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Message-ID: <tip-1d91c1d2c80cb70e2e553845e278b87a960c04da@git.kernel.org>
Date: Sat, 17 Feb 2018 02:10:27 -0800
From: tip-bot for Dan Williams <tipbot@...or.com>
To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc: tglx@...utronix.de, hpa@...or.com, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
bp@...en8.de, peterz@...radead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
arjan@...ux.intel.com, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org,
dwmw2@...radead.org, dan.j.williams@...el.com, jpoimboe@...hat.com,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, will.deacon@....com,
luto@...nel.org, mingo@...nel.org
Subject: [tip:x86/pti] nospec: Kill array_index_nospec_mask_check()
Commit-ID: 1d91c1d2c80cb70e2e553845e278b87a960c04da
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/1d91c1d2c80cb70e2e553845e278b87a960c04da
Author: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
AuthorDate: Fri, 16 Feb 2018 13:20:42 -0800
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
CommitDate: Sat, 17 Feb 2018 08:40:59 +0100
nospec: Kill array_index_nospec_mask_check()
There are multiple problems with the dynamic sanity checking in
array_index_nospec_mask_check():
* It causes unnecessary overhead in the 32-bit case since integer sized
@index values will no longer cause the check to be compiled away like
in the 64-bit case.
* In the 32-bit case it may trigger with user controllable input when
the expectation is that should only trigger during development of new
kernel enabling.
* The macro reuses the input parameter in multiple locations which is
broken if someone passes an expression like 'index++' to
array_index_nospec().
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
Cc: linux-arch@...r.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151881604278.17395.6605847763178076520.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
---
include/linux/nospec.h | 22 +---------------------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/nospec.h b/include/linux/nospec.h
index fbc98e2..d6701e3 100644
--- a/include/linux/nospec.h
+++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
@@ -30,26 +30,6 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index,
#endif
/*
- * Warn developers about inappropriate array_index_nospec() usage.
- *
- * Even if the CPU speculates past the WARN_ONCE branch, the
- * sign bit of @index is taken into account when generating the
- * mask.
- *
- * This warning is compiled out when the compiler can infer that
- * @index and @size are less than LONG_MAX.
- */
-#define array_index_mask_nospec_check(index, size) \
-({ \
- if (WARN_ONCE(index > LONG_MAX || size > LONG_MAX, \
- "array_index_nospec() limited to range of [0, LONG_MAX]\n")) \
- _mask = 0; \
- else \
- _mask = array_index_mask_nospec(index, size); \
- _mask; \
-})
-
-/*
* array_index_nospec - sanitize an array index after a bounds check
*
* For a code sequence like:
@@ -67,7 +47,7 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index,
({ \
typeof(index) _i = (index); \
typeof(size) _s = (size); \
- unsigned long _mask = array_index_mask_nospec_check(_i, _s); \
+ unsigned long _mask = array_index_mask_nospec(_i, _s); \
\
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_i) > sizeof(long)); \
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_s) > sizeof(long)); \
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