(sg, np + 1);
- np--;
+ if (rem)
+ np--;
for (k = 0; k < np; k++)
sg_set_buf(&sg[k + 1], xbuf[k], PAGE_SIZE);
- sg_set_buf(&sg[k + 1], xbuf[k], rem);
+ if (rem)
+ sg_set_buf(&sg[k + 1], xbuf[k], rem);
}
static void test_aead_speed(const char *algo, int enc, unsigned int secs,
diff --git a/drivers/auxdisplay/img-ascii-lcd.c b/drivers/auxdisplay/img-ascii-lcd.c
index 83f1439e57fd..6e8eaa7fe7a6 100644
--- a/drivers/auxdisplay/img-ascii-lcd.c
+++ b/drivers/auxdisplay/img-ascii-lcd.c
@@ -442,3 +442,7 @@ static struct platform_driver img_ascii_lcd_driver = {
.remove = img_ascii_lcd_remove,
};
module_platform_driver(img_ascii_lcd_driver);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Imagination Technologies ASCII LCD Display");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Paul Burton <paul.burton@...s.com>");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c
index a2ec6d8796a0..3322b157106d 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.c
@@ -392,6 +392,31 @@ static void rcar_du_crtc_start(struct rcar_du_crtc *rcrtc)
rcrtc->started = true;
}
+static void rcar_du_crtc_disable_planes(struct rcar_du_crtc *rcrtc)
+{
+ struct rcar_du_device *rcdu = rcrtc->group->dev;
+ struct drm_crtc *crtc = &rcrtc->crtc;
+ u32 status;
+ /* Make sure vblank interrupts are enabled. */
+ drm_crtc_vblank_get(crtc);
+ /*
+ * Disable planes and calculate how many vertical blanking interrupts we
+ * have to wait for. If a vertical blanking interrupt has been triggered
+ * but not processed yet, we don't know whether it occurred before or
+ * after the planes got disabled. We thus have to wait for two vblank
+ * interrupts in that case.
+ */
+ spin_lock_irq(&rcrtc->vblank_lock);
+ rcar_du_group_write(rcrtc->group, rcrtc->index % 2 ? DS2PR : DS1PR, 0);
+ status = rcar_du_crtc_read(rcrtc, DSSR);
+ rcrtc->vblank_count = status & DSSR_VBK ? 2 : 1;
+ spin_unlock_irq(&rcrtc->vblank_lock);
+ if (!wait_event_timeout(rcrtc->vblank_wait, rcrtc->vblank_count == 0,
+ msecs_to_jiffies(100)))
+ dev_warn(rcdu->dev, "vertical blanking timeout\n");
+ drm_crtc_vblank_put(crtc);
+}
+
static void rcar_du_crtc_stop(struct rcar_du_crtc *rcrtc)
{
struct drm_crtc *crtc = &rcrtc->crtc;
@@ -400,17 +425,16 @@ static void rcar_du_crtc_stop(struct rcar_du_crtc *rcrtc)
return;
/* Disable all planes and wait for the change to take effect. This is
- * required as the DSnPR registers are updated on vblank, and no vblank
- * will occur once the CRTC is stopped. Disabling planes when starting
- * the CRTC thus wouldn't be enough as it would start scanning out
- * immediately from old frame buffers until the next vblank.
+ * required as the plane enable registers are updated on vblank, and no
+ * vblank will occur once the CRTC is stopped. Disabling planes when
+ * starting the CRTC thus wouldn't be enough as it would start scanning
+ * out immediately from old frame buffers until the next vblank.
*
* This increases the CRTC stop delay, especially when multiple CRTCs
* are stopped in one operation as we now wait for one vblank per CRTC.
* Whether this can be improved needs to be researched.
*/
- rcar_du_group_write(rcrtc->group, rcrtc->index % 2 ? DS2PR : DS1PR, 0);
- drm_crtc_wait_one_vblank(crtc);
+ rcar_du_crtc_disable_planes(rcrtc);
/* Disable vertical blanking interrupt reporting. We first need to wait
* for page flip completion before stopping the CRTC as userspace
@@ -548,10 +572,25 @@ static irqreturn_t rcar_du_crtc_irq(int irq, void *arg)
irqreturn_t ret = IRQ_NONE;
u32 status;
+ spin_lock(&rcrtc->vblank_lock);
+
status = rcar_du_crtc_read(rcrtc, DSSR);
rcar_du_crtc_write(rcrtc, DSRCR, status & DSRCR_MASK);
- if (status & DSSR_FRM) {
+ if (status & DSSR_VBK) {
+ /*
+ * Wake up the vblank wait if the counter reaches 0. This must
+ * be protected by the vblank_lock to avoid races in
+ * rcar_du_crtc_disable_planes().
+ */
+ if (rcrtc->vblank_count) {
+ if (--rcrtc->vblank_count == 0)
+ wake_up(&rcrtc->vblank_wait);
+ }
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&rcrtc->vblank_lock);
+
+ if (status & DSSR_VBK) {
drm_crtc_handle_vblank(&rcrtc->crtc);
rcar_du_crtc_finish_page_flip(rcrtc);
ret = IRQ_HANDLED;
@@ -606,6 +645,8 @@ int rcar_du_crtc_create(struct rcar_du_group *rgrp, unsigned int index)
}
init_waitqueue_head(&rcrtc->flip_wait);
+ init_waitqueue_head(&rcrtc->vblank_wait);
+ spin_lock_init(&rcrtc->vblank_lock);
rcrtc->group = rgrp;
rcrtc->mmio_offset = mmio_offsets[index];
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.h
index 6f08b7e7db06..48bef05b4c62 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.h
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/rcar-du/rcar_du_crtc.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#define __RCAR_DU_CRTC_H__
#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/wait.h>
#include <drm/drmP.h>
@@ -33,6 +34,9 @@ struct rcar_du_vsp;
* @started: whether the CRTC has been started and is running
* @event: event to post when the pending page flip completes
* @flip_wait: wait queue used to signal page flip completion
+ * @vblank_lock: protects vblank_wait and vblank_count
+ * @vblank_wait: wait queue used to signal vertical blanking
+ * @vblank_count: number of vertical blanking interrupts to wait for
* @outputs: bitmask of the outputs (enum rcar_du_output) driven by this CRTC
* @group: CRTC group this CRTC belongs to
*/
@@ -48,6 +52,10 @@ struct rcar_du_crtc {
struct drm_pending_vblank_event *event;
wait_queue_head_t flip_wait;
+ spinlock_t vblank_lock;
+ wait_queue_head_t vblank_wait;
+ unsigned int vblank_count;
+
unsigned int outputs;
struct rcar_du_group *group;
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.c b/drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.c
index f77252d6ccd3..d29c24854c2c 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/soc_camera/soc_scale_crop.c
@@ -418,3 +418,7 @@ void soc_camera_calc_client_output(struct soc_camera_device *icd,
mf->height = soc_camera_shift_scale(rect->height, shift, scale_v);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(soc_camera_calc_client_output);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("soc-camera scaling-cropping functions");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Guennadi Liakhovetski <kernel@...gutronix.de>");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c
index bdbcd2b088a0..c3c28f0960e5 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c
@@ -3849,7 +3849,7 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_flush_mbx_queue(struct qlcnic_adapter *adapter)
struct list_head *head = &mbx->cmd_q;
struct qlcnic_cmd_args *cmd = NULL;
- spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock);
+ spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock);
while (!list_empty(head)) {
cmd = list_entry(head->next, struct qlcnic_cmd_args, list);
@@ -3860,7 +3860,7 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_flush_mbx_queue(struct qlcnic_adapter *adapter)
qlcnic_83xx_notify_cmd_completion(adapter, cmd);
}
- spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock);
}
static int qlcnic_83xx_check_mbx_status(struct qlcnic_adapter *adapter)
@@ -3896,12 +3896,12 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_dequeue_mbx_cmd(struct qlcnic_adapter *adapter,
{
