linux-kernel - [PATCH] KVM: SVM: Fix SEV LAUNCH

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Date:   Mon, 19 Feb 2018 10:13:25 -0600
From:   Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
To:     kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: SVM: Fix SEV LAUNCH_SECRET command

The SEV LAUNCH_SECRET command fails with error code 'invalid param'
because we missed filling the guest and header system physical address
while issuing the command.

Fixes: 9f5b5b950aa9 (KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_SECRET command)
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@...hat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index a2f1bb73640c..22fc3022386a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -6599,7 +6599,7 @@ static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	struct page **pages;
 	void *blob, *hdr;
 	unsigned long n;
-	int ret;
+	int ret, offset;
 
 	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
 		return -ENOTTY;
@@ -6625,6 +6625,10 @@ static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	if (!data)
 		goto e_unpin_memory;
 
+	offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+	data->guest_address = __sme_page_pa(pages[0]) + offset;
+	data->guest_len = params.guest_len;
+
 	blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
 	if (IS_ERR(blob)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(blob);
@@ -6639,8 +6643,8 @@ static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 		ret = PTR_ERR(hdr);
 		goto e_free_blob;
 	}
-	data->trans_address = __psp_pa(blob);
-	data->trans_len = params.trans_len;
+	data->hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
+	data->hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
 
 	data->handle = sev->handle;
 	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET, data, &argp->error);
-- 
2.14.3