[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <2A2A000F-D39E-40A6-8C01-58344F1034DD@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 16:48:23 -0800
From: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/6] x86: Disabling PTI in compatibility mode
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
> On 02/15/2018 04:25 PM, Nadav Amit wrote:
>> Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On 02/15/2018 08:35 AM, Nadav Amit wrote:
>>>> I removed the PTI disabling while SMEP is unsupported, although I
>>>> must admit I did not fully understand why it is required.
>>>
>>> Do you mean you don't fully understand how PTI gives SMEP-like behavior
>>> on non-SMEP hardware?
>>
>> No. I understand how it provide SMEP-like behavior, and I understand the value
>> of SMEP by itself.
>>
>> However, I do not understand why SMEP-like protection is required to protect
>> processes that run in compatibility-mode from Meltdown/Spectre attacks. As
>> far as I understand, the process should not be able to manipulate the kernel
>> to execute code in the low 4GB.
>
> There are two problems: one is that regardless of Meltdown/Spectre, SMEP
> is valuable. It's valuable to everything, compatibility-mode or not.
>
> The second problem is the RSB. It has a full-width virtual address and,
> unlike the other indirect branch prediction, can steer you anywhere
> including to the low 4GB.
Thanks for the explanation. Based on Linus response, I guess this series is
nak’d, but still thanks for your patience.
I suspected the RSB might be the reason but it seemed to me that all the ROP
opportunities are still there, so I assumed it is not a reason.
Anyhow, thanks again.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists