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Message-ID: <CAKv+Gu-gs_HuRW2iuW4GA46USd9cNWiSVbU_efZCxgPWrHcrig@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2018 11:08:30 +0000
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>, jmorris@...ei.org,
jforbes@...hat.com, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Michael Kerrisk-manpages <mtk.manpages@...il.com>
Subject: Re: linux-next: UEFI Secure boot lockdown patchset
Hi David,
On 1 March 2018 at 11:06, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Stephen,
>
> Can you pull the following branch into linux-next please?
Could you please include a URL?
> It does three
> things:
>
> (1) It restricts various accesses userspace may make upon the kernel when the
> kernel is locked down.
>
> (2) It engages the lockdown if UEFI Secure Boot mode is detected.
>
> (3) It passes the UEFI Secure Boot mode indication across kexec.
>
> The restrictions include:
>
> - Enforcing the use of module signatures
> - Enforcing the use of kexec image signatures
> - Requring IMA to use secure boot rules
> - Disabling:
> - The kexec_load() syscall
> - Use of /dev/{mem,kmem,port,kcore}
> - Hibernation
> - PCI BAR access
> - Direct I/O port access
> - Preventing direct port specification in drivers:
> - SCSI EATA
> - TIOCSSERIAL
> - Module parameters
> - Restricting:
> - MSR access
> - Certain ACPI features
> - kprobes
> - BPF
> - Perf
> - Debugfs
>
> The aim of the restrictions is twofold:
>
> (1) Prevent userspace from altering the kernel image directly (eg. by
> /dev/mem) or indirectly (eg. by manipulating a device to do DMA);
>
> (2) Prevent userspace from accessing crypto data stored in the kernel
> (eg. filesystem keys).
>
> A warning is logged if a restriction is triggered for which I've written a
> manpage that is referenced in the message (see attached).
>
> David
>
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