linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH RFC v2 4/6] x86: Disable PTI on compatibility mode

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Message-ID: <CAJwJo6ZxnuG9PyP2H_gGq_gTRhE7kzWk1OEtGwQ9dk+Px8aWGQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 16 Feb 2018 22:07:14 +0000
From:   Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@...il.com>
To:     Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Andrey Vagin <avagin@...tuozzo.com>,
        Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@...tuozzo.com>,
        Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
        Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 4/6] x86: Disable PTI on compatibility mode

2018-02-16 7:11 GMT+00:00 Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>:
> On Thu, Feb 15, 2018 at 11:29:42PM +0000, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> ...
>> >>> +bool pti_handle_segment_not_present(long error_code)
>> >>> +{
>> >>> +       if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
>> >>> +               return false;
>> >>> +
>> >>> +       if ((unsigned short)error_code != GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS << 3)
>> >>> +               return false;
>> >>> +
>> >>> +       pti_reenable();
>> >>> +       return true;
>> >>> +}
>> >>
>> >> Please don't.  You're trying to emulate the old behavior here, but
>> >> you're emulating it wrong.  In particular, you won't trap on LAR.
>> >
>> > Yes, I thought I’ll manage to address LAR, but failed. I thought you said
>> > this is not a “show-stopper”. I’ll adapt your approach of using prctl, although
>> > it really limits the benefit of this mechanism.
>> >
>>
>> It's possible we could get away with adding the prctl but making the
>> default be that only the bitness that matches the program being run is
>> allowed.  After all, it's possible that CRIU is literally the only
>> program that switches bitness using the GDT.  (DOSEMU2 definitely does
>> cross-bitness stuff, but it uses the LDT as far as I know.)  And I've
>> never been entirely sure that CRIU fully counts toward the Linux
>> "don't break ABI" guarantee.
>>
>> Linus, how would you feel about, by default, preventing 64-bit
>> programs from long-jumping to __USER32_CS and vice versa?  I think it
>> has some value as a hardening measure.  I've certainly engaged in some
>> exploit shenanigans myself that took advantage of the ability to long
>> jump/ret to change bitness at will.  This wouldn't affect users of
>> modify_ldt() -- 64-bit programs could still create and use their own
>> private 32-bit segments with modify_ldt(), and seccomp can (and
>> should!) prevent that in sandboxed programs.
>>
>> In general, I prefer an approach where everything is explicit to an
>> approach where we almost, but not quite, emulate the weird historical
>> behavior.
>>
>> Pavel and Cyrill, how annoying would it be if CRIU had to do an extra
>> arch_prctl() to enable its cross-bitness shenanigans when
>> checkpointing and restoring a 32-bit program?
>
> I think this should not be a problem for criu (CC'ing Dima, who has
> been working on compat mode support in criu). As far as I remember
> we initiate restoring of 32 bit tasks in native 64 bit mode (well,
> ia32e to be precise :) mode and then, once everything is ready,
> we changing the mode by doing a return to __USER32_CS descriptor.
> So this won't be painful to add additional prctl call here.

Yeah, restoring will still be easy..
But checkpointing will be harder if we can't switch to 64-bit mode.
ATM we have one 64-bit parasite binary, which does all seizing job
for both 64 and 32 bit binaries.
So, if you can't switch back to 64-bit from 32-bit mode, we'll need
to keep two parasites.

-- 
             Dmitry