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Message-ID: <9a825978-fe69-1c10-0da0-0c67dbb9b232@linux.intel.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 16:42:51 -0800
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
To: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/6] x86: Disabling PTI in compatibility mode
On 02/15/2018 04:25 PM, Nadav Amit wrote:
> Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
>
>> On 02/15/2018 08:35 AM, Nadav Amit wrote:
>>> I removed the PTI disabling while SMEP is unsupported, although I
>>> must admit I did not fully understand why it is required.
>>
>> Do you mean you don't fully understand how PTI gives SMEP-like behavior
>> on non-SMEP hardware?
>
> No. I understand how it provide SMEP-like behavior, and I understand the value
> of SMEP by itself.
>
> However, I do not understand why SMEP-like protection is required to protect
> processes that run in compatibility-mode from Meltdown/Spectre attacks. As
> far as I understand, the process should not be able to manipulate the kernel
> to execute code in the low 4GB.
There are two problems: one is that regardless of Meltdown/Spectre, SMEP
is valuable. It's valuable to everything, compatibility-mode or not.
The second problem is the RSB. It has a full-width virtual address and,
unlike the other indirect branch prediction, can steer you anywhere
including to the low 4GB.
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