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Message-ID: <CALMp9eQMtV+f2+uYzeq2SCmvCVBAZ9G9pxJWV-BbAsSLbqR5zg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 20:02:15 -0800
From: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@...zon.de>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 8/9] KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 9:29 AM, David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk> wrote:
> @@ -8828,6 +8890,15 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>
> vmx_arm_hv_timer(vcpu);
>
> + /*
> + * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if
> + * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there
> + * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
> + * being speculatively taken.
> + */
> + if (vmx->spec_ctrl)
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl);
> +
Shouldn't this be wrmsrl_safe? Userspace can make an ioctl to set
vmx->spec_ctrl to non-zero even if the MSR is not supported on the
host.
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