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Message-ID: <20180221182104.GI3231@tassilo.jf.intel.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2018 10:21:04 -0800
From: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
"Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@...el.com>,
Joe Konno <joe.konno@...ux.intel.com>,
"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>,
Jeremy Kerr <jk@...abs.org>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>,
Peter Jones <pjones@...hat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
James Bottomley <james.bottomley@...senpartnership.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] fs/efivarfs: restrict inode permissions
> But it should be fairly easy to just add a 'struct ratelimit_state' to
> 'struct user_struct', and then you can easily just use
>
> '&file->f_cred->user->ratelimit'
>
> and you're done. Make sure the initial root user has it unlimited, and
> limit it to something reasonable for all other user allocations.
How about uid name spaces? Someone untrusted in a container could
create a lot of uids and switch between them.
A global rate limit seems better. While in theory it allows DoS
it's probably not worse than a lot of others we have with
other resources, and it's relatively harmless.
-Andi
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