struct qlcnic_mailbox *mbx = adapter->ahw->mailbox;
- spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock);
+ spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock);
list_del(&cmd->list);
mbx->num_cmds--;
- spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock);
qlcnic_83xx_notify_cmd_completion(adapter, cmd);
}
@@ -3966,7 +3966,7 @@ static int qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd(struct qlcnic_adapter *adapter,
init_completion(&cmd->completion);
cmd->rsp_opcode = QLC_83XX_MBX_RESPONSE_UNKNOWN;
- spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock);
+ spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock);
list_add_tail(&cmd->list, &mbx->cmd_q);
mbx->num_cmds++;
@@ -3974,7 +3974,7 @@ static int qlcnic_83xx_enqueue_mbx_cmd(struct qlcnic_adapter *adapter,
*timeout = cmd->total_cmds * QLC_83XX_MBX_TIMEOUT;
queue_work(mbx->work_q, &mbx->work);
- spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock);
return 0;
}
@@ -4070,15 +4070,15 @@ static void qlcnic_83xx_mailbox_worker(struct work_struct *work)
mbx->rsp_status = QLC_83XX_MBX_RESPONSE_WAIT;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mbx->aen_lock, flags);
- spin_lock(&mbx->queue_lock);
+ spin_lock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock);
if (list_empty(head)) {
- spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock);
return;
}
cmd = list_entry(head->next, struct qlcnic_cmd_args, list);
- spin_unlock(&mbx->queue_lock);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&mbx->queue_lock);
mbx_ops->encode_cmd(adapter, cmd);
mbx_ops->nofity_fw(adapter, QLC_83XX_MBX_REQUEST);
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c
index 298b74ebc1e9..18e68c91e651 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c
@@ -1387,7 +1387,7 @@ DECLARE_RTL_COND(rtl_ocp_tx_cond)
{
void __iomem *ioaddr = tp->mmio_addr;
- return RTL_R8(IBISR0) & 0x02;
+ return RTL_R8(IBISR0) & 0x20;
}
static void rtl8168ep_stop_cmac(struct rtl8169_private *tp)
@@ -1395,7 +1395,7 @@ static void rtl8168ep_stop_cmac(struct rtl8169_private *tp)
void __iomem *ioaddr = tp->mmio_addr;
RTL_W8(IBCR2, RTL_R8(IBCR2) & ~0x01);
- rtl_msleep_loop_wait_low(tp, &rtl_ocp_tx_cond, 50, 2000);
+ rtl_msleep_loop_wait_high(tp, &rtl_ocp_tx_cond, 50, 2000);
RTL_W8(IBISR0, RTL_R8(IBISR0) | 0x20);
RTL_W8(IBCR0, RTL_R8(IBCR0) & ~0x01);
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
index db65d9ad4488..e1e5e8438457 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
@@ -944,6 +944,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id products[] = {
{QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x2c7c, 0x0125, 4)}, /* Quectel EC25, EC20 R2.0 Mini PCIe */
{QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x2c7c, 0x0121, 4)}, /* Quectel EC21 Mini PCIe */
{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2c7c, 0x0296, 4)}, /* Quectel BG96 */
+ {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x2c7c, 0x0306, 4)}, /* Quectel EP06 Mini PCIe */
/* 4. Gobi 1000 devices */
{QMI_GOBI1K_DEVICE(0x05c6, 0x9212)}, /* Acer Gobi Modem Device */
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43/main.c b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43/main.c
index 6e5d9095b195..a635fc6b1722 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43/main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/b43/main.c
@@ -71,8 +71,18 @@ MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode11.fw");
MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode13.fw");
MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode14.fw");
MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode15.fw");
+MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode16_lp.fw");
MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode16_mimo.fw");
+MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode24_lcn.fw");
+MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode25_lcn.fw");
+MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode25_mimo.fw");
+MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode26_mimo.fw");
+MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode29_mimo.fw");
+MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode33_lcn40.fw");
+MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode30_mimo.fw");
MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode5.fw");
+MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode40.fw");
+MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode42.fw");
MODULE_FIRMWARE("b43/ucode9.fw");
static int modparam_bad_frames_preempt;
diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/pxa/pinctrl-pxa2xx.c b/drivers/pinctrl/pxa/pinctrl-pxa2xx.c
index 866aa3ce1ac9..6cf0006d4c8d 100644
--- a/drivers/pinctrl/pxa/pinctrl-pxa2xx.c
+++ b/drivers/pinctrl/pxa/pinctrl-pxa2xx.c
@@ -436,3 +436,7 @@ int pxa2xx_pinctrl_exit(struct platform_device *pdev)
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pxa2xx_pinctrl_exit);
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Robert Jarzmik <robert.jarzmik@...e.fr>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Marvell PXA2xx pinctrl driver");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c
index f2303f390345..23973a8124fc 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c
@@ -965,6 +965,8 @@ static int uart_set_info(struct tty_struct *tty, struct tty_port *port,
}
} else {
retval = uart_startup(tty, state, 1);
+ if (retval == 0)
+ tty_port_set_initialized(port, true);
if (retval > 0)
retval = 0;
}
diff --git a/drivers/vhost/net.c b/drivers/vhost/net.c
index 96a0661011fd..e5b7652234fc 100644
--- a/drivers/vhost/net.c
+++ b/drivers/vhost/net.c
@@ -1078,6 +1078,7 @@ static long vhost_net_reset_owner(struct vhost_net *n)
}
vhost_net_stop(n, &tx_sock, &rx_sock);
vhost_net_flush(n);
+ vhost_dev_stop(&n->dev);
vhost_dev_reset_owner(&n->dev, umem);
vhost_net_vq_reset(n);
done:
diff --git a/include/linux/fdtable.h b/include/linux/fdtable.h
index 6e84b2cae6ad..442b54a14cbc 100644
--- a/include/linux/fdtable.h
+++ b/include/linux/fdtable.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
@@ -81,8 +82,10 @@ static inline struct file *__fcheck_files(struct files_struct *files, unsigned i
{
struct fdtable *fdt = rcu_dereference_raw(files->fdt);
- if (fd < fdt->max_fds)
+ if (fd < fdt->max_fds) {
+ fd = array_index_nospec(fd, fdt->max_fds);
return rcu_dereference_raw(fdt->fd[fd]);
+ }
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/init.h b/include/linux/init.h
index e30104ceb86d..8e346d1bd837 100644
--- a/include/linux/init.h
+++ b/include/linux/init.h
@@ -4,6 +4,13 @@
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
+/* Built-in __init functions needn't be compiled with retpoline */
+#if defined(RETPOLINE) && !defined(MODULE)
+#define __noretpoline __attribute__((indirect_branch("keep")))
+#else
+#define __noretpoline
+#endif
+
/* These macros are used to mark some functions or
* initialized data (doesn't apply to uninitialized data)
* as `initialization' functions. The kernel can take this
@@ -39,7 +46,7 @@
/* These are for everybody (although not all archs will actually
discard it in modules) */
-#define __init __section(.init.text) __cold notrace __latent_entropy
+#define __init __section(.init.text) __cold notrace __latent_entropy __noretpoline
#define __initdata __section(.init.data)
#define __initconst __section(.init.rodata)
#define __exitdata __section(.exit.data)
diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
index 0c3207d26ac0..d2224a09b4b5 100644
--- a/include/linux/module.h
+++ b/include/linux/module.h
@@ -791,6 +791,15 @@ static inline void module_bug_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr,
static inline void module_bug_cleanup(struct module *mod) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */
+#ifdef RETPOLINE
+extern bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline);
+#else
+static inline bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
+{
+ return true;
+}
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
static inline bool module_sig_ok(struct module *module)
{
diff --git a/include/linux/nospec.h b/include/linux/nospec.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b99bced39ac2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+// Copyright(c) 2018 Linus Torvalds. All rights reserved.
