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Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 16:25:32 -0800 From: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com> To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>, x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/6] x86: Disabling PTI in compatibility mode Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com> wrote: > On 02/15/2018 08:35 AM, Nadav Amit wrote: >> I removed the PTI disabling while SMEP is unsupported, although I >> must admit I did not fully understand why it is required. > > Do you mean you don't fully understand how PTI gives SMEP-like behavior > on non-SMEP hardware? No. I understand how it provide SMEP-like behavior, and I understand the value of SMEP by itself. However, I do not understand why SMEP-like protection is required to protect processes that run in compatibility-mode from Meltdown/Spectre attacks. As far as I understand, the process should not be able to manipulate the kernel to execute code in the low 4GB.
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