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Message-ID: <20180217161746.GC3231@tassilo.jf.intel.com>
Date: Sat, 17 Feb 2018 08:17:46 -0800
From: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@...hat.com>,
"Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@...el.com>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
Joe Konno <joe.konno@...ux.intel.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Jeremy Kerr <jk@...abs.org>,
Benjamin Drung <benjamin.drung@...fitbricks.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] efivars: reading variables can generate SMIs
> Would rate limiting (but not only for non-root) help mitigate Spectre
> v1 issues in UEFI runtime services code as well? I have been looking
> into unmapping the entire kernel while such calls are in progress,
> because firmware is likely to remain vulnerable long after the OSes
> have been fixed, and we may be able to kill two birds with one stone
> here (and not break userland in the process)
Yes a global rate limit would seem like a good compromise.
-Andi
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