+// Copyright(c) 2018 Alexei Starovoitov. All rights reserved.
+// Copyright(c) 2018 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_NOSPEC_H
+#define _LINUX_NOSPEC_H
+
+/**
+ * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a ~0 mask when index < size, 0 otherwise
+ * @index: array element index
+ * @size: number of elements in array
+ *
+ * When @index is out of bounds (@index >= @size), the sign bit will be
+ * set. Extend the sign bit to all bits and invert, giving a result of
+ * zero for an out of bounds index, or ~0 if within bounds [0, @size).
+ */
+#ifndef array_index_mask_nospec
+static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ /*
+ * Warn developers about inappropriate array_index_nospec() usage.
+ *
+ * Even if the CPU speculates past the WARN_ONCE branch, the
+ * sign bit of @index is taken into account when generating the
+ * mask.
+ *
+ * This warning is compiled out when the compiler can infer that
+ * @index and @size are less than LONG_MAX.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ONCE(index > LONG_MAX || size > LONG_MAX,
+ "array_index_nospec() limited to range of [0, LONG_MAX]\n"))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Always calculate and emit the mask even if the compiler
+ * thinks the mask is not needed. The compiler does not take
+ * into account the value of @index under speculation.
+ */
+ OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(index);
+ return ~(long)(index | (size - 1UL - index)) >> (BITS_PER_LONG - 1);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * array_index_nospec - sanitize an array index after a bounds check
+ *
+ * For a code sequence like:
+ *
+ * if (index < size) {
+ * index = array_index_nospec(index, size);
+ * val = array[index];
+ * }
+ *
+ * ...if the CPU speculates past the bounds check then
+ * array_index_nospec() will clamp the index within the range of [0,
+ * size).
+ */
+#define array_index_nospec(index, size) \
+({ \
+ typeof(index) _i = (index); \
+ typeof(size) _s = (size); \
+ unsigned long _mask = array_index_mask_nospec(_i, _s); \
+ \
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_i) > sizeof(long)); \
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_s) > sizeof(long)); \
+ \
+ _i &= _mask; \
+ _i; \
+})
+#endif /* _LINUX_NOSPEC_H */
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 0e54d5bf0097..07bfb9971f2f 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2817,6 +2817,15 @@ static int check_modinfo_livepatch(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_LIVEPATCH */
+static void check_modinfo_retpoline(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info)
+{
+ if (retpoline_module_ok(get_modinfo(info, "retpoline")))
+ return;
+
+ pr_warn("%s: loading module not compiled with retpoline compiler.\n",
+ mod->name);
+}
+
/* Sets info->hdr and info->len. */
static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len,
struct load_info *info)
@@ -2969,6 +2978,8 @@ static int check_modinfo(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info, int flags)
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_OOT_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
}
+ check_modinfo_retpoline(mod, info);
+
if (get_modinfo(info, "staging")) {
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_CRAP, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
pr_warn("%s: module is from the staging directory, the quality "
diff --git a/net/core/sock_reuseport.c b/net/core/sock_reuseport.c
index 77f396b679ce..5dce4291f0ed 100644
--- a/net/core/sock_reuseport.c
+++ b/net/core/sock_reuseport.c
@@ -93,6 +93,16 @@ static struct sock_reuseport *reuseport_grow(struct sock_reuseport *reuse)
return more_reuse;
}
+static void reuseport_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+ struct sock_reuseport *reuse;
+
+ reuse = container_of(head, struct sock_reuseport, rcu);
+ if (reuse->prog)
+ bpf_prog_destroy(reuse->prog);
+ kfree(reuse);
+}
+
/**
* reuseport_add_sock - Add a socket to the reuseport group of another.
* @sk: New socket to add to the group.
