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Message-ID: <20180227171419.3nlz23qzptvew2as@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 17:14:19 +0000
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
To: Benjamin Gaignard <benjamin.gaignard@...aro.org>
Cc: gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, robh+dt@...nel.org,
mcoquelin.stm32@...il.com, alexandre.torgue@...com,
devicetree@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Benjamin Gaignard <benjamin.gaignard@...com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] ARM: mach-stm32: Add Extended TrustZone Protection
driver
On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 03:09:26PM +0100, Benjamin Gaignard wrote:
+
> +static const u32 stm32mp1_ip_addr[] = {
> + 0x5c008000, /* 00 stgenc */
> + 0x54000000, /* 01 bkpsram */
> + 0x5c003000, /* 02 iwdg1 */
> + 0x5c000000, /* 03 usart1 */
> + 0x5c001000, /* 04 spi6 */
> + 0x5c002000, /* 05 i2c4 */
...
This duplicates information that is in the DT, which is unfortunate.
Why can these not be marked disabled inthe DT instead?
If it's dynamic form boot-to-boot, then the FW can probe this prior to
entering Linux, and patch the DT appropriately.
Thanks,
Mark.
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