@@ -101,7 +111,7 @@ static struct sock_reuseport *reuseport_grow(struct sock_reuseport *reuse)
*/
int reuseport_add_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sock *sk2)
{
- struct sock_reuseport *reuse;
+ struct sock_reuseport *old_reuse, *reuse;
if (!rcu_access_pointer(sk2->sk_reuseport_cb)) {
int err = reuseport_alloc(sk2);
@@ -112,10 +122,13 @@ int reuseport_add_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sock *sk2)
spin_lock_bh(&reuseport_lock);
reuse = rcu_dereference_protected(sk2->sk_reuseport_cb,
- lockdep_is_held(&reuseport_lock)),
- WARN_ONCE(rcu_dereference_protected(sk->sk_reuseport_cb,
- lockdep_is_held(&reuseport_lock)),
- "socket already in reuseport group");
+ lockdep_is_held(&reuseport_lock));
+ old_reuse = rcu_dereference_protected(sk->sk_reuseport_cb,
+ lockdep_is_held(&reuseport_lock));
+ if (old_reuse && old_reuse->num_socks != 1) {
+ spin_unlock_bh(&reuseport_lock);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
if (reuse->num_socks == reuse->max_socks) {
reuse = reuseport_grow(reuse);
@@ -133,19 +146,11 @@ int reuseport_add_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sock *sk2)
spin_unlock_bh(&reuseport_lock);
+ if (old_reuse)
+ call_rcu(&old_reuse->rcu, reuseport_free_rcu);
return 0;
}
-static void reuseport_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
-{
- struct sock_reuseport *reuse;
-
- reuse = container_of(head, struct sock_reuseport, rcu);
- if (reuse->prog)
- bpf_prog_destroy(reuse->prog);
- kfree(reuse);
-}
-
void reuseport_detach_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
struct sock_reuseport *reuse;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/igmp.c b/net/ipv4/igmp.c
index 9c7a4cea1628..7f5fe07d0b13 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c
@@ -386,7 +386,11 @@ static struct sk_buff *igmpv3_newpack(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int mtu)
pip->frag_off = htons(IP_DF);
pip->ttl = 1;
pip->daddr = fl4.daddr;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
pip->saddr = igmpv3_get_srcaddr(dev, &fl4);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
pip->protocol = IPPROTO_IGMP;
pip->tot_len = 0; /* filled in later */
ip_select_ident(net, skb, NULL);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
index 7efa6b062049..0d1a767db1bb 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -2316,6 +2316,12 @@ int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int flags)
WARN_ON(inet->inet_num && !icsk->icsk_bind_hash);
+ if (sk->sk_frag.page) {
+ put_page(sk->sk_frag.page);
+ sk->sk_frag.page = NULL;
+ sk->sk_frag.offset = 0;
+ }
+
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
return err;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c
index e86a34fd5484..8ec60532be2b 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c
@@ -452,7 +452,8 @@ static void bbr_advance_cycle_phase(struct sock *sk)
bbr->cycle_idx = (bbr->cycle_idx + 1) & (CYCLE_LEN - 1);
bbr->cycle_mstamp = tp->delivered_mstamp;
- bbr->pacing_gain = bbr_pacing_gain[bbr->cycle_idx];
+ bbr->pacing_gain = bbr->lt_use_bw ? BBR_UNIT :
+ bbr_pacing_gain[bbr->cycle_idx];
}
/* Gain cycling: cycle pacing gain to converge to fair share of available bw. */
@@ -461,8 +462,7 @@ static void bbr_update_cycle_phase(struct sock *sk,
{
struct bbr *bbr = inet_csk_ca(sk);
- if ((bbr->mode == BBR_PROBE_BW) && !bbr->lt_use_bw &&
- bbr_is_next_cycle_phase(sk, rs))
+ if (bbr->mode == BBR_PROBE_BW && bbr_is_next_cycle_phase(sk, rs))
bbr_advance_cycle_phase(sk);
}
diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
index 5cad76f87536..421379014995 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
@@ -274,6 +274,7 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
__be32 v4addr = 0;
unsigned short snum;
+ bool saved_ipv6only;
int addr_type = 0;
int err = 0;
@@ -378,19 +379,21 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
if (!(addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST))
np->saddr = addr->sin6_addr;
+ saved_ipv6only = sk->sk_ipv6only;
+ if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY && addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED)
+ sk->sk_ipv6only = 1;
+
/* Make sure we are allowed to bind here. */
if ((snum || !inet->bind_address_no_port) &&
sk->sk_prot->get_port(sk, snum)) {
+ sk->sk_ipv6only = saved_ipv6only;
inet_reset_saddr(sk);
err = -EADDRINUSE;
goto out;
}
- if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY) {
+ if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY)
sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_BINDADDR_LOCK;
- if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED)
- sk->sk_ipv6only = 1;
- }
if (snum)
sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_BINDPORT_LOCK;
inet->inet_sport = htons(inet->inet_num);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c
index 117405dd07a3..a30e7e925c9b 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c
@@ -495,6 +495,7 @@ static void *ipmr_mfc_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
it->mrt = mrt;
+ it->cache = NULL;
return *pos ? ipmr_mfc_seq_idx(net, seq->private, *pos - 1)
: SEQ_START_TOKEN;
}
diff --git a/net/sched/cls_u32.c b/net/sched/cls_u32.c
index ae83c3aec308..da574a16e7b3 100644
--- a/net/sched/cls_u32.c
+++ b/net/sched/cls_u32.c
@@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ static void u32_clear_hw_hnode(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_hnode *h)
static int u32_replace_hw_knode(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_knode *n,
u32 flags)
{
+ struct tc_u_hnode *ht = rtnl_dereference(n->ht_down);
struct net_device *dev = tp->q->dev_queue->dev;
struct tc_cls_u32_offload u32_offload = {0};
struct tc_to_netdev offload;
@@ -520,7 +521,7 @@ static int u32_replace_hw_knode(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_knode *n,
offload.cls_u32->knode.sel = &n->sel;
offload.cls_u32->knode.exts = &n->exts;
if (n->ht_down)
- offload.cls_u32->knode.link_handle = n->ht_down->handle;
+ offload.cls_u32->knode.link_handle = ht->handle;
err = dev->netdev_ops->ndo_setup_tc(dev, tp->q->handle,
tp->protocol, &offload);
@@ -788,8 +789,9 @@ static void u32_replace_knode(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_common *tp_c,
static struct tc_u_knode *u32_init_knode(struct tcf_proto *tp,
struct tc_u_knode *n)
{
- struct tc_u_knode *new;
+ struct tc_u_hnode *ht = rtnl_dereference(n->ht_down);
struct tc_u32_sel *s = &n->sel;
+ struct tc_u_knode *new;
new = kzalloc(sizeof(*n) + s->nkeys*sizeof(struct tc_u32_key),
GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -807,11 +809,11 @@ static struct tc_u_knode *u32_init_knode(struct tcf_proto *tp,
new->fshift = n->fshift;
new->res = n->res;
new->flags = n->flags;
- RCU_INIT_POINTER(new->ht_down, n->ht_down);
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(new->ht_down, ht);
/* bump reference count as long as we hold pointer to structure */
- if (new->ht_down)
- new->ht_down->refcnt++;
+ if (ht)
+ ht->refcnt++;
#ifdef CONFIG_CLS_U32_PERF
/* Statistics may be incremented by readers during update
diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
index c626f679e1c8..91722e97cdd5 100644
--- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c
+++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/nl80211.h>
#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/etherdevice.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include <net/genetlink.h>
@@ -2014,20 +2015,22 @@ static const struct nla_policy txq_params_policy[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
static int parse_txq_params(struct nlattr *tb[],
struct ieee80211_txq_params *txq_params)
{
+ u8 ac;
+
if (!tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP] ||
!tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX] ||
!tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS])
return -EINVAL;
- txq_params->ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]);
+ ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]);
txq_params->txop = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP]);
txq_params->cwmin = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN]);
txq_params->cwmax = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX]);
txq_params->aifs = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS]);
- if (txq_params->ac >= NL80211_NUM_ACS)
+ if (ac >= NL80211_NUM_ACS)
return -EINVAL;
-
+ txq_params->ac = array_index_nospec(ac, NL80211_NUM_ACS);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
index 845eb9b800f3..238db4ffd30c 100644
--- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c
+++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
@@ -2130,6 +2130,14 @@ static void add_intree_flag(struct buffer *b, int is_intree)
buf_printf(b, "\nMODULE_INFO(intree, \"Y\");\n");
}
+/* Cannot check for assembler */
+static void add_retpoline(struct buffer *b)
+{
+ buf_printf(b, "\n#ifdef RETPOLINE\n");
+ buf_printf(b, "MODULE_INFO(retpoline, \"Y\");\n");
+ buf_printf(b, "#endif\n");
+}
+
static void add_staging_flag(struct buffer *b, const char *name)
{
static const char *staging_dir = "drivers/staging";
@@ -2474,6 +2482,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
add_header(&buf, mod);
add_intree_flag(&buf, !external_module);
+ add_retpoline(&buf);
add_staging_flag(&buf, mod->name);
err |= add_versions(&buf, mod);
add_depends(&buf, mod, modules);
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index a871159bf03c..ead2fd60244d 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -141,23 +141,22 @@ static int valid_ecryptfs_desc(const char *ecryptfs_desc)
*/
static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
{
- if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) {
- if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)
- goto out;
- if (orig_desc)
- if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
- goto out;
- } else if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) {
- if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)
- goto out;
- if (orig_desc)
- if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
- goto out;
- } else
- goto out;
+ int prefix_len;
+
+ if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
+ prefix_len = KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN;
+ else if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
+ prefix_len = KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!new_desc[prefix_len])
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (orig_desc && strncmp(new_desc, orig_desc, prefix_len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
return 0;
-out:
- return -EINVAL;
}
/*
diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c b/sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c
index 712ed6598c48..ebdf9bd5a64c 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x-spi.c
@@ -70,3 +70,7 @@ static struct spi_driver pcm512x_spi_driver = {
};
module_spi_driver(pcm512x_spi_driver);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ASoC PCM512x codec driver - SPI");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
diff --git a/sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c b/sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c
index f608f8d23f3d..dd88c2cb6470 100644
--- a/sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c
+++ b/sound/soc/generic/simple-card.c
@@ -232,13 +232,19 @@ static int asoc_simple_card_dai_link_of(struct device_node *node,
snprintf(prop, sizeof(prop), "%scpu", prefix);
cpu = of_get_child_by_name(node, prop);
+ if (!cpu) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ dev_err(dev, "%s: Can't find %s DT node\n", __func__, prop);
+ goto dai_link_of_err;
+ }
+
snprintf(prop, sizeof(prop), "%splat", prefix);
plat = of_get_child_by_name(node, prop);
snprintf(prop, sizeof(prop), "%scodec", prefix);
codec = of_get_child_by_name(node, prop);
- if (!cpu || !codec) {
+ if (!codec) {
ret = -EINVAL;
dev_err(dev, "%s: Can't find %s DT node\n", __func__, prop);
goto dai_link_of_err;
diff --git a/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c b/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c
index 560cf4b51a99..a9a43acce30e 100644
--- a/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c
+++ b/sound/soc/sh/rcar/ssi.c
@@ -699,9 +699,14 @@ static int rsnd_ssi_dma_remove(struct rsnd_mod *mod,
struct rsnd_priv *priv)
{
struct rsnd_ssi *ssi = rsnd_mod_to_ssi(mod);
+ struct rsnd_mod *pure_ssi_mod = rsnd_io_to_mod_ssi(io);
struct device *dev = rsnd_priv_to_dev(priv);
int irq = ssi->irq;
+ /* Do nothing if non SSI (= SSI parent, multi SSI) mod */
+ if (pure_ssi_mod != mod)
+ return 0;
+
/* PIO will request IRQ again */
devm_free_irq(dev, irq, mod);
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